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VOLUME III




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
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The *Harvard Theological Review* has been partially endowed by a bequest of the late Miss Mildred Everett, "for the establishment and maintenance of an undenominational theological review, to be edited under the direction of the Faculty of the Divinity School of Harvard University. . . . I make this provision in order to carry out a plan suggested by my late father, the Rev. Charles Carroll Everett." During the continuance of *The New World*, Dr. Everett was on its editorial board, and many of his essays, now collected in the volume entitled *Essays, Theological and Literary*, appeared first in its pages. Sharing his belief in the value of such a theological review, and in devotion to his honored memory, the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, of which he was a member from 1869, and its Dean from 1878 until his death in 1900, has accepted the trust, and will strive to make the *Review* a worthy memorial of his comprehensive thought and catholic spirit.

The *Review* is edited by a Committee of the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School consisting of Professors G. F. Moore, W. W. Fenn, and J. H. Ropes.



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HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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THE THEOLOGY OF CHARLES CARROLL EVERETT¹

WILLIAM W. FENN

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

It is related that Dr. Everett was once asked by the professor of systematics in another institution what subjects he found it possible to discuss in a non-denominational school of theology. The question was a silly one, for it assumed that in such a school no teacher gives utterance to the particular views which determine his own denominational affiliations, whereas, in Harvard at any rate, each instructor expresses without hesitation or reserve his entire thought, not seeking to present a composite picture but trusting that his instruction will blend with that of his colleagues to impress upon the minds of his students, whatever distinctive features they may finally adopt, the deep common lines of Christian faith. Characteristically, however, Dr. Everett did not point out the false presupposition of the question, but mentioned some of the principal topics considered in his lectures,—the nature of religion, the thought of God as Absolute Spirit, and the like,—to which the inquirer replied in some surprise, Why, we take all those things for granted. Dr. Everett answered mildly, I wish we could. It was a thoroughly charac-

¹ The more important of Dr. Everett's books are: *The Science of Thought*. Boston, William V. Spencer, 1869. Revised edition: Boston, De Wolfe, Fiske & Co., 1890. *Fichte's Science of Knowledge*. Chicago, S. C. Griggs & Co., 1884. *Poetry, Comedy, and Duty*. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1888. *The Gospel of Paul*. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1893. *Essays Theological and Literary*. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1901. *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, edited by Edward Hale. New York, Macmillan, 1902. *Theism and the Christian Faith*, edited by Edward Hale. New York, Macmillan, 1909.

teristic remark not only because of the humor of its gentle rebuke, so gentle that probably the victim did not realize that his head was off, but also on account of its utter fidelity to his own theory and practice. He did not take fundamental things for granted; hence it was that while students in other theological schools were articulating a body of divinity, Dr. Everett's pupils were searching into the deep things of the spirit. For he was, first of all, a philosopher whose religious nature made him a theologian. The twenty-fifth chapter, of the thirty-five which make up the recently published volume upon *Theism and the Christian Faith*, begins with the words, "It may seem as though we were only now beginning our examination of the content of Christian faith." Doubtless it would have seemed so to most of his contemporaries in theological chairs, but it was precisely in the relation between the Christian faith, as he conceived it, and the profound metaphysics of the preceding chapters, that Dr. Everett found the supreme worth of Christianity and the assurance of its absoluteness. The heart of a worshipper made the mind of a philosopher that of a Christian theologian.

This distinction appears likewise in the method of his work. He offered no array of proof-texts. Occasionally, indeed, he cited a passage from Scripture, but always by way of illustration and never, I think, as decisive argument. It is true that in his little book *The Gospel of Paul* he entered the realm of New Testament interpretation, but the theological aspect of the book is more valuable than the exegetical. Of some old-time preacher the story is told that his hearers once exclaimed, "He is preaching the Bible, for, see, he has it in his hand all the time." From such a point of view Dr. Everett's theology would not be deemed Biblical, and yet it actually was, in the sense that he thought and lived in the world of the spirit where the Bible took its rise. In a word, his theological method is that of the philosopher and not that of a Biblical exegete.

It is not at all improbable that readers of Dr. Everett's earlier volume of lectures will feel that in the later one there has been a change in orientation. Those who listened to the lectures in the class-room sometimes had, at first, a similar feeling. There seemed to be a transition from the world of Schleiermacher to that

of Hegel. Of the former he said: "No writer has had more influence on modern theological thought. He is one of the pillars of Hercules, with Hegel the other, that mark the entrance through which one passes into modern theology" (*Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 60), but it seemed as if the two courses hugged opposite shores. In the first, religion was defined as consisting primarily in feeling: it is true that in the description of the religious feeling Dr. Everett parted company with Schleiermacher, defining the feeling not as one of absolute dependence but as feeling first towards a supernatural presence, and then towards a supernatural presence manifesting itself not only in truth but also in goodness and beauty; nevertheless the general impression made was like that of Schleiermacher. But in the lectures on Theism and the Content of Christian Faith, a student was introduced at the outset into the Hegelian world. The plan of the course showed the characteristic division: first, ideal affirmation; then the moment of difference, with a distinction between the creator and the creature, which rises to a negation of the ideal of unity in freedom, and to actual antagonism in sin and evil considered as negations of the ideals of goodness and beauty respectively; and finally, the stage of reconciliation in a higher synthesis, with discussions of retribution, forgiveness, and atonement. In conclusion, Christianity was presented as the Absolute Religion because exemplifying this higher synthesis in its purest and noblest form. Moreover, the three ideas themselves were treated as examples of the dialectic: truth is that which is; goodness, that which ought to be; beauty, that which is as it ought to be.² And not merely in the great lines of the course, and in the concept of God as Absolute Spirit manifesting itself in the dialectic process, but also in the several and specific discussions, Hegel was everlastingly in evidence. It seemed a remarkable change from immediacy of feeling to reason with its dialectic, and students were occasionally somewhat bewildered by the transition. The difficulty is removed, however, neither by recognition that Schleiermacher sometimes hegelianizes, although that is true, nor by pointing out, as Dr. Royce once did, that the Hegelianism is more in form than in substance, but by the per-

² The *Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 200.

ception that with Dr. Everett feeling and reason are virtually identical. The religious feeling is that awakened by a supernatural presence manifesting itself in truth, goodness, and beauty, which are the three ideas inherent in reason. This point is so important, for a just appreciation of Dr. Everett's theology, that it must be brought out more plainly, and his practical identification of reason and feeling will become evident if we consider what he means by each of the terms.

If religion consists in feeling, Dr. Everett asks,³ shall we say that religion exists to make a man feel good or to make a man of good feeling? Manifestly, the answer is not in doubt, but the distinction marks an important and significant difference. An eminent physician once said with reference to a case presented to him for diagnosis, "I guess that the fundamental trouble is thus and so,—but of course you understand that this is a scientific guess." Now the difference between a superficial and a scientific guess is that the latter is the guess of a disciplined mind, trained in the realm in which the guess is made. The Yankee has often been derided for his much guessing, but his guesses have opened the way of advance just because it was a Yankee that was doing the guessing, and acting upon his guesses. The distinction is akin to that which Dr. Everett himself draws between fancy and imagination: ⁴ fancy is the dreaming of an untrained child, imagination is the same power working in a disciplined and scientific mind. Fancy may lead astray, but imagination is humanity's pioneer. Hence, when Dr. Everett speaks of the imagination as the essential faculty of religion,⁵ and of religion as "poetry believed in," he is but putting in another way the thought that religion consists primarily in feeling. A thoughtful man may feel that an argument is fallacious, even though at the moment he is unable to put his finger on the fallacy; a good man feels that a proposed course of conduct is wrong, although he may not be capable of exposing the speciousness of a plausible plea in its behalf; a man of aesthetic appreciation feels that a picture is poor, although he cannot logically justify his disapproval; a trained critic feels that his favorite author

³ The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith, p. 24.

⁴ Poetry, Comedy, and Duty, p. 4.

⁵ Ibid., p. 41.

cannot have written a certain passage, although tradition may ascribe it to him and no objective considerations contradict. In such cases, and they might be multiplied indefinitely, judgment is passed on the ground of the "feel" of things, notwithstanding the absence of logical warrant or intellectual demonstration. In a word, there are two kinds of feeling, lying one on the hither, the other on the thither, side of thought.⁶ The first kind Dr. Everett calls emotion, undifferentiated feeling, but the feeling which properly deserves the name is that which transcends the intellect, although resting upon it. Here, again, is the dialectic: first, feeling which is mere emotion; then the discriminating intellect which stands over against the feeling, producing in theology the conflict between the heart and the head; and finally the higher synthesis in which feeling and reason are one. This suggests the approach to the identity from the side of reason.

In a valuable essay,⁷ Dr. Everett distinguishes between reason and reasoning, holding that the former is intuitive in character, while the latter is discursive and analytic.⁸ It is the familiar difference between the reason and the understanding, or the intellect. We say occasionally, it stands to reason that a thing is thus or so, and it will usually be found, when such a statement is made, that decisive logical proof is lacking. To say that something stands to reason is not the same as to say that it stands by reasoning. Now according to Dr. Everett, reason consists in the intuition that something is harmonious with, or inconsistent with, truth, goodness, or beauty; it does not wait on the analytic understanding; it may, and often does, hold its ground in spite of it, for it comes with a certainty which the understanding can neither give nor take away. It is indeed a feeling, but a feeling which is held trustworthy because one cannot help trusting it. Thus the conflict between Schleiermacher and Hegel

⁶ See essay on Instinct and Reason, in *Essays Theological and Literary*, pp. 157 ff., especially p. 169.

⁷ Reason in Religion, in *Essays Theological and Literary*, pp. 1-29. Cf. also *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, pp. 145 ff.

⁸ "Reason is the faculty which discerns the inner unity." *Science of Thought*, p. 109. Cf. *Poetry, Comedy, and Duty*, p. 45. "The imagination gives us the Universe in its wholeness."

disappears before the three ideas of the reason which give reason its content and feeling, its distinguishing character for religion.

The use of the term "idea" as applied to truth, goodness, and beauty, may need brief explanation. It means not so much concept as form. The ideas of the reason are like the categories of the understanding; we may not be conscious of them as such, but we use them habitually, they underlie all our mental activity and are implicit in all its methods and conclusions. Perhaps this is as good a place as we shall find to point out a slight confusion attending Dr. Everett's use of these ideas. By truth he means unity,⁹ and the idea of truth is the universal and everlasting human tendency to reduce all things into order and system. Unfortunately, however, truth is used sometimes in this general sense and sometimes in the more specific sense of the operation of this unifying principle in the world of thought alone. It would not be unjust to Dr. Everett to say that with him the tendency to unity is the inherent principle of reason or spirit which shows itself in thought as truth, in social relations as goodness, and in feeling as beauty. There are obvious reasons why Dr. Everett did not make explicit this classification, chief among which perhaps was his feeling that classifications have more significance than is now commonly accorded them, but if we regard classification as a device for convenience, the scheme suggested will serve to make his meaning clearer and remove some intellectual embarrassments.

For example, the three ideas are usually treated as if they were equal and coördinate, nevertheless in *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith* (p. 149) it is said that "Goodness and Beauty are really manifestations of Truth, so that ultimately we have the one innate idea, the first idea of the reason." Similarly in *Theism and the Christian Faith* (p. 183) he declares that "an analysis of the three ideas shows that the idea of unity is the basis of the others." Thus Dr. Everett seems to lay himself open to the criticism he himself had passed upon Schleiermacher for putting freedom, an outgrowth of the sense of dependence, upon the same plane with it—"to place these two elements (primary and secondary) on the same plane is not properly to define" (*The Psy-*

⁹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 131.

chological Elements of Religious Faith, p. 80). Furthermore, in his own discussion of freedom, he gives the idea of goodness veto power over the idea of truth, which would seem to exalt a secondary over the primary element. The riddle is read, however, when we realize that although unity is fundamental, it is known to us only through its manifestations in respective realms. The trinity is an economic trinity.

Returning now to the three ideas of the reason, we must repeat that they appear as modes of activity earlier than as definite concepts, else their universal inherence could not be maintained. "The truth of the matter appears to be that we come into the world with certain instincts of activity, bodily and mental, and a faith by which we follow these instincts, confident that they will not deceive or mislead us" (*Science of Thought*, p. 122, cf. *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, pp. 42 ff., 153 ff.). Of course, a savage has no idea of vast systematic unity comprehending and systematizing all phenomena, the concept of a universe has not dawned upon him. Yet, to borrow one of Dr. Everett's apt illustrations, like the farmer who repudiated the idea that he wanted all the land there was, but confessed that he always coveted the field adjoining his, so the savage acts in such a way as to prove that the impulse towards all-embracing unity is present and operative within him. That he is animistic, indicates, first, that he seeks a cause for whatever sufficiently interests him to excite thought, and to seek a cause for anything signifies desire to take it out of its seeming isolation and bind it to something else (thus causation is an expression of that tendency towards unity), and, secondly,¹⁰ by supposing as cause a being like himself he is employing analogy, which, again, testifies to a constructive conviction of unity.¹¹ Thus, at the very beginning of mental life one finds evidence of the presence of this idea of unity as a form of activity. Similarly with goodness,¹² man at first has no theory of a social order which depends upon goodness and is its ultimate meaning, yet man is prone to act as a member of a

¹⁰ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 163.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

¹² *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 185. *Science of Thought*, pp. 143 ff.

tribe or clan, even as there is a jungle-law which wild beasts unconsciously obey. A savage, likewise, shows the rudiments of aesthetic taste in his habit of adornment,—bad taste, to be sure, but bad taste is still taste,—and thus testifies to the presence of an aesthetic tendency.¹³ There is a somewhat wistful glance towards Darwin's theory of sexual selection, as if Dr. Everett would gladly carry love of beauty down into the lower orders, but his main concern is with man and the phenomena of human life. Man's experience, then, is determined by impulses inborn within him, and when later he comes to the state of reflection, and strives to read the meaning of his experience, he attains to the intellectual recognition of the principles upon which he has all along been acting, and the ideas of the reason become definite and conscious concepts.

It follows, then, that these ideas of the reason have not been given man from without. They are in his experience, but, like the categories of the understanding (which are only their specific applications) they are elements of experience contributed from within. That is to say, they are supernatural in character, for Dr. Everett uses the word "supernatural"¹⁴ to denote that which is non-composite. "By 'nature' [he says] we mean the universe as a composite whole, and by 'supernatural' the non-composite unity in and through which this composite whole exists; the supernatural is not a disturbing influence apart from and over against the natural, but the absolute unity which manifests itself in and through the diversity of nature" (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 15). Here Dr. Everett aligns himself with those who virtually identify the supernatural and the personal. Objects in the material world are made up of atoms (so the theory ran before the atom became anachronistic), and can be disintegrated into their component parts, but man's impulse to unify cannot thus be compounded, since itself is present to effect the composition into unity of sensations and ideas. Goodness, too, is not the sum of acts, but reaches its perfection in love, which is a creative principle of conduct and hence an inner bond of unity. "The filthy rags of our own righteousness," Dr.

¹³ *Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 181.

¹⁴ Cf. *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith*, p. 89.

Everett used to say, "yes, our separated moralities are rags, and filthy rags, compared with the seamless robe of love in which is the life of the spirit." Goodness finds its fulfilment in love, which is more than goodness conceived as morality. Beauty, also, is not the product of analysis; we do not appreciate beauty by first evaluating the various parts of an object and then pronouncing the sum of the parts beautiful. On the contrary, beauty lies in the intuitive perception of the whole upon which the parts depend, and in its consummate form is the divination of a living presence animating nature with which man is capable of communion. Truth, goodness, beauty, then, these are supernatural elements in man, and religion consists in the feelings appropriate to these ideas when man believes himself in the presence of a supernatural being, of whom, because He is supernatural, these ideas are the manifestations. Or, to put it more concretely and accurately, because these supernatural elements are in man they are in the world also, and that man is incurably religious is the supreme testimony to their universal presence. And this leads us to a more detailed exposition of Dr. Everett's theology.

How can it be shown that these elements in man witness to their existence in the world beyond him? How can psychology pass over into theology? To this crucial question there are various answers, some of which must be mentioned. First of all, then, how do we know that there is anything beyond our own consciousness at all? Why should we not reduce all science to psychology, as some are inclined to do? But the fact is that man naturally and normally approaches the world in good faith;¹⁵ if he has certain sensations, he takes it for granted that there are objects, corresponding to those sensations, which carry for him the possibility of further experience. No man doubts the objective reality of things until he sips of the Pierian spring. Then the philosophical problem vexes him, the world of consciousness and the world of material things stand over against each other, and between the two is a great gulf fixed. When the question has once arisen, there seems to be no answer possible save a resort to the primitive good faith, which now, however, has

¹⁵ *Science of Thought*, pp. 122 ff.

become sophisticated and may be called simply faith. The intellect has raised a question it is incompetent to answer, but even in our deepest doubt we practically take the world in good faith, a convinced solipsist sets out to convert the world, and it is for philosophy to baptize at its font the primitive good faith of the child. But if we thus take our sensations at their face-value, if we trust our powers of perception, why may we not legitimately extend this good faith to cover all our experiences, and all our powers, including the religious? If we do think, and must think, in certain ways, why should we argue that because these forms are ours, they are therefore ours alone? Why not rather take it for granted, until the contrary has been proved, that they are ours because they pertain also to that larger world in which our lot is cast and with which our experience has to do? Thus, the good faith which gives us a world at all gives us also a world wherein truth, goodness, and beauty, are real as they are real in us.

And, secondly, this good faith finds confirmation in various ways. The fact that action dictated by the impulse to unity gives us the experience we ought to have if the mysterious world were indeed the home of unity, furnishes strong corroboration. Again, if man is really a part of this world then whatever is in him is also in the world, and, if we hold to the notion of evolution, it is but a natural inference that what is patent in man was latent in the world which has produced him as distinct but undivided part. Or, to put it otherwise, and more superficially, if these elements in man were not present in the world, then action dictated by them would put man out of harmony with his environment with disastrous results. The fact that in the world man, in whom these three ideas exist as modes of activity, has arisen, developed, and maintained himself, is good evidence in support of faith.

But with such answers Dr. Everett was not quite content, for, as has been said, he was most of all a philosopher and a metaphysician. We have these three ideas, our good faith in the world requires that it shall correspond to them, but how is such a world to be conceived? The world of space and time is not a world of unity, therefore the world of space and time cannot

meet our demands. Unity in space can be realized only when each finds itself in its other, unity in time when identity is preserved through the changes so that the present gathers up into itself the past. Then it is plain that only in the world of conscious spirit can the demand of unity find its realization. For the very nature of consciousness is to find oneself in the opposite, and only in memory does the past live and identity consist. If, then, we are to trust our tendency to unity,—and, be it observed, we do trust it in every moment of our lives and in every action whether instinctive or deliberate,—we must conceive of the world under the forms not of space and time but of conscious spirit. The world then is spiritual, even as man is spiritual, and only in absolute spirit does the ideal of unity find its fulfilment. Similarly with the ideal of goodness; with respect to goodness conceived as morality, there is an apparently irreducible antinomy, for if goodness have any reason beyond itself, it cannot be absolute, and if it have no such reason, it must be pronounced arbitrary and capricious; but this antinomy is resolved by the recognition that love is more than morality, and hence the second ideal of the reason leads us to conceive of the Absolute Spirit as “good and more than good,” even as perfect love. Finally, since beauty is the expression of the ideal in the actual, the thought of God as the Spirit manifest in all carries with it the conviction of the glory of God in an ordered creation. This is Dr. Everett’s form of the *a priori* argument; we cannot help believing in our ideal of unity, therefore we cannot help believing in Absolute Spirit which alone satisfies that ideal, without which indeed it could have no validity. Thus the three ideas of truth, goodness, and beauty, find their fulfilment only in the Absolute Spirit, in whom they are inherent and constitutive, even as they are in the finite human spirit. It follows, therefore, that whatever can be truly said concerning this Absolute Spirit must be in harmony with truth, goodness, beauty, and since the Spirit is one, even as the life of the tree is one with the life of the least and outermost leaf, whatever is consistent with these ideas in man may safely be attributed to God.

But this is a growing world, and man is a growing man;

his tendency to unity finds fulfilment in no system; his ideal of goodness has different concrete exemplifications from age to age and from race to race; his ideal of beauty creates one school of art after another,—are not these ideas, then, quite abstract and, because abstract, worthless? How, then, is it possible to reason from a man and a world in process to God? The answer is that our thought of God is and can be only a *Vorstellung*. But, indeed, all our ideas have both an individual and a universal element, and the latter always tends to burst the confines of the former. Because of this universal element, therefore, every idea is dynamic instead of static, our idea of God among the rest. Yet our idea of God may have the same value as other ideas, provided like them it is recognized only as an approximation destined inevitably to negate itself in the dialectic process toward a larger and truer thought.

Now, however, the deeper question comes, how this manifold world with its flux and change stands related to the One who is eternal. It is the old baffling problem—how out of the One has come the many, out of the changeless the changing, out of all-embracing truth individual error, out of perfection sin and suffering? It is in reality the problem of creation which Dr. Everett discusses at length and in detail. Without following the intricacies of the discussion, we may simply note in passing that Dr. Everett holds to what he describes as the philosophical, instead of the more common theological, view that creation is a manifestation of spirit and hence eternal, since of two antithetical terms one must be as real and as enduring as the other. Nevertheless, he insists with apparent inconsistency that “the gulf between the material world and the very germ of consciousness is absolute,” although in the next sentence he adds, “It is like a magnet,—a single grain of the magnetic stone will have its two poles with the absolute antithesis between them” (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 159). But, in any event, this antithesis between matter and spirit involves the absolute dependence of the world upon God which satisfies all the interest that religion has in a theory of creation. Hence it follows that spirit is not abstract but of concrete fulness, the One does not cancel the many but includes the manifold con-

creteness, the imperfect is taken up as an element into the perfect. The world is a world of process just because of the immanent dialectic of spirit—if it were not a world of process it could not be a manifestation of Spirit, whose very being is life and process. The Hegelian insists that since goodness consists in victory over evil, there could be no goodness unless there were evil to be vanquished; consequently, so far from the presence of evil in the world being an objection to Theism, we could not believe in a good God in any other kind of a world. Dr. Everett demurs at this, holding that the possibility of evil would suffice for the argument, and not its actuality,¹⁶ but he does rest in the assurance that, since spirit is what it is, a world created by and dependent upon Spirit, its manifestation, must necessarily be a world of process. The only important question is whether the world reveals the supremacy of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.

At this point in his unfolding thought, Dr. Everett introduces a discussion of evolution by natural selection. It is conceded that the method is of slight consequence, provided only the ideas of the reason appear as supreme. From what has already been said it is evident that the success of activity unwittingly dictated by the ideas, and, after conscious recognition and adoption of them, the firmer consistency and progressive enlargement of life loyal to their demands, amply satisfy the needs of his discussion. These facts also seem to prove the presence of a teleological principle in the world. "From the first nature has been an idealist. That is, the ideas which we claim, whether rightly or wrongly, are in some sense innate in the spirit, have been innate in nature itself . . . through the working of the material forces, these ideas have been the ruling principle to which the material world has been subject" (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 186). It is manifest that from Dr. Everett's point of view it is absolutely essential that the world should disclose in its process the dialectic of spirit. The teleological principle must be exhibited. After arguing that ultimately there must be a choice between chance and teleology, Dr. Everett pleads that the present outcome of the

¹⁶ *Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 260.

process is of such a character that chance must be pronounced an impossible explanation. Furthermore, he argues, to produce the unity which is the distinctive mark of spirit from the discreteness which is the distinguishing characteristic of matter, atomically considered, is an absolute inconceivability. Teleology, then, remains, although the care with which his statements on this subject are guarded is very noticeable. He will not speak of design, for that seems to him to go beyond the facts; he insists only upon a teleological principle, or impulse, in things having truth, goodness, and beauty, as final causes.

It is this teleological principle in the universe, conceived as the dialectic of the Spirit, which governs Dr. Everett's treatment of the more specific theological problems. This may be shown by reference to the discussions concerning hamartiology and Christology. The question of Determinism falls under the first of these categories because of the assumption that moral responsibility depends upon individual freedom, so that unless some amount of freedom be acknowledged sin and salvation become meaningless terms. But the difficulty is to find enough freedom to enable man to become a sinner. After thorough discussion of the opposing arguments, in which, however, the argument for freedom based on consciousness is perhaps too summarily dismissed, the question is reduced to an antinomy between the first and the second idea of the reason; truth seems to demand a unity wherein freedom is impossible, but goodness requires individual initiative and responsibility. If this antinomy be irreducible, the assertion is that the idea of goodness must be held decisive, since in such matters the practical reason is more likely to be true than the theoretical,¹⁸ but an analysis of the meaning of freedom and our desire for it, leads to the recognition of an absolute freedom reconciling real and formal freedom. In so far as man is at one with the Absolute Spirit he has real freedom in the expression of inner purpose, and formal freedom because his will is at one with the will of God. And man has power to win or not to win this absolute freedom by the amount of earnestness he puts into life. "A man is under restraint everywhere; whatever the immediate sphere in which

¹⁸ Theism and the Christian Faith, p. 226.

he finds himself, he is bound by the laws of that sphere. But by greater earnestness of life, he may pass from one sphere into another. . . . The owner of a music-box cannot change its tunes, but he can determine which of those tunes shall be played. A man in a balloon is in a certain sense at the mercy of atmospheric currents, but these currents move in different directions at different heights, and the aëronaut can cause his balloon to rise or fall from one current to another" (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 229).

Manifestly, this conclusion satisfies neither side in the great debate: indeed, the determinist may justly protest that it begs the whole question by assuming that man has power over his own earnestness, ability to rise from one level to another, if indeed the stratification appealed to is not completely subversive of the principle of unity. On the other hand, a believer in freedom may marvel that where any freedom at all is granted, and the contradictory principle so far denied, more freedom is not claimed. A modern aëronaut is by no means at the mercy of the air-currents. Our present business, however, is not to criticise but to expound, and from Dr. Everett's point of view it is plain that since the Spirit is onward-pressing, sin consists in failure to rise to ever higher levels of life. In a word, sin is inertia. Man's real being and destiny is to live and grow in obedience to the immanent Spirit, if he fail to respond to this inner impulse he is in a state of sin. Sin is regarded, therefore, as a state rather than an act, sins are but manifestations of this inert, unprogressive condition. It is negative, because it means the absence of the animating and directing principle which should be present. It is selfishness, because the Spirit which should prevail is universal, and by denying it man falls into the isolation of his merely individual interests. It is death, because in death the organism is at the mercy of the environment which disintegrates its unity, while life means the supremacy of a principle superior to the natural environment. From this it follows that the penalty of sin is deeper sin. "We find the complete punishment of sin only in sin itself, either a deeper sin or, if there is repentance, in the pain of struggle with which sin is relinquished" (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 298).

In sin, therefore, there is a breach between man and the Spirit, a breach which religion has sought to heal in various ways, notably by sacrifice. But Christianity professes to close the chasm without the aid of sacrifice, and by its effect upon those who receive it amply justifies its claim. How, then, is the reconciliation accomplished by Christianity? The outcome of a rather disproportionately long discussion of the doctrine of the Atonement is that no theory can be considered Orthodox; that is, none has thoroughly and universally commended itself to the Christian consciousness; hence no particular theory can be deemed essential for the production of harmony, and, therefore, no doctrine of the atonement is essential. Dr. Everett's view is that since in the life of Jesus, and in his teaching concerning the fatherhood of God and the sonship of man, the teleological principle which is at the heart of all finds perfect expression, Jesus appeals persuasively to the spirit in every man, which when thus quickened effects the inner reconciliation.

Thus we are brought naturally to a consideration of Christ and Christianity. The discussion of the Trinity is rather surprisingly brief. Explicit reference is made only to the theories of Augustine, Shedd, and Dorner, of the last of which it is said: "If this is the doctrine of the Trinity, then every theist is a Trinitarian. But Dorner's statement does not satisfy the historical conception of the Trinity" (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 325). Declaring that historically the doctrine was developed from a Scriptural basis, he goes on, with no careful canvassing of the evidence, to affirm that "the nearest approach to the New Testament position, considered as a whole, is found in the Arian doctrine" (*ibid.*, p. 326). The treatment of the doctrine of the Incarnation, by which is meant the dual nature of Christ, is even more unsatisfactory, but Dr. Everett's statement of his own view is clear and definite. Given a teleological principle in the world, we should expect to find prophetic personalities appearing in whom that principle finds more perfect expression than in the mass of mankind, who for this very reason become leaders of their fellows. Just because the spirit which is more abundant in them abides in the breasts of all men, these leaders are not alien to their kind, neither is their voice that of

a stranger. On the contrary, their presence and teaching sharpen and fortify the ideal which each man vaguely and dimly cherishes; therefore they lead by human right and by no official status. Such anticipative personalities one finds in all departments of life—they are the geniuses in art and letters, in science and state-craft. Such a man was Jesus in religion; in him the teleological principle in the world showed at what it had all along been aiming. Hence he is the leader of the race just because he leads (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 361).

Moreover, Jesus came of the Hebrew race as the flowering of a long historical development. The more intimately therefore he is related to the process in the life and thought of Israel, the more evident it becomes that this national process is a replica, diminished to scale, of the process of the Spirit in humanity. That process is a process of revelation, consequently the unfolding of Hebrew history is revelation. In the Bible one finds the record of that revelation, which, as chronicling revelation, may itself also justly be deemed revelation, the more since its writers were men in whom the immanent teleological principle peculiarly resided. Hence Christianity, the religion of Jesus, being at once the consummation of the process in Israel and in humanity, is the Absolute Religion which can no more be surpassed than can the personality of its founder.

At this point one naturally asks, what is meant by Christianity—is it the religion of Jesus himself, or is it the religion which under widely different forms the world has called by the one name? Dr. Everett answers the question by emphasizing historic continuity. The Christian stream of influence proceeds from Jesus and, however many its affluents, still preserves its identity. It has proved the dominating power: influenced by the Mazdean religion, which next to the Jewish was the best embodiment among the religions of the world of the teleological principle, it nevertheless showed its preëminence by taking the influence up into itself instead of being absorbed by it. So reinforced, the stream received what was in harmony with its essential character and interpenetrated all with its transforming power. To say that Christianity is the absolute religion, however, does not mean that now or at any previous time it is or has

been perfect. That it is more perfect than any other religion known to us is affirmed as matter of fact, notwithstanding a popular prejudice against such a position,—a prejudice which amiably blurs all distinctions and cancels differences,—but it is argued that absoluteness does not imply perfection. Absoluteness, that is, consists in the fact that “it presents the sphere, it lays down the limits, within which development and progress are to take place, just as in the law of gravitation are laid down the limits within which the study of the heavenly bodies is to be pursued. Christianity is not perfect, but it contains within itself the possibility of an infinite development, which must however take place along the lines and in the direction that are indicated by it” (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 345). That is to say, within Christianity is room for the perfect expression of all three ideas of the reason, which other religions of the world express severally and often in mutual opposition. There is unity in the doctrine of the interpretation of the human by the divine, goodness in the harmonious blending of religion and ethics in the perfection of love, beauty in the vision of the world as manifesting in ever-growing completeness an ideal life until its consummate exhibition appears in the personality of Jesus. It does not therefore follow that all will become Christian in name or that all religions will merge in Christianity. Whether or no that will be the event, time alone can determine. Yet in the universal and intuitive character of its principles, in the personality of its founder as an ideal for all lives and a symbol of the essential nature both of the religion and of humanity, and in the organization of the church, Christianity has advantages which make it improbable that any religion will surpass it.

From the whole character of Dr. Everett's thought his attitude towards immortality may be easily forecasted. After a terse but trenchant survey of the arguments for and against, he finds assurance of immortality in its compatibility with his general world-view. All along he has rested upon the Hegelian principle of the process from unity through differentiation into a higher, synthetic unity, and now the argument is that if the individuals in whom the Absolute has found manifestation

merely fall back again into the original unity, the process lacks its third and culminating stage, which is realized only if the individuals, as such, return to their source in the higher way of fellowship and love. This is but a more technical way of putting the argument from the theistic world-view. "I hardly understand how one who has real faith in God, can have serious doubt in regard to the immortality of the spirit. . . . If we grant the existence of God, then the fact that the individual is conscious of the divine life, and feels that his own life is rooted in it, makes the thought of immortality in one aspect easy if not necessary, while the fact that an infinite sphere is provided in which the spirit may dwell when severed from the material world, removes the difficulty of the belief in another aspect" (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, pp. 478-9).

Perhaps we may best review the course of Dr. Everett's thought by recapitulating the six definitions of religion which like milestones mark the stages of his advance. He begins with an inclusive and ends with a typical definition; the first is intended to include all phenomena that may properly be called religious, the last is designed to describe religion at its best. First, then, religion is defined as "feeling, or essentially feeling." Here he enters upon Schleiermacher's path, recognizing, however, that feeling can never exist wholly apart from thought and will, but insisting that in religion feeling takes the accent. But in defining the character of the feeling, he presents his second definition, "Religion is essentially feeling towards the supernatural." By the supernatural he means, as has previously been said, that which is non-composite. The savage does not worship the fetich as such, but rather the mysterious power akin to himself which is present in the fetich or somehow associated with it. A closer definition of the supernatural, or better a careful inquiry into what is supernatural, leading to a discrimination between the supernatural considered negatively, as superstition, and positively, as religion properly so called, followed by a consideration of the various higher religions of the world (to which his course on comparative religion was devoted), yields a third definition, "Religion is essentially feeling towards a supernatural presence manifesting itself in Truth,

Goodness, and Beauty." At this point the lectures published in *Theism and the Christian Faith* take up the discussion, and by a profound study of the implications and requirements of these ideas of the reason justify substitution in the fourth definition of the word "spiritual" for "supernatural". Here he enters the broad highway of theological progress. In man spirit is partially and imperfectly manifest, but truth, goodness, and beauty in him testify to their perfection in absolute Spirit, wherein alone they are capable of full realization. This perfect Spirit is in the world as a teleological principle which has reached its consummate issue in the personality of Jesus. Hence we have the fifth definition, "Religion is essentially a feeling toward a spiritual presence manifesting itself in Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, especially as illustrated in the life and teachings of Jesus." Yet, inasmuch as the spirit that was in him is also in all, he is the first-born among many brethren, and in ever-increasing numbers men accept his way of life and approach his personality, realizing in themselves the universal spirit. Consequently we have the sixth and final definition, "Religion is essentially feeling towards a spiritual presence manifesting itself in Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, especially as illustrated in the life and teaching of Jesus and as experienced in every soul that is open to its influence."

One of the most brilliant among younger philosophical writers in America has recently referred to Dr. Everett as an "old-fashioned teacher." Although other pupils of Dr. Everett may resent the term, it must be conceded that it is not indefensible. He was old-fashioned in his manner of teaching. In his lectures there was no splutter of epigrammatic paradoxes, such as one hears from many teachers and writers of the modern school. His lectures moved with smooth and gentle flow, so evenly in fact that often his most important teachings seemed almost to slip from him casually, and the full import of his unemphasized sentences was not immediately discerned. Yet if wit was lacking there was often a touch of subtle humor so subtle that it frequently passed unnoticed at the time. It must be acknowledged, too, that in substance and method there was something which may fairly be called old-fashioned, now that

Hegelianism is out of vogue and the Absolute is almost everywhere spoken against. A great deal of water has flowed under philosophical and theological bridges since his thought took form. We hear of truth as expediency, of the mind as merely an instrument by which adjustments to environment may be more speedily and surely effected, of a pluralistic universe, and the like, all of which seems alien to his thought. Nevertheless, it is not so certain that there were not fundamental, if the term had not acquired other associations one would rather say radical, elements in his thought which are congenial with recent developments, and, perhaps one may be permitted to add, corrective of them. The most general description of the present philosophical movement would be to say that it has been from intellectualism to voluntarism, from the static to the dynamic view. It is true that in Dr. Everett's system the static quality often seems to predominate, but it is only in seeming, for his emphasis upon the teleological principle was constant, and the notion of process everywhere prevails. Perhaps if unity should be defined by the category of purpose (and such a definition would be essentially true to his thought), he might be more manifestly in harmony with present tendencies. One of his colleagues in the philosophical department of Harvard said soon after his death, that Dr. Everett seemed to him in a process of intellectual transition, and it would have been interesting to see whither a few more years of mental activity would have led him. It may be doubted whether there would have been any change in the creative principles of his thinking, indeed whether there would have been need of any. His recognition of the three ideals of the reason as modes of activity opens a most interesting vista along which, as he journeyed, he would have found many modern companions. Certain recent discussions of beauty, a subject to which he gave much attention, deeming it one of great significance too often neglected by theologians to the detriment of their science, read like Dr. Everett's thought translated into a different dialect and with new orientation. Upon this point, however, we cannot dwell here; it is enough to suggest that perhaps a studious reading of Dr. Everett will reveal that notwithstanding the "old-fashioned

habit of his mind" his thinking puts him among the moderns in philosophy.

A somewhat similar remark must be made about his theology. Dr. Everett was a Unitarian in his denominational relations. The fact is mentioned not merely because it is a fact but because I am sure he would have been glad to have it stated here, and because in existing circumstances, here in New England where he lived and taught, it has exceptional significance. Unitarianism in New England has already had two distinct phases of theological thought and seems about to enter upon a third. The earlier, pre-transcendental phase was rationalistic in character, but, largely through the influence of Emerson and others of the same way of thinking, the mystical elements which, as has recently been shown, were present in the thought of Channing, were vivified and came to the front, thus introducing the second phase of New England Unitarianism. When Dr. Everett began his theological career these two phases were coexistent and in antagonism, threatening to disrupt the fellowship. He recognized the opposition, but interpreted it as one of the antitheses in which his soul delighted. It was essentially a conflict between common-sense and mystical theology, and the bent of his mind was decisively towards the latter, and this although he expressly declares that the former has been represented by the Socinians and kindred schools, while the latter has been "more prominent in the so-called Orthodox belief of Christianity" (*Theism and the Christian Faith*, p. 18). In his emphasis upon the Spirit,—he was accustomed to declare the doctrine of the Holy Spirit the most significant doctrine of Christianity,—he was at one with the mystical school, and in his doctrine of the immanence of the Spirit as a teleological principle he exalted the reason of the rationalists into something higher and finer. It is not extreme to say that his own theological thought furnished the synthesis in which each of the elements in his own communion found its fulfilment. In the circumstances it was of inestimable benefit to Unitarianism that, in the non-denominational school where most of its ministers studied, the intellectual and personal influence of Dr. Everett was supreme. But his service was of much wider range. A prom-

inent Trinitarian Congregational clergyman of New England has said that he owes it to Dr. Everett that he became able to remain philosophically and sincerely a Trinitarian. On the other hand more than one pupil of Dr. Everett entered his classroom a Trinitarian and came out a Unitarian. But it should be added that in either case the Trinitarianism or the Unitarianism was of a peculiar type. This would seem to imply, what indeed is probably the case, that in Dr. Everett's theology there were principles which, carried to their fulfilment, mean a higher synthesis of religious thought in which Unitarian and Trinitarian may yet be at one.

*MODERNISM AND CATHOLICISM*¹

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In the instrument providing for the endowment of the series of lectures which bears his name Judge Dudley directed that the third lecture should be for "The Detecting and Convicting and Exposing the Idolatry of the Romish Church, their Tyranny, Usurpations, Damnable Heresies, Fatal Errors, Abominable Superstitions, and other Crying Wickednesses in their high places; and finally that the Church of Rome is that mystical Babylon, that man of sin, that apostate Church, spoken of in the New Testament."

It is upon this topic that I am to speak this evening. The times have changed since the lectureship was founded in 1750. Many of the animosities of the fathers are no longer felt by us, and particularly in religious matters union has taken the place of division, sympathy of hostility, coöperation of rivalry. We are interested in other things. Our sense of proportion has changed. We are farther away from the days of persecution, and less nervous about many movements and institutions that our fathers dreaded unspeakably. The spirit of toleration has taken hold upon us all, and Protestants can think and speak kindly of men of other faiths, and can coöperate gladly and heartily with them as opportunity offers for the promotion of good ends dear to them all.

With this spirit I am myself in cordial sympathy, and it is as an historian, not as a polemic, that I shall treat the subject assigned me. I wish to consider as dispassionately as possible the great system that still remains essentially unchanged, in spite of all the vicissitudes that have overtaken the affairs of men since Judge Dudley made his will a hundred and fifty years ago.

¹ The Dudleian Lecture, delivered at Harvard University, May 13, 1909.

The present situation in the Roman Catholic church caused by the open conflict between conservative and liberal tendencies within its communion is most interesting and instructive. Not since the sixteenth century has there been so splendid an opportunity and so pressing an invitation to study the nature of Catholicism as exhibited in its greatest exponent the Roman Catholic church.

The so-called modernist movement is a very complicated phenomenon, appearing in different forms in Germany, France, Italy, England, and America.² It is not the fruit of any single principle, nor the expression of any single philosophy. The endeavor to embrace it within the compass of a single formula is foredoomed to failure. One may describe with accuracy the positions of some particular modernists, and others may claim with perfect right that the description does not fit them. The situation is the same in the Protestant world. No formula can possibly be invented that will cover all the Protestant liberals of the day, or even any large number of them. Some are moved by one interest, some by another. Some repudiate this feature of the old system, others that. In their constructive work some follow one line of thought, others another, while many do not attempt to construct at all, but content themselves wholly with criticism, Biblical and historical. It is as difficult to describe Roman Catholic modernism as it is to describe Protestant liberalism. The two are the outgrowth of the same general situation, and both reveal the effort, in varying degrees and more or less consciously, to adjust their religious ideas and their theological thinking to the modern world in which they live. Some are historically, others philosophically or theologically or socially or politically, interested. All are more or less out of sympathy with

² Books and articles dealing with the movement are very numerous and are continually appearing. Among them the brief work by Holl, *Modernismus*, 1908, in the *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*, and the longer work by Kübel, *Geschichte der Katholischen Modernismus*, 1909, are perhaps the best general accounts. Lilley's *Modernism: a Record and Review*, 1908, is also useful, especially for its bibliography; and some of the writings of the Abbé Houtin are particularly important for the growth of the movement in France (*L'Américanisme*, 1904; *La question biblique chez les catholiques de France au XIX^e siècle* 1902; *La question biblique au XX^e siècle*, 1906; *La crise du clergé*, 1907). For Italy the *Lettere di un prete modernista* (Rome, 1908) is instructive.

traditional modes of thought and traditional ways of looking at things, and the common interest that binds them all together, if there be any such, and justifies us in speaking of a common movement, is the desire to bring about a better adjustment between Christianity and the modern world. Roman Catholic modernism cannot possibly be understood unless it be brought into intimate connection with similar tendencies within Protestantism. The modernists may protest, and with perfect right, against being identified with Protestant liberals. But, fundamental as are the differences that separate them, Catholic modernists as well as Protestant liberals are children of the modern age, and both feel in their own peculiar way the influence of modern tendencies. The new scientific spirit, the new historical sense and the new methods of historical criticism, the new psychological interest, the new emphasis on evolution, the new estimate of nature and the supernatural, in general the new way of looking at the universe, all this has made itself felt within Catholic as well as Protestant circles, and the result has been similar in both. The effects have naturally been present more widely and for a longer time within Protestantism than within Catholicism. It was easier for the new spirit to penetrate the former than the latter. Not only was the one divided and unorganized, while the other was a compact and centralized whole, but the one was, at least in theory, a child of the modern age and open to its influences, while the other was in theory irrevocably bound to an ancient past.

But what has long been happening in Protestantism has now begun to happen in Catholicism. The new spirit has not only penetrated the church but it has come to conscious and vigorous expression, and the result is controversy and condemnation in the one case as in the other. To regard the Roman Catholic modernists as mere followers or imitators of liberal Protestants would be grossly unjust. Influence of one kind and another there may have been, but the modernists are Catholics, not Protestants, and they have read the message of the modern age in their own way. Its spirit has spoken as directly to them as to any Protestant, and by training and temperament they have been fitted to learn from it lessons that no genuine Protestant

could have understood. They have been accused of crypto-protestantism or of being only Protestants in disguise. The Roman Catholic authorities have denounced them as wolves in sheep's clothing, and Protestants have wondered why they do not come out of the old church and throw in their fortunes with one or another Protestant sect. But this means a complete misunderstanding of their attitude, even more complete than has been widely manifested in connection with various Protestant liberals who have happened to be members of conservative denominations. Both by orthodox and radicals they, too, have been denounced because they did not withdraw and go where they belonged. But they believed they belonged where they were, and even more emphatically it may be said that the Roman Catholic modernists believe themselves to belong in the bosom of Mother Church. They count themselves still loyal, faithful, and devout Catholics. Their reading of Christianity in the light of the modern spirit has not, they think, made them Protestants. On the contrary it has made them more truly Catholic than ever; and why then should they go out? Are they not called rather to minister the new light and the new life to the church to which with heart and soul they belong? Only as we appreciate and sympathize with their attitude in this matter can we understand them and do them justice at other points.

We must distinguish Catholic modernists and Protestant liberals from those, of whom there are many, who have been driven by the influence of modern thought to break altogether with Christianity, or at any rate with the Christian church; who have recognized the lack of harmony between the old and the new, but, instead of trying to readjust or reconstruct, have simply given the thing up and turned to other interests, believing readjustment and reconstruction impossible or not worth while. The religious views of some of these men may be not unlike those of modernists and liberals, but their attitude toward Christianity and the church is very different, and the two classes must not be confounded. The modernists are within the church, not without it, and they apparently propose to remain within it, believing that Catholic Christianity is essentially in harmony with modern thought and has a message for

the modern world. Had their attitude been other than this, had they recognized a necessary incompatibility between their own views and Catholic Christianity and withdrawn from the Catholic church, no controversy would have resulted. It is because they have remained within, and have thereby challenged the traditional view of the nature of Christianity and of the church, that the conflict has come.

What, then, is the controversy about? What are the positions of the modernists at which the Roman Catholic authorities have chiefly taken offence? In the famous papal encyclical *Pascendi Dominici Gregis* of September, 1907, there is an elaborate description of the modernist views against which the encyclical is aimed. It has been denounced by leading modernists as utterly unjust. In the very nature of the case any summary of such a complex movement must be unsatisfactory, particularly to the representatives of the movement itself. And yet an impartial observer can hardly fail to recognize that the encyclical contains on the whole an admirable diagnosis of the situation. The account, to be sure, is too schematic. Too much emphasis is laid on philosophy and too little on historical criticism. The theological opinions of perhaps no single modernist are accurately reflected in the document, and certainly much less than justice is done to the personal motives of those condemned. But a number of tendencies which have made themselves felt in one and another way and in greater or less degree in the thinking of many modernists are here depicted, in spite of some exaggeration and of a natural lack of sympathy, with adequate correctness on the whole.

Many replies to the encyclical have been written by modernists. Among them Abbé Loisy's *Simple réflexions*, the anonymous *Lendemains d'encyclique*, and, most important of all, because of the clear and systematic presentation of the matters in which the modernists themselves are chiefly interested, the *Programme of Modernism*, which appeared anonymously in Italian and has been translated into English and widely circulated.

The modernist movement, as has been said, is a very complicated thing and comprehends a great variety of interests and opinions. At the same time there are certain positions, inti-

mately related to each other and representing a common spirit, which appear and reappear in modernist writings. Among them are such as the following, to which I can only refer in passing.

First of all, Biblical and historical criticism. Undoubtedly this had much to do with the inception of the movement, although its influence is perhaps somewhat exaggerated by Loisy and the authors of the *Programme of Modernism* and of *LeSedemains d'encyclique*. In the field of literary and historical criticism some of the modernists are as radical as any of our leading Protestant scholars.³ The Bible is taken to be a record of religious experience, and its value thought to lie not in its infallibility and dogmatic authority but in the fact that it induces religious faith and life in us.⁴

The old idea of fixity and permanence in the religious and theological realm has been displaced by the idea of growth and development. Where the traditionalists have a closed system, the modernists are commonly standing for change and progress.⁵ In general it may be said that the modern dynamic conception of the universe has taken the place of the static conception.

God is widely thought of as immanent in man and the world, and the old contrast between the natural and the supernatural tends to disappear altogether.⁶ Accordingly, the external and mechanical idea of revelation is abandoned, and religious truth is conceived not as something given from without but discovered through human experience.⁷

³ Compare for instance the numerous writings of the Abbé Loisy and some of the historical works of the Abbé Duchesne; also the brief summary in the *Programme of Modernism*, pp. 23 f.

⁴ Loisy, *Simple réflexions*, pp. 47 f., *Quelques lettres*, pp. 145 f.; *Programme of Modernism*, pp. 59 f.

⁵ Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church* (English translation of *L'évangile et l'église*), pp. 166 f., 214 f.; LeRoy, *Dogme et critique*, pp. 275 f., 355 f. It is worthy of remark that the philosophy of Henri Bergson has had large influence over the thinking of some of the French modernists, notably LeRoy.

⁶ Loisy, *Quelques lettres*, pp. 45 f., 149 f.; Laberthonnière, *Essais de philosophie religieuse* and *Le réalisme chrétien et l'idéalisme grec*, pp. 106 f.

⁷ Loisy, *Autour d'un petit livre*, pp. 195 f., *Simple réflexions*, pp. 61, 159; LeRoy, *Dogme et critique*, pp. 63 f.; Laberthonnière, *Le réalisme chrétien*, pp. 104 f.; *Programme of Modernism*, pp. 92 f.

Dogmas are considered true only in so far as they express facts of vital religious experience, and their value is made to depend upon their practical bearing on the moral and religious life.⁸

Some have felt the influence of Kantian epistemology, and recognize that by ordinary rational processes we cannot penetrate to the reality back of phenomena.⁹ A more or less thoroughgoing relativism is thus not uncommon.¹⁰ The organ of religious knowledge is sometimes said to be faith,¹¹ sometimes the moral will,¹² in close agreement with Kant himself, with Fichte, Ritschl, and pragmatists in general.

Most of the modernists emphasize the social element in religion, laying stress upon solidarity over against individualism. In this connection much is made of the Kingdom of God.¹³

Finally, all are opposed to absolutism in religion and consequently to Roman Catholic ultramontaniam.¹⁴

In all of these matters we recognize a striking similarity to tendencies widely felt in Protestant churches as well, and it is quite evident that the modernists are children of their age as truly as any of our Protestant liberals. It is certainly not to be wondered at that they have been denounced by their Roman Catholic brethren and condemned by the ecclesiastical authorities. Even in Protestant churches similar positions have caused similar trouble, and the situation must necessarily be more acute in the Roman Catholic church. Some of the positions are of a sort to undermine the whole Catholic system,

⁸ Loisy, *Autour d'un petit livre*, p. 200; LeRoy, l. c. pp. 25 f.; Laberthonnière, *Essais de philosophie religieuse*, pp. 272 f.

⁹ Loisy, l. c. p. 10; *Programme of Modernism*, p. 110; Lendemaîns d'encyclique, p. 49.

¹⁰ LeRoy, l. c. p. 355.

¹¹ *Programme of Modernism*, pp. 110 f.; Tyrrell, *External Religion*, pp. 148 f.

¹² LeRoy, l. c. pp. 133 f.

¹³ Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*, pp. 59, 209 f., *Simple réflexions*, p. 124; Tyrrell, *Medievalism*, p. 74; Williams: Newman, Pascal, Loisy, and the Catholic Church, p. 233 f.

¹⁴ Loisy, *Quelques lettres*, pp. 140 f.; *Programme of Modernism*; Lendemaîns d'encyclique; and the numerous passages quoted below from Tyrrell's writings.

and hostility to them is by no means necessarily a sign of ultramontaniam and reaction.

The controversy has brought to light a fundamental difference touching the theory of the church and its authority, and it is this which particularly concerns us, for it is in connection with it that the genius of Catholicism most clearly reveals itself. This difference constitutes the heart of the whole matter, and it is because it has emerged in the course of the controversy that the conflict has more than a merely temporary significance. The question is not primarily whether this or that historical and theological opinion is in accord with the teaching of the church and may be tolerated within it but what is the nature, the extent, the seat of ecclesiastical authority. This is a much more important and far-reaching matter.

The issue appears perhaps most clearly and sharply in the writings of the Englishman George Tyrrell, one of the best known of the modernists and until recently a member of the Society of Jesus.¹⁵

The first point of difference between him and the Roman Catholic rulers is the authority of the papacy. He takes sharp issue in his book entitled *Medievalism*, published in 1908, with what he calls "the new-fangled dictatorial conception of the papacy" (p. 38). That conception he sums up in the following words: "The Pope *is* the Church. To him alone Christ has committed the apostolic mission, the deposit of revelation, the plenitude of doctrinal authority and of spiritual power and jurisdiction. Him alone he has commissioned to teach and sanctify, not the world, but the bishops, the clergy, the faithful: 'Feed my sheep; feed my lambs.' If the episcopal or clerical sheep have any doctrinal or spiritual power over the lambs it is as mere delegates of the Pope, as streams deriving from that single fountain of all supernatural life and teaching. The shepherd is no part of his flock. He stands outside and above it as a being of another and higher species. They are absolutely passive and receptive under his guidance. They have no mind or will of their own singly or collectively" (p. 58).

¹⁵ Since this lecture was delivered, Father Tyrrell has died, to the great sorrow of a large circle of friends and admirers, Protestant as well as Catholic.

The ultramontane conception, accurately described in these words, Tyrrell denounces as uncatholic and heretical, because individualistic and opposed to the collectivity of true Catholicism. And over against it he sets the theory of the authority of the episcopate. "The promises made to Peter were made to every Apostle and bishop as such; and in the early centuries every bishop regarded himself as successor of Peter and heir of those promises. Formerly a bishop was the highest ecclesiastical official in his own diocese. He was answerable to no other official, but only to the universal Church of which he was the organ or officer. But now that your new theology has concentrated the universal Church into the person of the Pope, we have a sort of double episcopate in each diocese—the bishop of Rome and the local bishop, the latter being merely the delegate or Vicar-General of the former. Of this system there is not a trace in the first six centuries of Church History, from which we learn that the Pope is neither over the bishops as their master, nor under them as their delegate, but alongside of them as first in the rank of his brethren" (p. 61).

This historical statement is perfectly correct, and in opposing the theory of episcopal authority to the papal absolutism of the ultramontanists Tyrrell is true to the prevailing conception of the early Catholic church, and has with him a large and highly respectable body of theologians in all the centuries since. The division of opinion is an old one. The theory of papal absolutism was developed during the Middle Ages under influences which cannot be recounted here, but it never received universal recognition, and at Trent the opposition to it was so strong that the council adjourned without promulgating any dogma whatever upon the church, although the Protestants' theory of the church was their chief heresy in the eyes of the Catholics. The Society of Jesus stood consistently for papal absolutism, and scored its great triumph at the Vatican Council of 1870, when the dogma of papal infallibility, taught already by Thomas Aquinas and long widely believed among the faithful, was finally promulgated.

The Vatican decree runs in part as follows: "We teach and define that it is a dogma divinely revealed, that the Roman

pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra*, that is when in discharge of the office of pastor and doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter is possessed of that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed that his church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding faith and morals; and that therefore such definitions of the Roman pontiff are of themselves irreformable and not because of the consent of the Church."

This is very explicit and thoroughgoing, and yet like most conciliar decisions it admits, or at any rate has received, a double interpretation. Tyrrell says: "The Council tells us that the infallibility of the Pope is not other than that which belongs to the whole Church. This may mean either that the Church is said to be infallible only because she possesses an infallible Pope . . . or it may mean that the Pope—like the Council—speaks *ex cathedra* and infallibly only when and so far as he truly represents and utters the general mind of the Church" (p. 86).

The former was undoubtedly the meaning of those who framed the decree and of the majority of the council in adopting it. But the latter, which has been the interpretation of many that have accepted the dogma, brings it more into line with the ancient conciliar theory which conceived the collective episcopate assembled in oecumenical council to be an infallible mouth-piece of divine truth. This was not repudiated but rather confirmed by the Vatican decree, which was itself a conciliar decree. And in view of the explicit declaration of the council, that "the Holy Spirit was not promised to the successors of Peter in order that by his revelation they might make known new doctrine," it cannot fairly be denied that the second interpretation is legitimate, even though it does not agree with the intention of the framers of the decree. It has not, indeed, hitherto been the interpretation of the Roman authorities under Pius IX, Leo XIII, and Pius X. On the contrary, the tendency has been all in the opposite, or ultramontane, direction,—to magnify more and more the authority of the Pope at the expense of the bishops. But it is entirely conceivable that the

other interpretation may ultimately prevail within the Roman Catholic church without leading to a repudiation or revision of the Vatican dogma. Any Pope may so interpret his own infallibility if he pleases. And even now, one who stands for this interpretation rather than for the ultramontane cannot fairly be accused of disloyalty and heresy, even though he suffer excommunication.

But this is not the only point at issue. If it were, the situation would be simple, and the modernists might well hope for ultimate victory. As a matter of fact the difference is far more fundamental. Tyrrell, for instance, goes further, and interprets the authority of the bishops as resting upon the authority of the people as a whole, the collective children of God. Thus he says: "What we really bow to is a Divine Tradition of which the entire Church, and not merely the episcopate, is the organ and depositary" (p. 54). "Tradition is the faith that lives in the whole Church and is handed down from generation to generation, of which the entire body, and not a mere handful of officials, is the depositary and organ of transmission. Of this rule and law the Holy Spirit diffused in the hearts of all the faithful is the author; the episcopate merely the servant, the witness, the interpreter" (pp. 55 f.)¹⁶.

Is this a correct reading of the Catholic principle of authority? To answer the question we have to go as far back as the second century. Over against the heretics of that period Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Hippolytus, commonly known as Old Catholic Fathers, set up a theory of external authority upon which the historic Catholic church was built. In primitive days dependence upon the Holy Spirit, present in the hearts of all believers, was commonly supposed to be adequate protection against false teaching and evil living, but the spread of gnosticism and kindred errors had convinced at any rate the theologians mentioned that something more definite and decisive was needed if the church were not to be completely overwhelmed and the simple faith of the gospel forever lost. In this emergency they appealed to the teaching of the apostles as perma-

¹⁶ Cf. Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*, pp. 175 f.; and Williams, l. c. pp. 224 f., 290, 294, 304 f.

nently normative, and insisted that all would-be Christian truth must be tested by it. But where was the teaching of the apostles to be found? In answer to this question recourse was had to apostolic writings, which now came to be recognized as constituting an authoritative Biblical canon, and to apostolic rules of faith, in which it was claimed that the essential features of the teaching of the apostles were summarized for the use of the church. But neither of these standards proved adequate to the emergency. The apostolic writings were susceptible of diverse interpretations, and for the current rules of faith there was no sufficient guarantee of apostolic authorship. In this situation Irenaeus took his stand upon the doctrine of the authority of the bishops as successors of the apostles. They were in possession of a divine charisma, received from the apostles, which enabled them to transmit and interpret apostolic truth. To them recourse was to be had in all cases of dispute. They and they alone were in a position to determine beyond question the mind and will of the apostles. The very essence of this theory of episcopal authority was that it erected a standard external to the Christian populace in general. To cut off the appeal either to the individual or the common Christian consciousness was what Irenaeus was concerned to do. It was not the divergence of individual gnostics from the universal sentiment of the church that made the trouble, but the divergence of multitudes and the formation of sects, in some cases approximately as large as the Catholic churches themselves. It was not common consent that Irenaeus appealed to, the appeal would have been futile and ineffective, but episcopal authority. Because the bishops were in this matter independent of their flocks and in direct connection with the apostles, they could declare in a final and authoritative manner, and if necessary against all other Christians, the will and truth of God.

Side by side with this theory of episcopal authority was growing the notion of the church as an institution offering to men through the sacraments the divine grace needed to transform their fallen and corrupt natures and make them heirs of eternal life. Apostolic succession, involving the transmission to the bishops of the grace necessary to enable them to mediate apos-

tolic truth, had been emphasized in the conflict with the heretics. It came now to be believed that the power of communicating the grace necessary for salvation had also been intrusted to them. According to Cyprian, who states the theory most clearly, the divine grace without which no one can be saved is in the hands of the bishops alone, and only they themselves or those whom they have empowered thereto can mediate this grace to others. Inasmuch as the church is the saving institution which supplies this needed grace to fallen and lost humanity, the bishops are themselves the church. The church is not the multitude of Christian people, or of followers of Jesus Christ; it is an organization providing them with salvation. The power which enables the bishop to mediate saving grace to men comes not from the people whose ruler he is, but from the apostles whose successor he is. And similarly the power to utter and interpret apostolic truth comes not from the people but from the apostles. This independence of the clergy over against the laity is of the very essence of the historic Catholic conception of the church. The steps by which it attained to universal recognition cannot be traced here. The process indeed is not wholly clear, but the fact is abundantly evident. The only guarantee of the possession by the church of saving grace and of apostolic truth has been recognized throughout all the centuries from the third to the twentieth to lie in the connection of its episcopate with the apostolate. To make this connection depend in any way upon the will of the laity, to make the laity in any way the medium or instrument by which grace is conveyed either for the one or the other purpose, is to overturn Catholicism completely, Greek as well as Roman. It is just at this point that Luther took sharp issue with the Catholic church of his day. The right of private judgment was but an incident, and to make that the whole of Protestantism is to misunderstand the situation. Back of and beneath that was the denial that the mediation of saving grace is confined to the clergy, and by consequence that they alone know the mind and will of God. The Reformers were condemned as heretics not because they repudiated this or that doctrine of the Catholic system, but because they struck at the very root of Catholicism in as-

serting the universal priesthood of believers and the direct access of every Christian to the fountain of divine grace and truth. The fundamental thing in Protestantism is not anti-collectivism but anti-sacerdotalism. To put oneself on the side of the laity against the hierarchy, to make the latter depend upon the former, to base the claim of the bishops to be the depositary of either saving grace or divine truth upon their relation to the people instead of upon their relation to the apostles is essential Protestantism.

Much, then, as we might wish that Tyrrell's interpretation of episcopal infallibility would find general acceptance within the Roman Catholic church, we cannot fail to see that it would mean the abandonment of an underlying principle of Catholicism which has controlled the Catholic church for more than sixteen centuries, and the adoption of a fundamental plank of Protestantism. This it is difficult to believe can happen.

But Tyrrell goes still further in the matter of authority, and claims that even the agreement of all Christian people, including popes and bishops, is not a guarantee of infallibility. In a private letter, the appearance of portions of which in an Italian journal led to his expulsion from the Society of Jesus, and which has since been published with an introduction and notes in a volume entitled *A Much-Abused Letter*, Tyrrell says: "It seems to me that a man might have great faith in the Church, in the people of God, in the unformulated ideas, sentiments, and tendencies at work in the great body of the faithful, and constituting the Christian and Catholic 'spirit'; and yet regard the Church's consciously formulated ideas and intentions about herself as more or less untrue to her deepest nature; that he might refuse to believe her own account of herself as against his instinctive conviction of her true character; that he might say to her: 'Nescitis cujus spiritus estis'—'You know not your own essential spirit'" (pp. 56 f.). And in the volume on *Medievalism* already quoted he says, "I ask myself whether a consensus in purely theological matters could ever possibly be more than that of a mere handful of experts; whether the general acquiescence of the crowd can have the slightest confirmatory value, any more than that of a class of schoolboys can be said

to confirm the teachings of their master" (pp. 81 f.). In other words, in the last analysis the religious experience of those truly Christian, and of those alone, is the only competent and adequate authority. "A general consensus of the faithful," he says, "can only obtain in regard to those matters where all may be experts; matters within the potential experience of each; matters which interest and affect their daily spiritual life—the life of Faith in virtue of which they are called 'the faithful.'" "If Faith were theology its problems could never be settled by general consensus. But because it is not theology, but the Gospel, because its object is that life of which Christ is the Divine Revelation, and not the analysis of that life, every believer may, as an expert, speak of his own personal response to the Gospel. Each is a judge of faith; and the agreement of all is an infallible judgment, eliminating private errors and idiosyncrasies" (p. 82).

Perhaps not all Protestants, but certainly many of them, would have no quarrel with such a statement as this. Its agreement indeed with the position of the great reformer Luther is very striking. In his Exposition of John 17 (Erlangen edition, vol. 50, p. 304) Luther says: "It is true that the Christian church cannot err. But listen, dear friend, and take notice what the true Christian church is. They, indeed, say that the Pope is the head of the church. Nevertheless they cannot deny that the Pope has erred dreadfully. But if the head has erred, the body easily follows. . . . But do you on the contrary say, 'Whoever cleaves to Christ cannot err; whoever does not must err even if he be more than a Pope.'" And what he means by not erring is made abundantly evident where he distinguishes, as he does over and over again, between theology and the fundamental truths of Christian experience. Where there are true Christians, there is a common and infallible knowledge of the forgiving love of God in Christ. This is in essence exactly the position of Tyrrell, though his interpretation of the central content of Christian truth may be different. Tyrrell's agreement with Luther is still more apparent in such passages as the following from his *Much-Abused Letter*: "After all, the visible Church (unlike the invisible) is but a means, a

way, a creature, to be used where it helps, to be left where it hinders. It is not the Kingdom of Heaven, but only its herald and servant" (p. 86). "Faith is not a sharing in the common creed of the visible Church, but in the common vision of the invisible Church which is, in a measure, that of God Himself" (p. 81).

This is true and beautiful, but it is at bottom Protestantism, not Catholicism, and in repudiating it the Catholic authorities are acting not in accordance with an uncompromising ultramontaniam but with the underlying principles of Catholicism as it has existed from the second century to the present day. It is true that the modernists do not stand alone among Catholics in their emphasis upon Christian experience as the ultimate source and standard of Christian truth. They have upon their side a long line of pious souls, commonly known as mystics, who have looked within rather than without for revelations of the divine. And the theory has always existed, even outside of mystical circles, that the truth taught by the church is harmonious with the individual experience of all true Christians, so that it can be assimilated and given a vital place in their religious life. The Catholic principle of authority therefore must not be interpreted too externally and mechanically, and if the Roman hierarchy and the Roman church at large shall be led to realize this more clearly than they do it will be a great victory for the modernists and a great gain for Catholicism everywhere. But it must be recognized that in the last analysis the authority not of individual believers or of the totality of believers but of the official ecclesiastical institution is on genuine Catholic principles supreme. If this has not always clearly appeared, it is because the personal experience of Catholic Christians has commonly fallen naturally into line with the Catholic tradition in which they were trained, and expressed itself easily in accepted religious formulae. When a divergence of any importance has appeared, the church has always, consistently with its age-long principle of authority, insisted upon conformity. Cardinal Mercier's words in his Lenten Pastoral of 1908 reproduce that principle roughly and mechanically, to be sure, but, on the whole, with substantial accuracy. "The Christian," he says, "is one who trusts the

teaching of the Church and accepts sincerely the doctrines she proposes for his belief. He who repudiates or questions her authority, and by consequence rejects one or more of the truths she compels him to believe, cuts himself off from the ecclesiastical community." "Catholicism says that the Christian Faith is communicated to the faithful by an official organ of transmission—the Catholic episcopate—and that it is based on the acceptance of the authority of that organ." "The Church, as a supernatural society, is essentially a positive and external institution, and must be accepted by its members as organized by her Divine Founder. It belongs to Christ Himself to dictate His will to us." "The bishops continue the apostles' mission. The faithful must hear them, believe their teaching, and obey them under pain of eternal damnation."¹⁷ This is not ultramontaniam, it is Catholicism, Greek and Roman. For the essence of Catholicism, as it has existed ever since the second century, in a true sense as it has existed ever since the Apostle Paul, is the conception of a salvation given from without. Man is radically bad and utterly helpless, and only as supernatural grace is bestowed upon him from above can he escape destruction and win eternal life. The idea of the Church as a saving institution external to its members and independent of them, and the idea of this external institution as authoritative in the religious sphere, were inevitable consequences. The modernists have repudiated this ancient, even apostolic, conception of salvation and have denominated it mediaevalism, though the Middle Ages inherited it from a much older past. It is therefore not to be wondered at that the principle of authority which was built upon it should also go by the board. The truth is that not the mediaeval church alone but the ancient church from Paul down stood under the dominance of a philosophy upon which modern men have generally turned their backs. Historic Protestantism is in this respect in much the same situation as historic Catholicism. In Protestantism, too, the old realistic views of philosophy and the old external and mechanical idea of revelation and of divine activity in general have commonly been in control. But there is this great difference

¹⁷ Quoted by Tyrrell, *Medievalism*, pp. 4, 7, 14, 15.

that at the very beginning Protestantism denied the traditional theory of the church as an institution external to and above its members, upon which they must depend for saving grace and truth. This was not all that should in consistency have been repudiated, and the old that was left remained to trouble Protestantism and to keep it bound to the past long after the new age had dawned. But the partial break, incomplete and in many respects ineffective as it was, has made other breaks easy, and modern Protestantism, unlike as it is to the older Protestantism, is yet not fundamentally untrue to it, while an equally modern Catholicism breaks with the Catholicism of all the past just at its most characteristic point.

Why, then, do the modernists remain Catholic? Why do they not withdraw from the Roman church and enter some Protestant communion? The Catholic authorities are continually accusing them of being Protestants at heart. Thus Cardinal Mercier traces the whole movement to Protestant influence, and declares that "in itself the idea, which first inspired many generous champions of Catholic apologetics and caused them to fall into Modernism, is at root identical with that Protestant individualism which is substituted for the Catholic conception of a teaching authority officially established by Jesus Christ, and commissioned to tell us what, under pain of eternal damnation, we are compelled to believe" (*ibid.*, p. 11).

Against the accusation of being an individualist Tyrrell strongly and justly protests in his reply to the Cardinal, and it is because he interprets Protestantism as the Cardinal does, as thoroughgoing individualism, that he finds it impossible to be a Protestant. He remains a Catholic because Catholicism means to him collectivity over against individualism, unity over against separatism, the social principle in religion over against the atomistic.¹⁸ Upon this he lays the greatest stress also in his *Much-Abused Letter*, coming back to it over and over again. Thus he says: "Communion with the visible Church, with those, namely, who *profess* to be Christ-like, is a great *desideratum*, is a condition of more fruitful communion with the invisible.

¹⁸ See also Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church*, p. 209; and Williams: Newman, Pascal, Loisy, and the Catholic Church, pp. 296 f.

For, besides the more obvious reasons which will occur to everyone, there is a depth, height, width, and fulness added to our inward life by our conscious and sympathetic association with a great world-wide cause or work such as that of Catholicism; something analogous to the spiritual expansion produced in us by an intelligent, self-sacrificing, and active participation in the life of our state or country. If God's cause on earth should be championed by each individual, it is certainly rational that, like other causes, it should be championed by a society; not merely by knights errant, but by an organized army. In the Catholic Church, God's cause on earth, the cause of Christianity, of Religion in its highest development, finds its visible embodiment and instrument" (p. 63).

This is doubtless the secret of many a modernist's remaining in the Roman Catholic communion, though he finds himself so completely out of sympathy with some of its principles and practices. But is this necessarily a distinguishing feature of Catholicism as contrasted with Protestantism? Is the latter inevitably individualistic, and is the kind of unity Tyrrell speaks of, unity of effort for the promotion of the cause of Christ, impossible to it? The modernists' criticisms of existing Protestant individualism are well taken. The history of Protestantism abundantly justifies their estimate of it, and, the situation being what it is, it is not strange that they should find it utterly uncongenial. But is the situation permanently necessary? It is to be noticed that the modernists are not seeking an external authority upon which they may throw themselves, and so find release from religious doubt and uncertainty. To those who feel this need Roman Catholicism offers what no other system can. This is the need which has driven many a troubled spirit into it from St. Augustine to John Henry Newman. But for fellowship in Christian life and work an institution like the Roman Catholic church is not indispensable. Its hierarchical principles and its external infallibility, which are of its very essence, are at best indifferent to such fellowship, at worst a hindrance and a bar, as the present situation abundantly shows.

What the modernists desire, and the desire is a noble one, is world-wide unity of purpose and of effort for the promotion

of the Kingdom of God on earth. As Tyrrell says, the mission of the church "is to impress upon every man the duty of living, not for himself, but for the common good, for the Kingdom of God, according to the opportunities of his station; to kindle in each that fire of self-devotion which Christ came to kindle upon earth; to stimulate faith, hope, and enthusiasm in the cause of an Ideal before whose immensity and remoteness the unaided spirit grows weary and discouraged. For without such faith and hope who could struggle for the reign of truth and justice upon earth?" (*Medievalism*, p. 74.)

This kind of unity, unity of purpose and of effort in a common cause, has laid hold also upon the imagination of many Protestants. The plans for organic church-unity which were so vigorously prosecuted in various quarters a few years ago, bear testimony to it perhaps only in part; but the many practical efforts at coöperation which we are to-day witnessing on every side are abundant proof of it. The extreme individualism and competition of an earlier day are giving way in religious work as in every other kind of work. It does not necessarily indicate a growing agreement in theological opinion, but it indicates the recognition that another kind of oneness is far more important, a oneness of purpose and of effort in labor for the good of humanity. Such oneness many Protestants believe is entirely possible on Protestant principles. Collectivism of this kind, they claim, is as truly Protestant as individualism. If without an infallible doctrinal authority which shall compel all Christians to a common faith it is impossible to unite them in effort for a common purpose, then such Protestants are wrong. But if, on the other hand, it is true that without the pressure of any such external authority men can be united in devotion to a common cause, and that such devotion will itself create all needed unity of faith, then Protestantism has its permanent justification and its lasting task. Whatever the modernists' actual attitude toward Protestantism may be, it is this latter alternative for which they stand. They, too, like many modern Protestants, believe that all needed unity of purpose and of effort may be attained without the pressure of an external authority and without such theological agreement as an external authority alone can dictate.

Another reason why modernists cling to Catholicism and find Protestantism so little to their liking is because they interpret Protestantism as teaching the absolute and permanent authority of the Scriptures, and so as preventing all real freedom and development in religious thought.¹⁹ They stand, over against this narrow and external interpretation of religious authority, for the rights of the religious experience of Christians of all ages. It is because Protestantism is too conservative and too authoritarian that they find themselves out of sympathy with it; Catholicism they believe is essentially progressive and modern in this matter. Their attitude is very instructive. It is identical with the attitude of many modern Protestants, of whom the great theologian Schleiermacher was the most eminent and influential. Indeed, the identity of interest and of emphasis at this point, as at many other points, between Schleiermacher and the Roman Catholic modernists is very striking. It is simply another indication of the oneness of spirit which largely controls modern men of all communions.

Still another aspect of Protestantism that makes it uncongenial to the modernists is its unhistorical character. It is divided from the larger part of the Christian world not only locally but temporally. In the Catholic church the Christian feels himself one not merely with a great company of his own day and generation but also with the saints of all the past.²⁰ Here, too, the modernists, like Catholics in general, exaggerate the isolation of Protestantism. Particularly with the revival of the historical spirit and interest in our own times there has grown up within Protestant circles a sense of solidarity with the Christianity of the ancient and middle ages such as our forefathers knew nothing of. And yet the difference is real, and the historic continuity of Catholicism, to which Catholics point as of the very essence of the system, is justly regarded as a possession of great value.

And, moreover, it must be admitted, and this is another fact of tremendous value which Catholics are justified in emphasizing, that hitherto Catholicism has conceived its task much more clearly and given itself to its accomplishment much more

¹⁹ Loisy, *Autour d'un petit livre*, pp. 205 f.

²⁰ Williams, *l. c.* p. 297.

consistently and unitedly than Protestantism. In the Middle Ages the Catholic church actually set before itself as an ideal the Kingdom of God on earth, and labored manfully for its realization. Its interpretation of the ideal may be criticised. A Kingdom such as it conceived, the dominance of the whole of life by the Roman Catholic church, may seem far from desirable; but at least it was a clear and consistent ideal. Protestantism, on the other hand, has never had any such single ideal, and it is chiefly because of this that its history has been one of controversy, division, and disunion. It is not to be wondered at that the modernists should see in the Roman Catholic church a power for the promotion of the Kingdom of God on earth incomparably superior to any or all of the Protestant sects. The genius of Catholicism is union and coöperation, a common purpose and common labor for its accomplishment. This has been its great strength in the past and continues to be its great strength in the present. This is above all the reason why it binds even the most radical of modernists so closely to itself.

But it is equally the genius of Catholicism to hinge eternal salvation upon dependence on an external institution and submission to its authority. The modernists would separate the one from the other. They would interpret Catholicism as unity but not as authority. If the word Catholic be taken by itself, of course their interpretation is justified. But from the second century down to the present it has had both meanings, and the Roman Catholic church is built even more definitely and explicitly upon the second than upon the first. It may at times have ceased to be a union of all Christians and have gathered into one communion but a pitiful minority. But it remained always, however small in numbers, the one divine institution endowed with saving grace and infallible truth, dependence upon which and submission to which were necessary to salvation.

It is an ideal Catholicism of which the modernists are dreaming—a Catholicism which antedates not only the Middle Ages but the age of the Fathers as well, and carries us back even beyond the Apostle Paul to Jesus himself, just where so many modern Protestants are seeking their Christianity. Whether

one shall call it Catholicism or simply Christianity is perhaps of minor importance. In any case it is neither the Catholicism nor the Protestantism of the past. It is something essentially modern. There are those, both Catholic modernists and Protestant liberals, who believe that it is the Christianity of Christ, and there, if they are indeed right in that belief, lies the great promise for the future—the promise of a wider unity and a more general coöperation than have yet been known, and so of the speedier and better accomplishment of the common task.

PANBABYLONIANISM

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In the year 1794 Charles François Dupuis brought out his *Origine de tous les cultes, ou religion universelle*, a work that made a great stir in its day. His object, he explains, was not to express his own religious views, but simply to describe the opinions of the ancients.¹ The religion of antiquity he represents as the recognition of the divinity of the universe, the heavenly bodies playing the chief rôle; all ancient cosmogonies, with heaven and earth, all the apparatus of religion (ritual, processions, images), and all myths were derived from sun, moon, planets, and constellations. The beast-forms and plant-forms of the Egyptian deities, for example, were copied from the constellations into which men had divided the starry sky; the zodiac was associated with the sun as a cause of mundane phenomena, and the division of the sky into twelve parts gave vogue and sacredness to the number twelve among Egyptians, Hebrews, and Greeks; the sun was the chief god—it was called the right eye of the world, and the moon the left eye; from the victory of the sun over darkness and winter sprang the idea of a Restorer of the world, a Saviour. He remarks also that the ancient Chaldeans were distinguished for their achievements in astronomy, and that from them the knowledge of these sciences was carried to the West.² They taught that the heavenly bodies controlled mundane destinies, and, according to Diodorus, that the planets were the interpreters of the will of the gods.

Dupuis's description thus involves the two points that in the ancient world there was a single religion, and that the ideas and

¹ He drew his material from all the sources available in his day—from Chaeremon, Plutarch, and Macrobius, from Athanasius Kircher, Contant d'Orville, and others; he cites Anquetil's translation of the Avesta, but does not mention Sanskrit.

² He regards Egypt, however, as the leader of ancient civilization.

forms of this religion were all taken from nature and particularly from the heavenly bodies. A revised edition of his work appeared in 1834, but not long after this date fresh discoveries turned the attention of scholars to other points in religious history, and Dupuis was almost forgotten. The study of Sanskrit revived the pursuit of solar myths, an investigation that held supremacy for a time and then gave way to the attempt to find the origin of myths in the conditions of savage life. In all these inquiries was visible the purpose to discover unity in the religions of antiquity.

It was not unnatural that fresh attempts to establish such unity should be suggested by the recent great enlargements of our knowledge of the religions of Egypt and Babylonia. In the learned world these two lands became rival claimants for the position of leadership, and in particular the origin of Old Testament customs and ideas was often referred to one or the other of them. We are not concerned here to follow the arguments of the rival schools, but we may note the work of Eduard Stucken, which paved the way for a serious attempt in our own day to make Babylonia a prime centre of all ancient religious thought.³ In the title of his volumes he announced a study of the astral myths of the Hebrews, the Babylonians, and the Egyptians,⁴ but his comparisons include India, Persia, Greece, China, Japan, Finland, the Slavic and Teutonic peoples, Polynesia, and America. In the course of his investigation he came to the conclusion that all sagas of all peoples go back to the creation-myth (p. 190), which passed, not in its original form but with local variations, to all lands. He adds—and this is a characteristic feature of his theory—that it was not the individual forms or types of sagas that thus migrated, but the motifs; a type, he says, is variable, a motif is often wonderfully persistent. In a given story, which appears in many places, the central personage may be man or woman, friend or enemy, while the kernel of the story remains

³ A similar attempt at unification is Professor Jensen's derivation of all ancient myths from the Babylonian Gilgamesh story.

⁴ *Astralmythen der Hebraeer, Babylonier und Aegypter*. The five parts, devoted respectively to Abraham, Lot, Esau, Jacob, Moses, appeared 1896–1907.

unchanged. He seeks, therefore, to identify situations rather than persons, and so far as this point is concerned he is right. He is convinced that similarities in myths, however far apart in space their loci, are to be explained only as due to transmission; he denies the possibility of independent origination in various places. In proof of his identifications he offers only collocation of stories, whence the identity, he holds, is obvious. The narratives concerning Abraham, for example, are traced by him to two Babylonian myths, the Etana saga and the descent of Ishtar to the underworld. In the former he recognizes four motifs: that of the wild ox (the snake, complaining of the eagle to the sun-god, is advised to hide in the carcass of a wild ox to which the eagle will fly down); that of the plant of delivery (Etana asks for the plant to assist his wife's delivery); the "see, my friend" motif (to Etana, carried up to heaven by the eagle, the earth far below looks like a garden); the fourth motif is too obscure to be usable. The analogies with the material in Genesis are the following: to Lot (Gen. 13) the Jordan valley looks like the garden of Yahweh; Sarai is sterile; in Gen. 15 birds of prey come down on carcasses; compare the sterility of Samson's mother, and the carcass of the lion in Judg. 14. Light, he adds, is thrown also on Deut. 32 11-13 and Isa. 14 12-14. Passing now to Ishtar, the rôle of the goddess is taken by Sarai, by Rebecca, and by Tamar: Sarai's descent into Egypt, like Ishtar's descent into the underworld, is followed by sterility; Rebecca and Tamar, like Ishtar, receive jewels and other adornments; Tamar, like Ishtar, is fatal to her lovers. Other comparisons are produced to show that Abraham, who is Tammuz-Adonis (that is, the spouse of Sarai-Ishtar), corresponds to Osiris-Orion; it is added that the identity of Samson with Orion is obvious. The other Biblical figures are treated in the same way. Their histories are held to embody motifs found all over the world and derived from the heavenly bodies; the histories are mythical in form, but Stucken does not say whether or not he regards Abraham and the rest as historical characters. He has in common with Dupuis the view of the unity of ancient religion and the theory of the astral origin of myths, but he treats the latter point at greater length, and, as is remarked above, defines

myths by their motifs. Apart from his theory his collection of mythical material is interesting.

Stucken's work attracted the attention of Hugo Winckler (whose pupil Stucken was) and its main features were adopted by him. In Winckler's hands, however, the investigation has received wider scope and a more definite theoretical form; "panbabylonianism" he represents as a system of thought with its rules and methods universally known and applied to the treatment of history. His positions have been adopted (with the exception of a few minor points) by the Lutheran pastor Alfred Jeremias, who has applied it in detail to the early Hebrew religion. Jeremias prefers to treat the material under the designation "ancient Oriental lore" instead of "panbabylonianism"; the reasons for this change will appear below.

The theory, as elaborated by Winckler and Jeremias, may be stated as follows: In the ancient Oriental world there existed one conception of the world, that is to say, one religion, which, having its roots in the beginnings of human society, had been developed through many generations till it appears fully formed in the great civilizations. Essentially one (Winckler calls it "the system"), it took different shapes in different lands, expressing the fundamental ideas under forms determined by the conditions of the various nations. Examination of most ancient religions, it is said, reveals the fact that the astral content of their myths is not in accord with their general grade of culture, their forms of worship, and their conceptions of gods and of the world. It follows that their astral lore was borrowed, and its source must have been Babylonia. For it was in Babylonia that the universal system found its closest expression, and for this reason it may be called "panbabylonianism." It was an astral system: it conceived that the starry sky was the revelation of the will of the gods, the book in which their designs were written; the stars were regarded not as gods but as the abodes and manifestations of gods. Babylonia was the home of astronomy and astrology, the centre, therefore, of this ancient religion. It was in Babylonia that the observation of the heavenly bodies was most carefully carried on and its results formulated with most precision; and in historical times the scientific Babylonian astronomy passed

to other countries, and the Babylonian religious ideas became predominant—that is to say, Babylon became the expounder of the one great Oriental system of the world.⁵ This system sought to explain the origin of things, to trace the history of the world from its emergence out of a chaos to its present form and into the future to the time of renewal. It is identical with religion, has the form of latent monotheism, and is characterized by the expectation of a saviour of divine origin, who in the course of the aeons will overcome the powers of darkness. There are indications that the diffusion of this system through the entire world occurred in the Taurus period, which began with the time of Sargon I and Naramsin, about 3000 B.C.

The theory thus assumes the existence, in historical times, of a well-defined “system,” astral in character, prevalent in all the great nations, the basis and explanation of all the religious ideas and customs of the ancient world. It is admitted by the expounders of the theory that certain customs attach themselves to mundane phenomena (darkness and light, heat and cold, summer and winter, sowing and reaping), particularly in the Canaanite communities, but these phenomena, it is held, are regarded as dependent on astral conditions. In this scheme there is an obvious element of truth. The initial assumption of similarity among the ancient religions has long been recognized as borne out by investigation. Customs (such as festivals, sacrifices, prayers), apparatus of worship (priests and temples), spirits and deities, myths and legends, are everywhere constructed after the same pattern. The modes of approaching and propitiating the supernatural powers are copied from the modes of approaching human potentates, and the divine powers themselves are endowed with the intellectual and moral qualities of their worshippers; and as men are everywhere psychologically the same, and their general social organization is the same, therefore their religious conceptions do not differ materially. This identity exists not only in the religions of civilized peoples, but also in savage communities; here, too, it results from

⁵ “Babylon” is taken by Jeremias to mean the historical Semitic civilization of the Euphrates valley, without reference to the question whether or not it was preceded and influenced by a non-semitic (Sumerian) civilization.

the sameness of human organization, which arises from the psychological unity of the human race. In this sense it may be said that there was only one religion in the ancient world.

It is also generally recognized that the heavenly bodies have played a great part in religious life. With the exception of certain of the lowest tribes that regard them merely as curious facts to be accounted for, the mass of peoples have looked on these bodies either as gods or as the abodes of gods; revered as in themselves powerful or as the seats of powerful beings, they have been held to stand in some relation to human life. Unusual occurrences and appearances in the sky (notably eclipses and comets) have been regarded as signs of some disturbance among the gods or of anger on their part. Such things were matters of common observation, and it was inevitable that explanations of them should be worked out. Astronomical observations began early in the history of man, and have been carried on continuously to the present time. Explanations of astral phenomena at first took the form of imaginary stories, and later were merely records of fact. It is doubtless true, as Winckler says, that Babylonia was the home of what may be called the scientific astronomy of the ancients down to the time when the East succumbed to the West; the developed astronomical systems of India and China (and later of the Moslems) appear to have been derived from the Babylonian. How it came to pass that this study was especially pursued in Babylonia it may not be possible to explain, nor is an explanation necessary for the purposes of the panbabylonian theory; it is enough that such was the fact. Astrology naturally followed the fortunes of astronomy; the formulated interpretation of astral phenomena was dependent on an exact knowledge of them.

So far the theory under consideration does not differ from the commonly received view. But, starting from the facts mentioned above—the similarity of the ancient religions and the religious importance of the heavenly bodies, its authors go on to affirm that all religious myths and customs are related to astral phenomena. They begin with some relatively simple propositions. Religion and the conception of the world, it is said, are for the

ancient Oriental one. The gods, who govern the world, are held to incarnate and reveal themselves chiefly in the stars, which thus become the book in which all human history may be read. Necessarily there is harmony in the world; the same law governs heaven and earth; every earthly place has its correspondent in heaven.

In these propositions, again, we have to recognize an element of truth, but also an extreme of generalization that may be misleading. Religion, in its content of thought and custom, may be said to be identical with the conception of the world, provided this conception includes the whole of the world and all that is involved in the relation between the human and the divine. In the earliest form of religion, says Jeremias, are found these three elements: a tendency toward monotheism, the belief in the control of man by gods, and the belief in continued existence after death. Without pausing to inquire into the precise nature of these early conceptions, which would carry us too far, we may accept the general statement that in fact, not only for the Oriental but also for all others, religion was coextensive with the theory of the world. But there is no evidence that these fundamental convictions were connected especially with astral phenomena, and in fact both Winckler and Jeremias confine themselves to the attempt to demonstrate astral influence in the formation of myths and in the external organization of religion. The other proposition stated above, that heaven is a copy of earth, embodies a very old conception. All savage tribes regard the arrangements in the sky as similar to those on earth: the landscape in the other world is like that of this world; the gods have their family life, their places of abode, and their occupation, like those of men; no other scheme is or has been conceivable to men not scientifically trained; the framework of religion has always been anthropocentric and anthropomorphic.

According to Winckler, as is observed above, the "one religion" of the ancient world had its roots in the beginning of human society; it was in the prehistoric period that the germs were planted whence later sprang the developed cults of ancient life. If this be so (and it amounts simply to saying that all early communities had religious conceptions), then there is no need of the

supposition of borrowing. Every people, possessing certain fundamental ideas, would work them out in accordance with its gifts and surroundings, and there would result a general substantial unity with local differences, just such a picture as we actually have in the ancient world. Jeremias, however, apparently aware of this difficulty, lays stress on the assertion that the borrowing contemplated by astralism has reference to the great civilized nations only. In this case it is incumbent on him to show that not only the astronomical and astrological systems of the outlying nation, but also their mythologies and their dominant religious customs and ideas, were taken from Babylonia; and this is nowhere shown. Stucken maintains a thorough-going theory of borrowing.⁶ He sets aside lightly the difficulty of supposing that there has been a transmission of ideas to remote savage regions; "we will be bold enough," he declares, "to affirm distinctly that myths have migrated not over a limited district only but over the whole earth." Here again, without affirming or denying, we ask for proof. The general conclusion from recent decisions of migration of myths is that when a myth may be explained naturally as arising from local conditions, it is to be regarded as native unless there is documentary evidence to the contrary. Borrowing may be inferred when similarities are too minute and numerous to admit of independent origination.

In proof of his astral scheme Winckler cites the sacredness of certain numbers. Number, he says,⁷ like every phenomenon of the material and spiritual world, is (in the Oriental view) an outflow of divine activity, and therefore prescribed in heaven and thence transferred to earth, and the doctrine of numbers, mathematics, likewise is a part of the science revealed in the heavens and communicated to humanity by a divinely directed tradition; but the preference for certain numbers is not original; it is a survival or relic of the "ancient Oriental lore," which teaches the sacredness of all numbers, and finds them in the heavens and in the organization of the universe; the choice of a particular number by a people depends on the local and temporal conditions of the people; no number has in itself any claim to sacredness,

⁶ *Astralmythen*, pp. 189 f.

⁷ *Himmels- und Weltenbild der Babylonier*, pp. 13 ff.

for the existence of "sacred" numbers is not due to any superstitious idea, but goes back to the old Babylonian science of the division of the heavens; and where a number, not appearing as sacred in Babylonian texts, is sacred in some other country (as nine among the Persians, Scandinavians, Romans, and Arabians), this country, nevertheless, has borrowed it from Babylonia, it has not arisen from universal human views or feelings. So far Winckler, whose contention that no number is in itself sacred may be accepted as obviously true. But whether, or how far, the recognition of sacred numbers in general and of our sacred numbers in particular is due to ancient Oriental lore as expounded in Babylonia is not clear. Certain standard numbers are connected with astronomical observation. Twelve, the number of new moons in the year, appears as a round number among the Israelites and the Greeks; it comes from simple observation and may have been widely employed, but it might easily have been adopted independently by different communities, and does not necessarily imply the existence of an Oriental "system."

The seven-day week has often been referred to the number of the moving heavenly bodies (sun, moon, and five planets); but this is by no means clear, since a substantial division of the month into four parts is found in communities (for example, the Hawaiians) who cannot be shown to have had any relation with Babylonia, or any astronomical knowledge beyond that derived from the simplest observation. The year and the day are fixed by the sun, the month is fixed by the moon; the number of months in the year by the sun and moon, and the moon's phases give about four seven-day weeks. All this calls for no great astronomical knowledge. The derivation of the five-standard from man's five fingers (and of the decimal system from twice five) seems to the panbabylonianists incompatible with the dignity of astronomy and religion—but why not accept as a wonderful thing the development of human science from crude observations to broad and organized knowledge? The origin of the Babylonian sexagesimal system, which has been so widely adopted, is doubtful. The simplest explanation would be that the number sixty was obtained by doubling the number of days in the month, and was adopted because of its convenience; it

contained the numbers three, four, five, ten, and twelve, but lent itself readily to arithmetical computations. However, it was not properly a sacred number, and does not concern us here. As for the number three, it is involved in so many natural human relations and ideas (beginning, middle, end; father, mother, child; sky, earth, sea, etc.) that its employment in religious construction calls for no astronomical explanation; and in regard to the panbabylonian theory it is to be observed that this number is more prominent and important in the Egyptian theistic system than in the Babylonian. Further, all these numbers appear to have been originally used for convenience in reckoning time and in other computations; that is, they were at first secular, and became religious or sacred only when they were brought into connection with religious ideas. Thus the number twelve, which had at first merely a chronological and astronomical significance (the months of the year, the signs of the zodiac), was at a relatively late period, in the time of literary construction, adopted by the Israelites as the number of their tribes (and the number of the sons of Jacob), though as a matter of fact this number cannot be made out from the Israelite history. The number seven becomes religiously prominent only in the later Biblical writings (the seven-branched candelabrum, the seventy years of exile, the seven times seven of the year of jubilee, the seventy year-weeks of Daniel, the seven lamps and the seven seals of the New Testament Apocalypse).⁸ The same thing is true of the number four, which is given by the natural directions in space. Religious ideas were formed from ordinary human thought, independently of numbers, and these latter were incorporated in the systems in periods of scientific construction.

The great religious festivals of the ancient civilized world are arranged with reference to the seasons, including the beginning of the month and the beginning of the year; a few in relatively late times, like the Jewish feast of dedication, commemorate events in national history, those of the earlier time relate to the ordinary social life. The festivals of spring, summer,

⁸ The Zoroastrian septad appears in the Avesta and may be very early; it is, however, not $2+5$ (sun, moon, and five planets), but $1+6$, which is not an astral combination.

autumn, and winter correspond to the most important agricultural periods, and also to important positions of the sun; the festivals of new moon and new year depend on positions of the moon and the sun. Omitting these last (which are based on simple observations requiring no scientific knowledge and no borrowing from Babylonia or other place), we have the two familiar explanations of origin, the astral and the agricultural. The arguments for the latter are given in many recent works, as those of Tylor, Frazer, and others, and cannot be detailed here; the arguments for the former are given in the various expositions of the general astral theory. As there are no explanations of the origin of customs in the records of remote antiquity preserved to us, we are dependent, for a solution of the question at issue, on the indications furnished by a comparison of usages the world over, including the customs of the earliest stages of civilization. A certain relation to the seasons is so clearly visible in many festivals (in Palestine, Rome, China, and elsewhere) that it is recognized by advocates of the astral theory, with the remark that the seasons are dependent on the heavenly bodies, to whose movements the origin of these observances must go back, though their astral origin may be forgotten by the peoples who still maintain the festivals. In many cases, as is remarked above, the astral and agricultural motives exist together in civilized times. The midwinter festival commemorates the lowest heating-power of the sun and also the productive decline or the deadness of the soil. The mythical representation of this fact is the descent of a deity (as Tammuz or Proserpine) to the lower world, and the deity is now variously interpreted as representing the sun or the spirit of vegetation. It is the latter character that is indicated by the simplest winter festivals with which we are acquainted, those, namely, that have survived in European popular customs;⁹ here the conception is mundane, and the spirit may easily be regarded as the kernel or forerunner of the developed god. The conception of the astral character of the winter situation is later in the progress of thought. This posteriority is involved in the account of Tammuz¹⁰ given by Jeremias.

⁹ Described by Mannhardt and Frazer.

¹⁰ *Das Alte Testament im Lichte des Alten Orients*, 1904, pp. 114 ff.

"Tammuz," he says, "stands for the double life of nature (Marduk and Nebo) . . . he represents the revolution of nature, sinking into the underworld and rising to new life, and as such he may bear the character of sun, moon, or Venus (Attar, Lucifer, Phosphoros), combining with this also the phenomena of Marduk (the light half) and Nebo (the dark half), or, more exactly, of Ninib and Nergal." This portraiture of the elastic Tammuz as the representative of the course of nature suggests that the god was originally not astral but agricultural, and therefore that his essential character was formed prior to the rise of Babylonian astronomy. What is true of Tammuz may be said also of Osiris. To those two gods correspond the goddesses Ishtar and Isis. In the complete myth each of these couples (the male deity and the female) sets forth the decline and restoration of the world of nature; and in the Babylonian poem, "the Descent of Ishtar to the Underworld," the consequences of the withdrawal of the goddess from the upper world go beyond crops and winter cold and include the marriage-relation and the perpetuation of human beings and the lower animals—a fact that is satisfactorily explained by the character of the goddess as the patron of fertility.

A point in ancient religion not discussed by Winckler and Jeremias is the recognition of unlucky days and seasons—days and seasons on which it was unfortunate and forbidden to engage in certain ordinary occupations. Some lists of such days are given in Babylonian and Egyptian documents.¹¹ The developed theory was that for some reason the supernatural powers were angry or unfavorable during these periods, and that therefore it was the part of prudence to refrain from work at such times. They were essentially periods of restriction. The origin of many of them lies far back in prehistoric times, so that it is not now possible to explain with certainty the conditions under which a particular day was set apart as taboo. But some late instances may give a clue to the beginnings of the custom. In Hawaii the ground was economic; it was forbidden to catch certain fish

¹¹ For the Babylonian see Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 373 ff.; for the Egyptian, Maspero, *Études égyptiennes*, i. pp. 28 ff., Wiedemann, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, chap. 10.

at certain times; the motive is the same as in the modern restrictions on hunting and fishing. In Borneo also there is an economic reason for restriction; work in harvesting is regulated by law, and on certain days is unlawful. Other grounds doubtless existed in other cases, as, for example, the fact that a great calamity had occurred on a certain day. The known cases suggest that the reasons determining this sort of legislation were generally mundane; there is no ground for supposing that they were connected with a theory of the heavenly bodies further than the primitive observation of the relation between the agricultural seasons and the sun, and the widely diffused belief in the influence of the moon on vegetable and animal life. This latter belief appears to be a generalization from some supposed experience. The moon does not figure in the myths that relate to the decay and revival of vegetation. The supposed relation between her waxing and waning and vital laws may well be considered to be a naïve fancy, and her connection with lunacy may have been originally hygienic in origin. In any case no astral theory is here visible. The seventh-day sabbath was doubtless originally connected with the moon's phases, but only as a result of primitive unscientific observation.¹² It represents an organization of taboo periods. Such periods (as appears in the Egyptian scheme) were at one time scattered throughout the month; convenience, probably, suggested their consolidation, as in New England the various fast-days (originally times of restriction or taboo) were consolidated in one day. The method of consolidation naturally followed the division of the month by the phases of the moon into four parts. In Hawaii there were four periods of restriction in every month. In Yoruba there is a monthly day of rest, that is, of cessation from work. In a Babylonian inscription there is a trace, in one of the months, of a seven-day recurrence of prohibition of certain occupations. The Israelite advance in organization consisted in making every seventh day a period of abstinence from ordinary work, counting the days continuously without reference to the moon;¹³ the

¹² See my article in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, vol. xviii, 1899, pp. 190 ff.

¹³ But new-moon was a day of abstinence, and the number seven appears in the sabbatical year and the year of jubilee; in these the motives were economic.

word sabbath means simply 'cessation' from work. This characteristic feature of the day is not explained by the theory of astral origin.

When certain numbers, as three, four, seven, twelve, came to be prominent and familiar, they would naturally be employed in late historical and theological constructions and in literary representations. The Babylonian and Egyptian divine triads do not appear as cultic unities in the earliest times. In both countries the collocations of gods at the leading religious centres were of various kinds, and seem to have arisen from political and social unions; a community would adopt all the deities worshipped in its constituent parts, and thus pantheons would be formed. In Assyrian royal inscriptions twelve great gods are commonly invoked; a divine triad rarely appears in Babylonian or Assyrian inscriptions; the Egyptian triadic and enneadic constructions are more definite.¹⁴ These combinations arise naturally out of the social conditions. Anu, Bel, and Ea may represent sky, earth, and sea, but these characters do not involve scientific astral origins; and the same thing is to be said of Ra, Amon, Thoth, Osiris, and other Egyptian gods. Early Babylonian poems deal with seven spirits, and very late Jewish works recognize seven heavens; in the representation there is nothing that betrays great astronomical knowledge. Psalm 139 refers to the four points of the compass, and Ezekiel's great vision describes four throne-bearers, each with four faces, but neither in the Old Testament nor elsewhere is there any hint that this number is derived from the four "critical points," the two highest and the two lowest, of the moon and sun.¹⁵

The advocates of the panbabylonian theory reject with scorn the supposition of fetichistic and totemistic elements in the development of divine personalities. The gods, they hold, together with their emblems, represent heavenly bodies or the natural phenomena that are dependent on these: the Egyptian

¹⁴ Erman, *Handbook of the Egyptian Religion*, p. 27; Maspero, in *Revue de l'histoire de religions*, 1892; Wiedemann, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, chap. 5.

¹⁵ Jeremias, *Das Alte Testament*, pp. 24 ff.

divine beast-forms are derived from the constellations;¹⁶ the frog and the tortoise represent respectively the male and the female procreative power; "the scarabaeus, according to the Oriental conception, is the representative of the underworld, and thus is the world-bearer, for out of the underworld the worlds arise. Dung is the element of the underworld. The view that the ball in which the beetle lays its egg and which it pushes along was the disc of the sun was a secondary fancy."¹⁷ The question of the origin of gods is too large a one to be discussed here, and a discussion is the less called for because the arguments for the astral origin of the ancient theistic system recently offered are of a vague character; it is presumed that the astronomical facts stated carry with them the demonstration of the theory. Two obvious remarks may be made on the lines of argument of Winckler and Jeremias. The first is that, though they regard astralism as having begun early and passed through a continuous development, they make no serious attempt to define the origin and nature of early theistic conceptions. Jeremias observes¹⁸ that the interest shown in the starry sky by uncivilized peoples is well known, and he cites a couple of recent articles on American mythology; he adds that our knowledge of such peoples is fragmentary, and that it is possible that they have forgotten the astral foundation of their myths and have come to lay the stress on the natural phenomena that are dependent on the heavenly bodies. But—with all respect be it said—this sort of argumentation is a begging of the question. The panbabylonianists cannot afford to neglect early religious history. The second remark—a corollary to the first—is that incidentally and unavoidably they do often assume that natural phenomena have influenced theistic thought. This influence they pass lightly over as something whose basis is astral; but, from the point of view of scientific investigation, it behooves them at least to try to draw the line between astral

¹⁶ Jeremias (op. cit. p. 92, n. 2) remarks that the question why the constellations were given beast-forms belongs to prehistoric times. It might have been well for him to look into this question. Compare Dupuis, *Origine*, i, pp. 117, 131.

¹⁷ Jeremias, *Die Panbabylonisten*, p. 32, n. 2.

¹⁸ *Die Panbabylonisten*, pp. 16 f., 10 f.

and mundane facts, and to show why and how the former in so many cases have, as they hold, been ousted by the latter.

The theory under consideration lays great stress on the relation of secular Periods or Ages to the ancient conception of history. These Ages, which are often named from metals, are determined, it is said, by the position of the equinoctial point in the zodiac, and come in the chronological order: Gemini, Taurus, Aries. They are identified also with the three ruling bodies of the zodiac, the moon, the sun, and Venus, and are named in the order silver, gold, copper, when the moon has precedence, and in the order gold, silver, copper, when the sun has precedence. "The golden age is naturally that of the bright sun; the Romans called it the age of Saturn. This was because the rôle of Saturn was similar to that of the sun."¹⁹ The existing age is that of iron, the astral origin of which is doubtful. The change of astral ages is held to be set forth in various myths; especially at the beginning of any age stands a prominent man having the traits of the astral deity who corresponds to this beginning. As examples Jeremias²⁰ mentions for the Taurus age, with the motif of mysterious origin, Sargon I, Moses, Buddha, Zarathustra, corresponding to the Marduk-Osiris myth; for the Gemini age, Romulus, Cyrus; the Aries motif appears in Alexander, who had himself painted by Apelles as Jupiter. Sargon II, Sennacherib, and other Assyrian and Babylonian kings love to represent themselves as the initiators of a new age, and so prophets, as Elijah and Elisha, are depicted.

So far the theory of Ages, which contains much that is obvious, but also something new. It is true that a great man represents a turn in human history, and, conversely, that a fresh historical departure is commonly the work of a great man or of a group of great men. Around such persons in the course of time legends and myths are likely to gather, and this legendary and mythical material is not invented, but springs naturally out of the ideas of the time in which it originates. All commu-

¹⁹ The gods show great facility in changing their relations to the heavenly bodies; thus Marduk may be the sun or the moon or Jupiter, as the exigencies of the case may require.

²⁰ *Das Alte Testament*, p. 71.

nities like to invest their founders with mystery and wonderfulness. Exactly how the legend of Sargon I arose, the documents do not inform us, but it required no great effort of imagination to conceive that a child was exposed, rescued, and brought up, and became a great king. Such revolutions of fortune were not uncommon in the ancient world. It seems unnecessary to trace the legend to the Taurus equinoctial point and the god Marduk, and there is the further difficulty that it does not appear in the adventures of Marduk, so far as these are now known; "but," says Jeremias, "it was certainly there," his ground being that the general motif is found in the Osiris myth, which is identical with the Marduk myth—the very question at issue. So also Romulus and Remus are twins, and Cyrus and Cambyses, and Harmodius and Aristogeiton, form couples, but for the assertion that their stories arose under the influence of Gemini we desiderate more definite evidence than this fact. Alexander may possibly have taken himself seriously as Jupiter-Amon, but it is equally possible that he accepted the name as an honorary title, or as a compliment to the Egyptians.

The division of the world's history into periods may be explained by man's natural tendency to organize life, by the disposition to distinguish times by their relation to some great personage or some astral or mundane event, and by vague recollections or traditions of the past.²¹ What is not proved is the assertion that the great Ages in the Oriental system were determined by the position of the equinoctial point—follow, that is, the precession of the equinoxes. It is true that secular "ages" were recognized by various ancient peoples, Egyptians, Hindus, Persians, Greeks, Romans—determined sometimes by astronomical observation (as, for example, the Egyptian Sothis-period of 1460 years, the cycle of the heliacal rising of Sothis or Sirius), sometimes by millenniums, taking the number one thousand simply as a convenient round number, as in India and Persia. The gigantic Indian scheme of a succession of cycles, each of 12,000

²¹ Thus we have the ages of Abraham, Confucius, and Pericles, the Augustan, Elizabethan, and Victorian ages, the period of the Reformation, the Romantic period, and the like, and we speak of the "golden age" of some history or movement.

years, is an imaginary construction of the universe from the point of view of mundane development, absorption into Brahma, then a new era, and so on for ever and ever. Neither this scheme nor the Buddhistic series of aeons marked by the appearances of new Buddhas is dependent on astral phenomena. The two questions involved in the astral theory are, first, whether or not all of those issued from Babylonia, and, second, what the religious significance of the systems of Ages is. Those questions have already been touched on, and will be further considered below. For the demonstration of the universality of the astral system and the hegemony of its Babylonian form we desiderate an illustration from some ancient religion, and this Jeremias undertakes to give, in his *Panbabylonisten*, by an examination of the Egyptian cult.²² At the risk of some repetition an outline of his argument may be given.

The Egyptian cult, Jeremias holds, is merely one division of the general Oriental scheme. That Egypt belongs socially to Western Asia is shown by the lively intercourse between it and Babylonia and Canaan, and identity of thought follows social identity.²³ Much has been said about distinguishing between early and late conceptions, but the fact is that the Egyptian religious system appears fully developed in the earliest inscriptions. Like all other cults the Egyptian religion has a fundamental conception—it is the doctrine that the activity of the Deity stands in relation to the starry sky and the parallel natural phenomena (summer and winter, sowing and reaping, cold and heat, day and night). This conception is found in all ancient peoples, and its independent origination in every community is out of the question (the agreement in details is too great to allow such a supposition), but great variations occur in the different local developments, according to the differences in endowments and surroundings among nations. The astral character of the Egyptian religion was recognized long ago, for example by many Greeks, as is reported by Eusebius (*Praep.*

²² He takes his material from Erman's well-known work on the religion of Egypt, but rejects Erman's interpretation of the facts, which is the more generally received one of development from crude beginnings. He rejects also Hommel's attempt to prove by philological methods the identity of the Egyptian and Babylonian cults, preferring to rest his thesis on the similarity of ideas.

²³ Here it is obvious to remark that social identity and identity of thought do not prove borrowing; or, if there be borrowing, they do not show in which direction the borrowing was.

ev. iii.). A striking illustration of this character is found in a pyramid text ²⁴ in which a dead king is said to rise with Orion in the east and descend with it in the west—that is, the dead king is regarded as the incarnation of the Deity who reveals himself in the world, and especially of Osiris. “As Osiris lives,” says another text, “so will he live.” Here, as elsewhere, Osiris has a lunar character; the moon, which after three days bursts forth from the power of the underworld, is the planet of resurrection (the same representation is found in the Babylonian system). The female correspondent to Osiris is Isis, who stands related to the former as Ishtar to Tammuz. In Egypt Sothis (Sirius) appears in place of Isis, and Orion in place of Osiris.

The religion of Egypt of the earliest time known to us was influenced by the teaching of the priests of On, where the reigning cult was that of the sun,²⁵ while in Babylon at this time it was on the cult of the moon that the emphasis was laid. This contrast is in agreement with the grandiose conception that earthly lands reflect the heavens, according to which Babylonia bears the character of the upperworld and Egypt that of the underworld,—the full moon represents resurrection, while the sun, at the time of full moon, reaches its lowest point, and becomes an underworld star. The proof that Egypt was so considered is found in the great development of the conception of the future life by the Egyptians, and in the division of Egypt into forty-two districts corresponding to the forty-two judges of the dead (forty-two is the characteristic number of the underworld).

The essential identity of the Babylonian and Egyptian systems (the former being the basis of the latter) appears in the fact that both have the antithesis of light and darkness, with similar cosmogonies (a primeval ocean, for example), in both the sun and moon are twins, and both have divine trinities; in Egypt the trinity is the sun, the moon, and Venus²⁶ (and in the genealogy of the myths we have father, mother, son). Finally, the festivals (the dramatic presentation of dogma) are similar in the two systems (the new-year festival, for example), and all of them are astral.

²⁴ See Spiegelberg's paper in *Orientalische Literaturzeitung*, 1904.

²⁵ This doctrine is termed by Jeremias and others a “mystery.” It was not a mystery, however, in the proper sense of this term; there was no body of initiates and no intention to keep knowledge from outsiders; the fact was simply that the higher thought of the educated, priests and others, was not intelligible to the masses.

²⁶ Jeremias explains that the reason why the heavenly goddess (Hathor = Isis = Venus) is pictured in the form of a cow is that she is the female principle corresponding to the moon-deity represented as a bull. The first station of the moon was in Taurus.

This summary, with its astounding assumptions, gives fairly well the method pursued by Jeremias, which is in all important points that of Winckler. They do not distinguish between the illustrations of similarity in the religions of Egypt and Babylon and the elaborate astralism that is held to underlie all religions. They do not distinguish clearly between astronomy and religion (the fact that the calendar is astral seems to them to prove astralism in their sense), and they do not allow sufficient liberty to the gods to reveal themselves in other things than heavenly bodies.²⁷ They are right in recognizing the religious importance of these bodies, but they have organized the facts into a hard and fast system, with such unrestrained application to minutiae as often leads them into exaggerations and forced and sometimes fantastic interpretations—witness, for example, the thesis, abundantly introduced by Jeremias, that Egypt was regarded in the “system” as representing the underworld and Babylon as representing the upperworld. There is no documentary proof of this opinion; Egypt and Babylon are treated by each other and in the Old Testament simply as political powers, no symbolic values are attached to them. But, according to Winckler and Jeremias, as in the Oriental cosmographic system the North was the region of light and the abode of the gods, so the South was the place of darkness, the abode of the dead, and therefore—such apparently is the reasoning of Jeremias—Babylon as northern and Egypt as southern correspond to the two cosmic worlds. But such a leap from celestial and infernal relations to purely terrestrial is wholly improbable for the ancient times under discussion. Or, if this sort of ratiocination be disowned, then the identification of Egypt (or Sodom) in the Old Testament with the underworld must be regarded as an unfounded fancy.

The significance of the gods and the central points of religious conceptions undergo such kaleidoscopic changes that it is hard to recognize any system in them. Egypt, we are told, was devoted

²⁷ As is remarked above, the part played by natural mundane phenomena is recognized, but these are treated as relatively unimportant adjuncts to the stellar powers.

to the sun, and Babylon to the moon. We might, then, be surprised to learn that the great Egyptian doctrine of resurrection (expressed only feebly, if at all, in Babylon²⁸) was embodied in Osiris, who was the moon; we are, however, relieved by learning that life issuing from death, which is represented by Osiris as moon, is represented also by the overflow of the Nile and by the setting sun; "therefore," it is added, "the unity of the two luminaries and the life of Nature in the eternal cosmic round is represented by Osiris."²⁹ Throughout Jeremias's treatment of the Egyptian doctrine of the future life there is a noteworthy failure to distinguish between the origin of ideas and the forms in which they clothe themselves. The belief that the soul of the dead man goes to the West may have been suggested by the setting of the stars; but this direction of the journey by no means proves that the conception of the future continuance of life arose from the motion of the stars. In ancient times the movement of the soul after death varied with the local conditions of communities; it is not strange that some advanced peoples should have thought the stars to be the abodes of the departed or to indicate their paths to the other world. It is in the view of the future life that the Egyptians differed most strikingly from the Babylonians. There are great similarities in the theistic schemes and the cultic rituals of the two peoples. Both have the usual gods connected with sun and moon and with the arts of life, and the usual apparatus of temples and priests, and in both the gods were originally local and the special prominence of any divinity was due to the political predominance of his home. As is mentioned above, Jeremias agrees with Hommel in holding that the Egyptian religious system was based on or derived from the Babylonian. But, so far from this being the case, the early civilization of Egypt was superior in breadth and depth of religious thought to that of its neighbor and rival. Babylon developed astronomy, and very early (about 2250 B.C.) produced an admirable civil code; but at an equally early date an Egyptian philosopher (Ptahhotep)

²⁸ The restoration of Tammuz to upper earth by Ishtar signifies the revivification of nature after the winter decay; but this is not a general doctrine of resurrection, and neither Ishtar nor Tammuz is the moon.

²⁹ *Die Panbabylonisten*, p. 59.

issued an ethical manual which in moral elevation hardly falls below our best standards, and eight centuries later an Egyptian king established a monotheistic cult of a sort never reached in Babylon.³⁰ It is an ungracious task to put one great nation over against another,—the facts just cited are mentioned merely to show the weakness of one side of the panbabylonian theory, namely, its claim of complete religious hegemony for Babylon. Babylon's title to greatness does not need such a pretension. To return to the conception of the future, it is well known that the idea of a moral basis of the future life was current in Egypt from a very early time, while Babylon never advanced beyond the old-semitic conception of the underworld as a sort of death-in-life without ethical sanction or intellectual activity. Semites and Egyptians probably came from the same original stock, but the two races grew by different lines, developing primitive ideas each in its own way; what those primitive ideas were can be learned only from the traces of them in later civilized cults and from the study of the conceptions of the undeveloped communities known to us. The existence of crude traits in the Egyptian and Babylonian cults is certain, and it is no disparagement to these cults, so admirable in their later forms, to refer these traits to early savage social conditions.

It is the alleged similarity between the Egyptian and the Babylonian cults that the panbabylonianists have laid most stress on, but the demonstration of their thesis of an astral unity calls for a comparison of the cults of India, Persia, and China, also with that of Babylon. The general agreements between all these in theistic ritual apparatus are obvious, and need not be described here. The disagreements, however, are no less obvious; the exuberant supernaturalism and metaphysical constructions of India stand in sharp contrast with the neat dualism of Persia, the family organization of the gods in China, and the succession of local divine chiefs in Babylonia. The existence of such disagreements is recognized by Winckler, but he contends that above them is the fundamental belief that the gods reveal themselves in the movements of the heavenly bodies. Doubtless, the stars were and are consulted in these countries,

³⁰ Breasted, *History of Egypt*, pp. 203 ff., 355 ff.

but other things were regarded as more important. The enormous significance attached to sacrifice in India is pointed out in all modern works on the Brahmanic religion; the emphasis laid on the culture of land in the Avesta is obvious, as is the predominance of the worship of ancestors in China. These facts do not accord with the exclusive claims of astralism; they all point to other conceptions. It is true that the cosmological theories of all the ancient nations are intended to explain the origin of things, that they all lay more or less stress on the primeval struggle between light and darkness, and that in all of them a primeval ocean or watery chaos plays a part. This ocean (whence, says Jeremias, divine wisdom, in the person of Ea issues) is independent of the stars. The mountains, rocks, rivers, and trees of the earth, as also the sky considered in itself apart from its content of luminaries, are important elements of ancient religion. That is, the formal part of religion was derived from the whole apparatus of nature. Man is a part of nature, and the gods were made in the likeness of man. But to admit this—and it cannot be denied—is to reject the astral theory in the form in which it is held by Winckler and Jeremias.

Cosmogonies in ancient systems are connected with religious conceptions, but do not give the essence of religion. Myths embody, but do not create, religious beliefs. They are the science of early times, which sought its agents in superhuman Powers, and they thus entered into alliance with the procedures of religion proper. Some myths are stellar, as, for example, the explanation given by an American Indian tribe of the disappearance of the stars by day and of the changing phases of the moon (the stars, they say, children of the sun and the moon, are devoured by their father every morning and are mourned for by their mother, who thus for a time fades gradually away), or the belief that the sun, traversing the sky in a chariot by day, descends into the ocean, passes beneath the earth, and ascends the next day.³¹ In such stories as these the heavenly bodies are clearly the actors; the heavenly gods produce natural phenomena. But no such clear evidence can be adduced for the affirmation that the myths of Osiris and Tammuz are stellar, for these admit

³¹ For other early examples see Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, i, pp. 288 ff., 356.

naturally of other explanations. The expounders of the alleged Oriental "system" content themselves with putting side by side certain astronomical facts and late mythological identifications, by Babylonian or Egyptian priests, of deities with heavenly bodies. But a late learned identification of Tammuz or Osiris with the sun or the moon or some other body tells us nothing of the origin of these gods or of the fundamental religious conceptions underlying their worship. And the panbabylonianists ignore several groups of gods (as those of winds and fire) that are, to say the least, not obviously astral.

Mention has been made above of the importance attached by the astralists to cosmic Ages. If, it is said, these ages be not taken into account, a history of the ancient Orient is inconceivable; the heavenly bodies control the course of the times.³² Every age, it is held, is characterized by the appearance of a saviour, of divine origin, who meets and overcomes the powers of darkness. Now it is true that some ancient nations conceived of the history of the world as moving through secular ages, and this is a fact of interest; but whether, or how far, it had anything to do with the conception of human progress or redemption, or was religiously related to astral conditions, that is a different question. The most definite schemes of ages are found in India and Persia, and these are products of learned construction and non-semitic theological speculation, and are relatively late. The enormous Hindu chronological scheme referred to above, an interminable series of aeons, each of twelve millenniums, exhibits in each aeon a gradual degeneration through its four parts of three millenniums each, and then the reabsorption of the universe into the Supreme Spirit.³³ Here we have the equivalent of the four Greek ages of continuous decadence, with round numbers but no proper zodiacal religious significance,³⁴ with an idea of redemption in this form of absorption. A distincter idea of salvation is involved in the late theory of avatars or incarnations of deities. Occasional incarnations occur in many parts of

³² Jeremias, *Das Alte Testament*, p. 69.

³³ Hopkins, *Religions of India*, pp. 418 ff.

³⁴ The number twelve in this scheme may be connected with zodiacal signs, but not in the way supposed by the astralist theory.

the world; it was natural that a deity should take human form to accomplish something that interested him. Hinduism concentrated its avatars in the person of Vishnu; the number of avatars varied in different schemes (sometimes including even Buddha himself), and was not fixed by astral conditions. Buddhism adopted the avatar conception in its theory of the succession of Buddha; and the Vishnus and Buddhas had religious significance, they appeared for the purpose of teaching truth and righting wrong. They are illustrations of the general human feeling that things tend to go wrong on earth and need some great force to set them right. The Hindu system of ages is arithmetically grand and symmetrical, and the Persian construction is similarly symmetrical but on a more modest scale.³⁵ The history of the world they comprise in twelve millenniums, divided into four periods; every millennium is under the control of a sign of the zodiac. The first period is that of the spiritual creation—there were no human beings on the earth; the second describes the material creation; the third gives the mythical and legendary history before the appearance of Zoroaster, wherein there is a temporary triumph of Angro-Mainyu; the fourth is ushered in by Zoroaster, and after him come three prophets, the third of whom is Saoshyant, the final saviour and reconstructor. This is an eschatological scheme similar to the Jewish and Christian conception of the End; it is the embodiment of the conviction that the supreme Deity will not give the world over to evil. The coördination of the twelve periods with the signs of the zodiac probably points to Babylonian influence; but it occurs in a late book, and is fitted into an artificial scheme: each zodiacal sign controls 1000 years instead of the 2200 of the precession of the equinoxes; a prophet is assigned to each millennium, not to each period of zodiacal control. Apparently it was only the astronomical fact of twelve zodiacal signs that was borrowed; the religious construction is native Persian. And a similar remark may be made in reference to the Hindu duodecimal system. It was astronomy, not religion, that passed from Babylon eastward.

³⁵ Given in the *Bundahish*, a work regarded by E. W. West as later than the seventh century of our era; comp. Spiegel, *Eranische Alterthumskunde*, i, pp. 502 ff., ii, 151 ff.

The Hindu saviours are deities or Buddhas who appear when there is need of them, without regard to zodiacal periods. The Persian Saoshyant is reserved for the end of the world, a rôle sometimes assigned to the Jewish Messiah; there is only one historical prophet, and he occupies a position like that of Moses, he is said to receive a law from the Deity. These are Aryan religious constructions, based the one on practical monotheism, the other on pantheism, conceptions not found among early Semitic and Egyptian communities, except in the evanescent movement of Amenhotep IV. We look in vain for these eschatological outlooks in Egypt and Babylon. As an example of the "Oriental expectation of a redeemer" Jeremias³⁶ cites one old Egyptian text, the prediction of the sage Epu to the effect that Egypt will be overtaken by a terrible catastrophe, and that there will be great suffering till there arise the Shepherd for all men in whose heart is nothing evil.³⁷ This is simply the anticipation of a clear-sighted statesman and patriot, and has nothing to do with a cosmic Age. He foresees evil and expects deliverance; the "Shepherd" is a king or other great man who will bring order out of chaos and give peace to "all men,"³⁸ that is, to all the people of Egypt; ³⁹ he is beloved by the gods, as all good men are, and he is "divine" in the sense in which the kings of Egypt were divine. For the statement that there was an Egyptian "scheme" of suffering and salvation there is no ground in the documents. There is a similar lack of evidence for a Babylonian dogma of this sort. In the cosmological poems Bel or Marduk conquers the dragon of chaos and elsewhere the mythical Gilgamesh slays the invader Humbaba. In the historical inscriptions any king or his god may be the deliverer of the land from enemies or the conqueror of foreign countries. But all these persons and events arise naturally out of local conditions and temporary needs, and are paralleled in dozens of modern situations.

³⁶ Die Panbabylonisten, p. 49.

³⁷ Taken from Erman, 'Die ägyptische Literatur,' in Die Kultur der Gegenwart, I, 7, pp. 31 f.

³⁸ In a Babylonian inscription (4 Rawl. pls. 32, 33) the king is called "the shepherd of many nations"; see Jastrow, Religion of Babylonia and Assyria, p. 377.

³⁹ Just such predictions the Hebrew prophets make.

Among ancient peoples it was only the Hebrews who developed in a practical way the conception of national deliverance from misfortune by divine interposition. In the Old Testament the expectation of salvation always refers to a definite political situation, protection from some enemy. As a dogma this expectation first appears in the prophets of the eighth century, and is modified from time to time in accordance with the changes in the national life. At first the immediate agent of salvation is the national god Yahweh himself; then, from the sixth century on, attention is fixed on a political head, a king, the instrument of Yahweh, and finally, a supernaturally endowed Messiah is imagined, who is to usher in a new era of national peace and prosperity. In all this process, neither in the prophetic nor in the apocalyptic writings is there reference to zodiacal periods.

The application of the panbabylonian theory to the narrative of the Old Testament is made in detail by Winckler and Jeremias.⁴⁰ In estimating their Biblical work it must be borne in mind that they distinguish on the one hand between the composition of our present Biblical books and the substantial accuracy of their statements, and on the other hand between the historical validity of their cultural pictures and the dress in which they are clothed. They accept the results of the recent criticism of the Pentateuch and the rest of the Old Testament, but claim to look beneath and beyond this criticism to the historical kernel of the narratives; and, as regards the literary dress, they hold that substantial fact is presented under astral forms. Their confidence in the general historical verity of the Old Testament material is based on the accordance of its representations with the known conditions of the times involved, or, as they sometimes put it, on the harmony between those representations and the unitary ancient Oriental lore. Jeremias, further, falls back on his religious feeling; in the Old Testament, he says, the New Testament is concealed, and as Christian he accepts the former,—“the Israelite idea of God

⁴⁰ See Winckler, *Geschichte Israels*, ii, and the first half of Schrader's *Keil-inschriften und das Alte Testament*, ed. 3, and Jeremias's *Das Alte Testament*². The two protagonists differ in some minor points, but agree in fundamentals. See also H. Zimmern, in Schrader, *op. cit.* second half.

and expectation of redemption is not a distillation of human ideas that grew up in various regions of the ancient Orient, but eternal truth in the variegated garment of the Oriental mode of thought, and the forms of this mode of thought belong to a unitary conception of the world which sees in earthly things and events copies of heavenly things that are typically set forth in the pictures and the course of the starry heaven."⁴¹

We are not concerned here with the discussion of the historical verity of the early narratives of the Old Testament; we have to do only with the astral element in them. The close resemblance between the Biblical and the Babylonian accounts of creation and the flood is generally recognized, however it may be explained. According to one statement of the astralists the former is not borrowed from the latter, but the two give slightly divergent forms of the old Oriental tradition—a view held by many Biblical scholars; the stories in Gen. 1, says Jeremias, are neither sagas nor pallid myths, but a religious application of a conception of the world. There is no mention of a fall of man in the known Babylonian literature, but Jeremias refers to the Babylonian penitential hymns as showing a sense of sin. The myth of Yahweh's combat with the dragon, which runs through a considerable part of the Old Testament,⁴² is supposed by Jeremias to appear in the curse pronounced against the serpent in Eden, but Winckler regards the passage as relating to the struggle between light and darkness.

The more definitely characteristic side of the astral theory appears in its application to the patriarchal histories and the narratives of the exodus and the conquest. These are interpreted as full of situations and expressions that reflect zodiacal movements and receive their complete illustration from Babylonian and other ancient mythologies.

Winckler's mode of procedure is based on his general scheme of the origin and interpretation of legends, which is as follows: Legend, he says, takes its material substantially from mythology. The deeds and the traits of the gods are transferred to the hero, the demigod, and thus receive a human coloring; the next step

⁴¹ *Das Alte Testament*², p. vi.

⁴² But it is found only in later writings, in none before the sixth century B.C.

is the saga or folk-story, which completely humanizes the legend, but preserves the air of unreality, and discards definite data of place and time. The legend employs a relatively small mass of material. The same fundamental traits, the "motifs," meet us in varied personal forms all over the world; the same thing is everywhere told of the *genius loci* or the god; every land is a microcosm which includes all myths within its own limits. The Semites, by reason of their inability to conceive things otherwise than objectively, never developed the folk-story. The old Semitic god is a *genius loci*, bound by local conditions, and therefore the pre-islamic mythology of the Semitic peoples could not have been indigenous; the theistic doctrine of their temples, literary and scientific in form, was borrowed from older cultures. It follows that their legends of heroes go back to these older civilizations, such as the immigrants to Canaan came in contact with. The Semitic hero belongs not to nomads but to a settled life; if an Israelite hero appears as a Bedawi sheikh, that is because the people had not lost all memory of their old manner of life. In the settled Israelite civilization two strata of legends must be recognized: those that the immigrants found attached to the soil, dealing with heroes who are copies of local deities (as Abraham domiciled in Hebron, and Isaac in Beersheba), and those that grew up in the land (connected with the judges and the earliest kings). Naturally, the legends attaching to the first stratum will be purely mythological, and those attaching to the second historical; and there is a transitional form (as in the stories of the judges), in which a really historical figure is so overlaid with mythical elements that the details cannot be regarded as historical. Both in these last legends and in the hero-legends historical material may be discerned. The creators of legends are the singers, who at the courts of princes recounted old histories dressed in the mythical forms that were supplied by current tradition. Royal annalists also employed mythical material for the glorification of kings, and later all this mass of quasi-historical material received formal literary and scientific exposition.

So far as this scheme sets forth the general tendency in ancient times to treat national beginnings mythically and to embellish

great personages with legend, it states what is commonly believed. Exception must be taken to certain particulars of the scheme, as well as to the way in which it is applied in the treatment of Hebrew history. The description of legend as always issuing out of mythology is arbitrary; it would have been better to adhere to the usual distinction that myth is imaginative explanation of phenomena, and legend the embellishment or distortion of historical fact. Further, in the criticism of ancient records much depends on the answer to the question whether or not a given figure is a hero in the sense of being a demigod, whether, that is, the stories about him are myth or legend, and here there is room for arbitrary judgment. It is, of course, assumed by Winckler that wherever myth is found it is astral, and thus the door is opened to the widest and wildest comparisons, inferences, and constructions.

For the interpretation of the patriarchal stories not only the Old and New Testaments but also the Talmud and the Koran are freely drawn on; while the Old Testament history, as we have seen, is accepted as substantially true, it is regarded as incomplete and as idealizing; for example, the scene of the proposed sacrifice of Isaac, it is said, was not Moriah but Horeb. Abraham is treated as an ancestor not in an ethnological but in a religious sense; the ancestors are the medium of divine revelation to Israel in the olden time, and he embodies the genesis of the Israelite theistic faith.

"The documents indicate that the beginnings of the religious community that was later called 'the children of Israel' are to be found in a migration from Babylonia, from Ur and Harra, where the worship of the moon-god prevailed. Abraham's forefathers followed this astral religion (Josh. 24 2); he embodies the monotheistic current of the time. It may be surmised that the migration was connected with a reform movement, which brought him into collision with the authorities.⁴³ The migration may have been a protest against the degeneration of the moon-cult, or against polytheism, or against the predominance assigned by Hammurabi to the wor-

⁴³ Jeremias, *Das Alte Testament*, p. 333, n. 1, thinks that the Jewish and Islamic legend of the persecution of Abraham by Nimrod is not a bare fancy but a religious and historical truth, legendary in form and dressed out with mythological motifs.

ship of Marduk. Abraham was a Mahdi; he was guided by God, and he had experience of God. As to the character of his religion, traces of it appear in the divine names mentioned in Genesis. The name Ya'u occurs in Babylonian texts; it is the Old Testament Yah (Jah), and 'Yahweh' is a solemn differentiation (for distinction from the 'heathen' name) which at Sinai became the expression of religious concentration. But the name tells nothing of the conception of God."

As to this statement it may be said that no evidence is cited by the astralists for the view that the Abrahamic migration was determined by religious reform-motives. There is no hint of such motives in the Old Testament or the New Testament or the cuneiform material.⁴⁴ Winckler suggests that the Marduk cult of Hammurabi was a retrogression from the purer religion of Ur,—a conjecture without documentary support and in itself very improbable. Equally improbable is the supposition that the establishment of the supremacy of Marduk at Babylon could drive men from the country. Hammurabi was a polytheist, his religious devotion was catholic, he did not interfere, so far as our records go, with the worship at Ur or with any other worship. If Ya'u was a recognized deity in Babylonia,⁴⁵ Abraham might have worshipped him with impunity. Further, the astralist theory lays too great stress on the supposed monotheistic strain in the thought of the ancient Orient, which thought the leaders of the Abrahamic migration are held to have brought over to Canaan. It is true that there was a tendency to monolatry in this ancient world, especially in Semitic communities; the tendency was a growth out of the old social constitution, in which every group had a special practically all-powerful deity whom it revered on local grounds. This sort of devotion to the local deity is apparent in Babylonia and particularly in Canaan (where the Baals, the divine lords, were numerous) and in Arabia. But, if we except the movement of Amenhotep IV in Egypt, there is no historical record of any ancient Oriental worship that was confined to one god. That Egyptian king seems to have been a religious genius; we have, however, no details of

⁴⁴ The Nimrod legend may be safely ignored.

⁴⁵ This is, to say the least, very doubtful.

his religious experience. His movement did not long survive him. In proof of the statement that the Abrahamic migration brought monotheism into Canaan, we expect it to be shown that the Israelite leaders in continuous line maintained the sole worship of one god. Jeremias affirms that they did so, but he ignores what is said of Jacob's people (Gen. 30 2), of Gideon (Judg. 8 27), of David (1 Sam. 26 19), and others, and fails to notice that the Decalogue does not deny the existence of other gods than Yahweh.

The panbabylonian theory maintains that the astral conception of the world and of religion was known in Canaan and expressed by Israelite writers; that, for example, the patriarchal histories, while containing religious and historical truth, are conceived by the editors of the Pentateuch under astral forms. Winckler weaves his description of these forms into his exposition of the general history; we are not here concerned with his radical transformation of the old history, but have only to note that on the legendary side his object is merely to establish the legendary character of a given occurrence, and not to trace the legend to its origin. He holds that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are *genii locorum*. Each is a precipitate of the *numen* of the place with which he is connected. Abraham, whose original Canaanite locus was in Galilee (whence he was transferred by the Yahwist to the South), is a complete figure; he is one of the Dioscuri (Lot being the other), and he is the brother and consort of Sarai; she is Ishtar, and he is Tammuz-Adonis, and the father of both of them is the moon-god Sin. The proof is that Abraham comes from Ur and Haran, seats of the worship of this god, to whom his two names point; Abram means 'the father (Sin) is exalted,' and Abraham 'the father of a multitude' (Abraham as moon-god, the god of war);⁴⁶ so the moon-god Janus has two faces; his story reflects the myths of Etana and Ishtar's Descent.

Jacob likewise has two characters; in his mythical aspect he is Israel, in his genealogical Jacob. His moon-character appears

⁴⁶ His connection with Beersheba, Winckler holds, 'the well of Sheba,' points to a Canaanite god Sheba, the 'seven-god.'

from various facts: his father-in-law is Laban (the moon); he has twelve sons (the months of the year), and seventy-two descendants from five wives including Joseph's wife; and $72 \times 5 = 360$. His four wives correspond to the four quarters of the moon; Leah, weak-eyed, is the new moon, the beautiful Rachel is the full moon; Leah has seven children (the days of the week), one of them a daughter, Dinah, who is Ishtar (compare the "day of Venus," Friday).

Joseph is a genealogical figure, the representative of the Northern tribes, and as such he is an older creation than Israel, who represents the later unity of all the tribes; as belonging to Shechem he corresponds to the local god of that place, Baalberith (Judg. 9 4). As son of the moon-god, Jacob, he must be the sun-god (the Babylonian Shamash is the son of Sin), and he had therefore to be placed in Egypt, the chief seat of the cult of the sun—his stay in Egypt represents Tammuz in the underworld; his two sons are the two halves of the year, and Jacob's change of hands in Gen. 48 refers to the two reckonings of the year, the older, with the beginning in autumn, and the later, (Babylonian) with the beginning in spring.

It is unnecessary to follow Winckler into his discussion of Moses (Tammuz) and the judges; the method is everywhere the same. There is a wearisome iteration of sun and moon, Tammuz and Ishtar; the discovery of "motifs" usually requires no great ingenuity, but the exposition of the theory as a smoothly rounded whole sometimes calls for violent procedures.

Jeremias, while following Winckler in essentials, lays special stress on zodiacal Ages. Abraham (with Lot), he points out, is the founder of a new era (Gen. 12 3 f.).

"The Oriental historical narration assigns to the introducer of a new era the astral form that represents the beginning of the age. Abram lived in the Marduk age (devoted to the cult of the sun). The religious movement in which he was concerned will have been directed against the reigning cult. The preceding age was that of the moon or Gemini, and for this reason if old Canaanite documents dealt with Abram, they would have been led to introduce

into their narrative moon motifs or Gemini motifs. It must be noted that in this case the critical point is not in spring (as in the Marduk age) but at the solstice. Whether the author of our text understood the allusions is another question; perhaps in his combinatory work many such features were lost. The later Judaism (in the pseudepigrapha and the rabbinical sagas) recognized and revived the doctrine of motifs."

Here various questions occur to us. Marduk, it is true, became the chief god of Babylon, but was there a Marduk age? Were there old Canaanite documents, and were the Pentateuchal editors trained in the lore of ages and eras, equinoxes and solstices? And if certain points escaped them, can we trust the late Jewish writers to give the exact information that their predecessors failed to give. Affirmative answers to these questions are not to be found in the Babylonian and Hebrew documents.

Jeremias goes on to give the astral motifs in detail: 1. In names: Ab-ram, signifying 'the (divine) father is exalted,' points perhaps to a priestly character for Abraham. Sarah corresponds to the title (Sarratu) of the moon-goddess of Harran, and Milkah to an epithet (malkatu) of Ishtar. 2. Moon-motifs: the number 318 (Gen. 14 14) is the number of days in the moon-year in which the moon is visible; Abraham with his 318 companions fights the enemies, as the moon for 318 days fights the darkness. The number thirteen (Gen. 14 4) is lunar; twelve days the moon-year needs to equal it with the sun-year, and the thirteenth day begins the new year. The moon, like Abram, is a wanderer. 3. Gemini (Dioscuri) motif: Abram and Lot (like sun and moon) are the hostile brethren; as beginners of the new (Gemini) age, they show the Gemini motif. But, further (according to the Babylonian doctrine), both moon and sun and also Venus may assume the Tammuz form,—they sink to the underworld and rise to the upperworld. So Abram, cast by Nimrod into the fiery furnace, is rescued. Abram's journey with Sarah to Egypt is represented as a journey to the underworld and rescue therefrom. So Lot is rescued from Sodom, which is here the underworld; he is the sun, his wife the moon, both leave the lower world. Tammuz corresponds

also to Orion, which comes up in the summer solstice and goes below in the winter solstice,—so Abram and Jacob.

The story of Joseph is represented as sparkling with astralistic material; the kernel of the biography is true, but not the particulars,—the situation corresponds to Egyptian manners and history, but it does not follow that Joseph is an historical figure or that the particular incidents mentioned in Genesis ever occurred. He is himself saved and becomes a saviour, and therefore his history is framed in Tammuz motifs: 1. The sun, the moon, and eleven stars (the eleven constellations of the zodiac) do him homage;⁴⁷ so Tammuz represents the course of the world through the zodiac, and before him sun, moon, and the eleven bow. 2. Joseph is thrown into the pit in the Southland and into prison in Egypt; Tammuz, as evening-star, sinks into the abyss of ocean. To this motif are attached also the baker and the butler; they correspond to the two ministers of Marduk-Adapa. 3. Joseph's coat has the same Hebrew name as that of Tamar (2 Sam. 13 18 f.), and this Tamar has the Ishtar character. Jacob's mourning corresponds to the mourning of Tammuz. 4. Potiphar's wife takes revenge on Joseph as Ishtar brings sorrow on her lovers. 5. Joseph marries a daughter of the priest of the sun-god, and Tammuz receives the daughter of the sun as reward for service rendered. 6. The blessing bestowed on Joseph in Gen. 49 22 f. contains the Bull-Marduk motif. 7. The twelve sons correspond to the twelve signs of the zodiac, or, more exactly, to the twelve months of the year. Benjamin, as twelfth, has the five epagomenal days, and therefore he receives five garments of honor and five times as much food as his brothers.

The blessings of the twelve sons of Jacob (Gen. 49) are said to refer to the signs of the zodiac: Judah is clearly related to Leo, and in Deut. 33 17 Joseph is a bull; Simeon and Levi form a pair (Dioscuri) and slay a man as Gilgamesh and Eabani slay Humbaba—their sign is Gemini; for Virgo Dinah may be taken.

⁴⁷ Why only eleven? asks Jeremias,—because one is hid behind the sun, or did they reckon only eleven? This question only the Hebrew writer could answer, and perhaps not even he.

For the others Jeremias is hard put to it, but struggles bravely through the list: thus, Benjamin is a wolf, and Lupus is south of Scorpio; Asher yields royal dainties, and fish is a royal dainty, etc.

Moses is the saviour of the people from Egypt; the rescue is equivalent to a victory over the dragon. The inaugurator of a new period is provided with definite motifs that are either connected with the traditional accounts of his life or attached as embellishments, or invested with mystery in names, numbers, and paronomasias. So with Moses: 1. His origin is mysterious; the names of his parents are not given in Ex. 21, and Ex. 6²⁰ is an addition of the late priestly document; in Deut. 33⁹ he is fatherless and motherless, like Melchizedek in Heb. 7³, and so Elijah is described in the Talmudic tract Berakoth, 58a. 2. He is persecuted by a dragon (Pharaoh), and is exposed and saved in a vessel—so Sargon I, Abraham in late Jewish legend, Hathor, Osiris, Zeus, Cyrus, etc. 3. As Ishtar loves and saves Tammuz, so the Egyptian princess had compassion on the babe Moses and saved him. 4. The name Moses is perhaps Egyptian, but, considered as Hebrew, it signifies 'he who draws,' that is, as the story of Sargon indicates, the drawer of water, the gardener; and behind the person rescued stands Ea, the 'drawer of water,' the world-gardener (comp. Gen. 3, Yahweh as gardener). And, it may be added, as to the wilderness sanctuary, the ultimate origin of its title 'place of meeting' is the Oriental conception of the heavenly, or rather earthly, sanctuary in which the gods meet to determine fates.

For other such details we must refer to the writings of Winckler and Jeremias. The sort of ratiocination assumed by the latter writer is illustrated by his above-mentioned treatment of the name Moses. By the scribe of Ex. 2¹⁰ this name was supposed to mean 'drawn out'; that is, he took it to be a Hebrew past-participial form, which is impossible. The earlier constructors of history, those who conceived Moses under mythical forms, understood the name, so Jeremias holds, to be of the

form of the Hebrew active participle; they were ignorant of its Egyptian origin, but they were so imbued with the Oriental mythical method of writing history that they could present Moses as a congeries of mythical motifs. This combination of ignorance and culture at such a time appears improbable.

Considered as an explanation of mythical forms, astralism must be judged by the principles of mythological science; its one-sided character, from this point of view, is referred to above. Considered as an exposition of Biblical personages and incidents, it is unscientific in that it provides no adequate canons of criticism, and in most cases leaves the play of fancy unchecked.⁴⁸ That the Canaanite religion resembled the Babylonian is universally admitted; that certain parts of the Hebrew religious material were derived from Babylonia is probable. The sun-god was worshipped at Bethshemesh; the name of the moon-god Sin appears perhaps in Sinai. The Old Testament cosmogonic material, including the contest of Yahweh with the dragon, is most naturally to be referred to Babylonia, though it may possibly be Old-Semitic lore. The story of Samson may contain solar myths, though this supposition is not necessary; his name points merely to the existence of a cult of the sun in Israel.⁴⁹ The character of Yahweh may have been developed in part through Babylonian and Assyrian influence. But all this is far from giving warrant for a thorough-going astralizing of Biblical stories.

Even if the theory in question were established, its value for religious history proper would be small. The demonstration of the unity of all myths and of their derivation from the stars would, indeed, be an interesting contribution to mythological science, but would leave the core of religion untouched. In fact the expounders of the theory do not make a serious examination of a single element of religious faith. They assume for the prehistoric time a belief in monotheism and immortality; they do not inquire how this belief arose, how it was developed, and

⁴⁸ A parallel is the allegorical hermeneutic applied by the Alexandrian grammarians to Homer and by Christian writers to the Old Testament.

⁴⁹ Such a cult seems to have continued long; see 2 Kgs. 21 5, 23 11, Ezek. 6 4, Job 31 26.

what effect it had on national and individual life. Babylonian thought is represented as the creator of the doctrine of bodily resurrection, which was never held by Semites till they came under Aryan influence. Conceptions of the gods, which must lie back of all myths, are left unaccounted for. The human demand for a saviour is brought into connection not with religious experience but with astronomy. For a fair estimate of astralism it must be borne in mind that it is simply a theory of the origin of myths.

The last remark applies, of course, to the treatment of the Old Testament by Winckler and Jeremias. Astralism is limited in its scope (besides being unscientific in its methods), but it is something more—it is positively hostile to the understanding of the Bible. The most noteworthy features of the Old-Israelite religious development are the sureness with which it moves and the way in which it springs from the national fortunes or the experiences of individuals. As we pass from Amos and Hosea to Jeremiah and his successors, and then to the psalmists and sages, we are aware of a natural advance of thought. Everything is wrought out by reflection in a simple human way, and we have before us the picture of a highly endowed people building up in successive generations a religious system destined to become one of the great achievements of the human race. The astral theory tends to turn the attention from this impressive spectacle and fix it on details that, if they were real, would have the value only of antique curiosities. The stories of Abraham and Moses as they stand exhibit human experience and have human interest,—they are dehumanized when they are made into reflections of the adventures of Tammuz and Ishtar. Even when a true religious fact is recognized by the theory—as the fact that Israel looked for salvation from its God—it is clothed in so bizarre a costume of extravagant mythical fancy that it fades into a dogma of the “Ancient Oriental Lore” and has no power to kindle the imagination or give comfort to the soul.

*PRESENT RELIGIOUS CONDITIONS IN GERMANY*¹

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In considering the present religious conditions and prospects in Germany, the main problem appears to be this: Can the church, which up to the eighteenth century had been the chief promoter and embodiment of culture, remain and be preserved over against a culture which has now become independent, or is this independent modern culture destined to sweep the church away? And if the latter be the case, what then will become of religion? This problem of the prospects of religion and church in the modern world has nowhere more significance than in Germany; for there, as nowhere else, an immensely rich and highly developed intellectual culture stands absolutely independent over against a strong and living church. Neither in France nor in England nor in America is the issue so burning as in Germany. In France secular culture faces no strong church filled with profound spiritual forces, but an outgrown institution governed by Roman spiritual tyranny; and therefore it has triumphed over the church. In England and America secular culture has not developed in opposition to the church, but is in the main friendly to it. In Germany, however, national culture since the eighteenth century has stood outside of the church and in a certain opposition to it; Goethe, who in his own person embodies our national culture, took a cool and unsympathetic attitude towards the church, and so have in a greater or less degree the other creators of our modern thought,—Kant and Schiller, the Darwinists and Karl Marx, the Naturalists and Nietzsche, the Liberals of 1848 and Bismarck. On the other hand the church made very great progress in the nineteenth century. German theologians—Schleiermacher, Strauss, Baur, Ritschl, Harnack—utilized for the church the best spirit-

¹ Two lectures delivered at the Harvard Summer School of Theology, July 12 and 13, 1909.

ual results of modern culture, and gave to German theology undisputed leadership in the Protestant world; piety in the church was profoundly deepened and enriched by Schleiermacher, Claus Harms, Löhe, Wichern, von Bodelschwing, Stöcker; while the external power of the church increased greatly in consequence of the restoration movement, the political leadership of the pious Hohenzollerns, and the establishment of a new and more democratic ecclesiastical constitution with synods and presbyteries.

Thus in Germany two strong and highly developed spiritual forces confront one another. Of course their mutual relation is not wholly one of conflict; the Protestant church knows very well that the best elements of modern culture are capable of rendering it service, and therefore tries to adopt them; and on the other hand secular culture, though developing independently of the church, cannot simply throw aside the religious educator of the people, for the representatives of culture feel that without religion culture would lose a great inner force, and that if the church were destroyed, their own chief means of access to the hearts of the people would be cut off. And yet there is a constant antagonism between the two forces; many representatives of the highest culture see in the church the main obstacle to a free development of modern civilization, and on the other hand there are in the church, particularly in the Catholic church, many who hold that Goethe is the chief enemy against which the church has to contend. This antagonism is not due merely to the backwardness of the church or the impiety of the cultured, but is a struggle between two principles, two philosophies. It can scarcely, therefore, be brought to an end in the near future, but will probably disturb the world for a long time to come. And yet the present time may be destined to bring the conclusion a good deal nearer, because both sides acknowledge more and more the necessity of such a conclusion, and many of the best men are consciously working to bring it about.

In the present discussion of the religious situation in Germany I shall first undertake to describe the German church and our institutional religion, then to consider the place of the church in the life of the German nation and the extent of its influence,

and finally to give an account of the antagonism between the church and modern German thought, with especial attention to those elements of modern culture which may be called religious, and which tend either to supplant the church or to make a reconciliation possible.

I

The German churches are established churches; and, unlike the churches of England, all German churches are established and national churches. In principle every German is by birth a member of a church, just as he is a citizen of a state. In 1871, when the German Empire was founded as a Union of states, the affairs of the church, like almost all affairs of culture, were left to the single states. Therefore each of the twenty-six German states has its own established church, and in Prussia even the provinces conquered in 1866 still have their own independent established churches. Luther had transferred the office of bishop to the sovereigns, so that they might govern the church by right not of authority but of love. Accordingly each state had one church, with a confession the same as that of the sovereign. That, however, could not last, for in the beginning of the nineteenth century Napoleon completely changed the boundaries of the German states, and moreover the freedom of migration brought about a mixture of the confessions. So it happens that today almost all the states have at least two established churches, one Protestant and one Catholic. The Protestant state-churches call themselves either Lutheran or Reformed (that is, Calvinistic) or United, and some states have both a Lutheran and a Reformed state-church. But these names mean very little, and in reality there is one Protestant and one Catholic denomination in Germany, while the special character of the single state-churches is not determined by the name of their confession, but by their history and traditions. Some churches are strictly Lutheran; in others, as for instance in Baden, Württemberg, and Hesse, the name of the denomination is almost completely forgotten, and only the Protestant and the Catholic church are known. All churches are ruled by consistories, appointed by the government of the state; besides

these consistories there are synods and presbyteries elected by the members of the churches. The consistories of all the Protestant established churches are united in the "German Evangelical Church Congress," which, however, has no executive power. Like the members of the consistories, so also the professors of the theological faculties are appointed by the governments of the states and not by the church. Accordingly, since every German minister (with the exception of the Catholics in a few states) must have graduated from a German university, the Protestant churches have no influence upon the education of their ministers. The independence of the single parishes is not very great; only a part of them are free to elect their ministers, while the order of the church, the number of services and the order of service, the texts of sermons, the religious instruction of the young, and the like, are all regulated, not by the single parishes or ministers, but by consistories and synods. The size of the parishes varies greatly, running from 300 to 100,000 members; in Berlin the parishes average 35,000 people, with four pastors to each parish, but within the last twenty years the need of more churches in such rapidly growing cities has been recognized on all sides, and much has been done to satisfy it.

The religious life in these churches and parishes is very different in the different states. It must be remembered that the great majority of the German people still live in the same state or even the same province where their ancestors have lived for generations. So, necessarily, local history and tradition plays a much greater part than in America; a great preacher or a pious sovereign or a religious movement may give to the piety of certain places its character for more than a hundred years. And yet we can say that the type of piety in all German churches has something in common; it is throughout a decidedly Lutheran type. Luther's confession at the Diet of Worms is the shortest expression of that which seems to the German Protestant the ideal of a Christian: courageous trust in God and a conscience free towards the world but bound by God. Luther's deep consciousness of sin and his pessimistic conception of human nature are characteristic for German piety and theology.

Luther's high appreciation of the Word of God determines the form of the German service of worship; German sermons are not free speeches loosely attached to a word from the Bible, but are primarily interpretations of the Word of God, direct applications of the Bible text. Luther's translation of the Bible lives in the memory of the German, Lutheran and Reformed alike; it has created for the Germans their religious language, even for the Catholics. Luther's catechism, or some other very similar to it, is learned by almost all Protestant children in the public schools, and together with the Bible stories forms the basis of all religious instruction. Luther's hatred of Roman servitude still unites German Protestantism; Luther's rich and deep family life is the pattern of the German home, above all of the home of the Protestant pastor. Except Bismarck there is no man who is revered with greater enthusiastic loyalty as the genuine German hero, even by those who have completely forsaken the church, than is that fearless, rough, and deeply pious founder of German Protestantism.

But Lutheranism not only means such a deep and free piety, it has also its faults. One of them is the lack of activity on the part of the laymen; the German church is much more than the church in America a church of pastors. That is, of course, largely due to the fact that the German churches are state-churches. Where the state takes the best care of everything, there individual activity always develops more slowly than where the state leaves all care of culture to private activity. The German is put to no trouble in order to become a member of the church, he is born a member. When the child comes to school, it receives religious instruction from two to twelve hours each week, from the first day up to the last class of the high-school. This is given at first by the teacher, later during at least two years by the pastor, who prepares the boy or girl for confirmation. Usually men of theological training also teach in the high-schools the Bible, church history, Christian theology, and ethics. The religious instruction is on the average very good, prepared according to the rules of modern pedagogics; all religious teachers are graduates from normal schools or divinity schools. Therefore one finds in Germany thousands of old men and women who still

know by heart Luther's catechism, many hymns, and hundreds of Bible verses; the preacher may assume that all his audience are well acquainted with the stories of the Bible.

But when the child has graduated from the high-school, and all religious compulsion has ceased, and participation in the life of the church has become voluntary, then the state's excellent care and Lutheranism show their defect. The layman, accustomed to having the state and the pastor do everything, is very hard to induce to take an active part in the life of the church. Even a large majority of those laymen who are deeply religious do not care for religious institutions. They want perhaps to be uplifted on Sunday by the Word of God, but they hold that apart from that religion should have its place in the heart and in the work of every day, in professional, business, and family life, and should not claim any special activity in a religious institution. This was Luther's view. He wanted the church only in order that it should teach the Word of God; all moral tasks were to be left to individuals or to the government of the Christian state. The Lutheran church has never had a Puritan Sabbath or Calvinistic church discipline or the Calvinistic ideal of a theocracy as in the Old Testament; it has never tried to exert a direct influence upon political life. That has all been regarded as Catholic formalism or Catholic aspiration after secular power. The church is to do nothing else than teach the Word of God through sermon and religious instruction to individuals, that they may have inner assurance of the forgiveness of sin and, as free and thankful children of God, may lead a Christian life in family, profession, and business. This Lutheran conception has given a great and fruitful power to the state governments, the states have assumed the promotion of all culture and civilization and have done wonderful work in all these directions. This Lutheran conception is also a main cause of the famous German conscientiousness in professional duty. In the eyes of the German people no gifts to the church could ever make up for the failure to maintain ethical standards in professional life.

Now this disregard for strong religious institutions as compared with piety of the heart and an honest life was well enough

so long as state and culture and public opinion were Christian, so long as Christian truth was generally considered as the only truth. But since the end of the eighteenth and especially since the middle of the nineteenth century that is no longer the case, and at the present day this disregard of the institutional church has become a great danger to religion. The modern state must be neutral towards all the different religious and philosophical views; art, social life, politics, public opinion, have developed their own values, an immensely rich literature and press, thousands of secular clubs and societies, bring those values to the people, who consequently do not feel the need of, and do not have the time for, seeking instruction in the church. But since the church has attracted its members by no other means than the sermon, more and more people after leaving school lose all contact with the church, and soon with all religion. This danger in Germany has long been recognized by the church, and, as pietism from the end of the seventeenth century gathered for specific religious activity small circles within the church, so during the last twenty or thirty years there has grown up among the ministers a strong movement which attempts to strengthen the church as a religious institution. More and more ministers and friends of the church begin to feel that our church, as it was up to the last decades, as a mere institution for preaching and teaching, is bound to die and to be dissolved into state and general culture. Prayer is performed in the closet, or in the small circle of kindred souls; instruction is sought from science and literature; public worship is supplanted by art; social wants are satisfied by many clubs; the care of the poor and sick is taken over by the state. If the church cannot offer something that no nation can dispense with, and that only the church can give, then it has no longer a place in modern life, it is a form which does not promote but hinders the religion of the heart.

This criticism and the splendid example of the churches in Calvinistic countries are leading many to a new ideal of the church. They believe that the church does possess such a unique and indispensable treasure, namely, religious nurture and education through fellowship and brotherhood. But if that be the task of the church in the future, then it must have a new

organization. It must no longer be a church of pastors, with parishes of 35,000 people, who can have no personal acquaintance with one another, but small parishes must be organized with definite common moral tasks and common education, with parish societies and meetings and activity, as these have long been established in Calvinistic countries. Many pastors in all parts of Germany have accepted with great enthusiasm this new ideal of the church, and have built up in hard struggle against the centuries-old customary passivity of the laymen a well-organized, rich, and vital parish life which will well bear comparison with that of the best American parishes, though the organization is very different. But in many places, especially in the country parishes, when no energetic minister has undertaken the new task, we still find almost the old state of things. And even where real parish life has been developed, the majority of those who have taken an active part have in most cases come from the middle class alone. This ideal cannot be completely realized so long as German churches are national and established, including as members believers and unbelievers, religious and irreligious.

There is another aspect to the problem. One of the best features of the German churches is that they contain all classes, that the educated and uneducated, the rich and the poor, are together in the same church, sit in the same pews, just as in our cities rich and poor live in the same streets, so that there are no slums and scarcely any exclusive quarters. Where the class spirit is so sharp and has such evil consequences as in Germany, the church must consider it one of its chief tasks to assemble all classes in the same church, and precisely the adherents of this new ideal of the church see in the reconciliation of classes an important part of the education through fellowship at which they aim. But on the other hand this diversity is the greatest obstacle to such a well-organized parish life. It is extremely difficult, even in the sermon, to speak at the same time to peasant-woman and professor, to employer and working-man; and it is still more difficult to keep these different people together in parish meetings, parish clubs, parish entertainments. The differences of class and education are so great in Germany

that the classes scarcely understand one another. They speak different languages, and therefore the new ideal of parish life can never be fully realized. Yet in a limited way it may be very valuable, and already in a thousand examples it has proved a fruitful means of reviving religion and church.

The most brilliant aspect of German church life is presented by the work of the Christian societies (*"christliche Vereine"*). This work shows that the provision made by the state for religious ends has not completely destroyed private initiative; for these thousands of Christian Societies, organized under a few great Associations, are, like the American Young Men's Christian Association, not immediately connected with the church. By far the largest is the so-called "Inner Mission," which Wichern started in 1848 by his inspiring address at the Church Congress in Wittenberg. In accordance with his programme this association today includes evangelization, Young Men's Christian Associations, Young Women's Christian Associations (both these have in Germany more local branches than in the United States and Canada together), care of the sick and infirm through 18,000 voluntary trained-nurses, care of the poor, the prisoners, the outcast, home missions, work against alcoholism and immorality, laborers' colonies, religious lectures to win the educated classes, influence upon the daily press, the publication of Christian literature, and, especially in the last decade, a national Christian labor-movement over against socialism. All this is organized, though very loosely, under one central committee of the Inner Mission, and the men and women working in these fields are trained in great Inner Mission schools.

Of the other great organizations may be mentioned the twenty-seven separate foreign missionary societies, and the two greatest and most popular religious leagues. These are the Gustav Adolf League with 2,000 local branches, ministering to Protestants living among Catholics, whether at home or abroad, but chiefly in Austria and South America; and the Evangelical League with 350,000 members, which aims to unite Protestantism and to protect its interests against the Roman church.

On the whole, it must be said that this work of the Christian

Associations, of which a hundred years ago almost nothing, and sixty years ago very little, was known, and which is carried on exclusively by persons friendly to the church, proves better than anything else that the church in Germany is not declining, but is a great living power with a strong hold upon the German nation.

The outlook is much less favorable when we pass from the practical religious life of the church to the theoretical, to the questions of doctrine. Here we come to the point where the unity and harmony of the Protestant church in Germany, so fruitful in practical coöperation, seems about to break down. The nineteenth century has introduced a marvellous change, and seems to have disproved the assumption of a continuous progress of humanity. In 1800 orthodoxy had almost disappeared in Germany; as far as there was any interest in religion at all, it was either rationalistic—a faith in natural religion, or pietistic—with a disregard of all doctrine. But after the wars against Napoleon came the great reactionary movement in politics and in the church as well, directed by very energetic and able men, and carried through by every means of persuasion and force. Pietism and orthodoxy, formerly enemies, now entered into a league against the common enemy, rationalism. It was indeed a revival of religion over against the indifference and superficiality of the eighteenth century, but at the same time it was a retrogression, which even today we have not yet made up. The old formulas and confessions of Lutheran orthodoxy were revived and forced upon the congregations by pastors and governments. After a hard struggle orthodoxy won the victory, and in 1850 rationalism was expelled from the pulpits and church governments. To be sure, in the circles of political liberalism, so far as they have not completely lost religion, there is still much of the old rationalism left; “God, righteousness, and immortality,” is still the summary of their creed. But the really religious circles, and above all those friendly to the church, are for the most part orthodox. The best church-attendants and the most loyal workers in the Christian societies are all of the orthodox pietistic type; here we find real Christian life, intimate knowledge of the Bible, readiness to give, and courage to confess.

On the other hand the universities teach a theology which has gone far away from the old formulas. At the time of the restoration there were many able orthodox professors in the theological faculties—Hofmann, Frank, Philippi, Thomasius, Beck—and the majority of the pastors of today have accepted their theology; but on the whole, German theology in the nineteenth century has never ceased to be influenced by Schleiermacher, the great liberal theologian, and today there is no professor in any German university who would hold to the Lutheran formulas of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Even the leaders of the so-called positive theology—Seeberg, Grützmacher, Theodor Kaftan—assert the necessity of a “modern positive theology,” or a “modern theology of the old faith,” and teach the old truth in new forms. But they constitute only a minority in the universities; the majority, and in particular the most able men, are completely on the liberal side, and have influenced many, chiefly of the younger pastors.

At present there may be distinguished four more or less organized parties in the German churches. First stand the genuine Liberals, the “*Protestantenverein*,” corresponding perhaps to Unitarianism in America. They started their organization in the sixties, and are mostly followers of Hegel, or perhaps also of the old rationalism; and they attempt to reconcile Christianity and modern culture in a higher, rational religion, earnestly contending against the restoration and orthodoxy. This party has decreased very much during the last twenty-five years, but at present is again increasing.

The second party are “the friends of the *Christliche Welt*” (a religious weekly bearing that title) who, once under the leadership of Ritschl, have won the majority of the professors and a great number of the ministers, including a large part also of those who formerly belonged to the *Protestantenverein*. They hold firmly to the established churches and to their history, but they stand before everything else for absolute freedom of theological scholarship, and for full personal freedom for ministers in thought and teaching. They think it possible for conservative and modern theology to live and work together in the unity of the Spirit in one church. This party admits every type

of theology, but in reality almost all "*Freunde der Christlichen Welt*" are liberals.

The third party is the "middle party," or "*Evangelische Vereinigung*." They stand for moderate progress, to be attained by the equipment and organization of the present churches. And, finally, the fourth party is the "Positive Union," or orthodox party, the smallest among the professors, the largest among the ministers. The great majority of the laymen who are friendly to the church, and consequently the majority in the synods and in the Christian societies, stand on this orthodox side.

It is easy to see that such a state of things gives rise to serious complications. The fact that a majority of the professors and of the younger pastors are liberal, gives rise to grave distrust among religious laymen, who try to prevent the ministers from working in the Christian societies, and denounce them before the consistories. So arise the continual heresy-trials which so much hurt the life of the German churches. Most of the consistories are broad and tolerant, willing to grant freedom of thought to the ministers, and anxious to avoid the condemnation of a pastor on account of heresy; but it would require more than human wisdom to avoid oppressing freedom of thought without, on the other hand, alienating the best and most religious members from the church by openly favoring modern theology. The situation for the ministers is indeed difficult. If they avoid all doctrinal preaching and teaching, as most of them do, they risk the accusation of insincerity, and it is one of the most discouraging aspects of the situation that so large a part of the people, church-attendants as well as non-attendants, are of the opinion that ministers do not believe what they preach. Yet if the ministers, for full sincerity, tell the people the results of modern theology, they repel the best members of their churches and induce them to go to the sects, besides running the risk of a heresy-trial, always harmful to the church.

In spite, however, of the disinclination for theological polemic and enlightenment, professors and ministers are coming to the decision that it is best to make known to the people the results of modern historical criticism, not from the pulpit but in public

addresses, popular literature, and religious magazines. The gulf between university and church would become broader and broader, and would lead to a fatal division, if such work of enlightenment were avoided. So a great popular theological literature has sprung up; the *Christliche Welt*, which is probably the best Christian magazine in the world, the *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*, *Lebensfragen*, *Religionsgeschichtlicher Commentar* to the New Testament—all of the highest scientific quality—are designed chiefly for laymen. In the cities public lectures are instituted for the educated, to discuss modern theological questions; these are not directly connected with the church, and intentionally avoid an ecclesiastical tone. But the more this work is done, although with the greatest caution, the sharper becomes the antagonism between scientific theologians and the pietistic conservative part of the laity. One is sometimes inclined to believe that at the very time when in America the separate denominations are tending to draw nearer together, in Germany the one church is destined to be divided. However, the German church has passed through several such crises; in fact the theological struggle has never stopped since the time of the Reformation; and we may hope that this present crisis will not dissolve the unity of the church, as long as the church can remain a state institution.

But the unity of the Protestant church in Germany is disturbed by another danger, namely, the influence of the English and American denominations. I have thus far spoken only of established churches, that is to say national churches to which their members do not belong through an act of joining them, but into which they are born. But this principle is no longer fully maintained. For sixty years there have been in Germany more and more persons who do not belong to the established churches. Their absolute number is still so small that in a general summary they might be omitted. To the established churches belong 99½ per cent of the German population, only ½ per cent are outside the national church. Of these ½ per cent about one-third have left any church, while two-thirds, that is to say 200,000 people, belong to free churches, or, as we call them, sects. A small part of these are of German origin, as,

for instance, the Free Church Lutherans in Prussia, who left the established church when the Lutheran and Reformed churches were united. Almost all the other sects have come from Great Britain or America—Methodists, Baptists, Irvingites ("Catholic Apostolic Church"), Adventists, Christian Scientists, Mormons, Darbyites, etc. They create a decidedly foreign element in German church life, chiefly on account of their evangelistic preaching, their emphasis each upon some rather subordinate point of doctrine or constitution, and their rejection of all modern culture, art, science, and literature. Although they have thus far won only uneducated people, we cannot help regretting their work in Germany, for these sects come over from England and America as if missionaries to the heathen, while in reality not the unchurched, but only church-attendants, chiefly pietists, are withdrawn by their work from the established churches. Their chief means of propagandism are the objections against the institution of state-churches, as containing good and bad, believers and unbelievers, and as even having "unbelievers," that is to say modern theologians, as ministers. Since all this is regretted by many religious people, it is not difficult for the sects to win by these arguments some of the less educated, but very devout, church-attendants. On the other hand, their methods, especially the extravagant evangelistic methods which are so foreign to the German philosophical and thoughtful mind, tend to estrange the educated classes from all religion.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the relations between the church, and especially the ministers, and the sects are strained. The enthusiastic minister in an established church has difficulties enough with the multitude of the indifferent, and he must doubly regret to find himself confronted with an earnest opposition to his work among the very best members of the churches. Since the seventeenth century the German church has always had separate pietistic circles within it, but these pietists have been, and for the most part are still, quiet persons, who attend church regularly and help the pastors, while in addition they maintain their own separate meetings for Bible-study and prayer. In the last decade, however, through the influence of the Evangelical Alliance, founded at Liverpool and supported

in Germany by the sects and by many pietists, there has grown up in some pietistic circles an aggressive attitude, unfriendly to the state-church, which has led to deplorable excesses. The sects will undoubtedly increase, because the essential irrationality of every established church fosters sectarian propagandism; and although we regret their progress, we may yet be glad that their competition forces the established church to greater and more intensive care of the religious life of its members.

Far sharper than the antagonism felt toward the sects is the hostility of German Protestants to the Roman church. One can say that the opposition to Rome is the single point in which all Protestants, friends of the church and indifferents, conservatives and liberals, are united. The two societies founded to protect Protestant interests against Romanism, the Gustav Adolf League and the Evangelical League, are the most popular of all religious societies, and many secular societies have as one of their aims to help in the struggle against Romanism. To be sure, at the meetings of Catholics and Protestants, and on all possible occasions, there is much talk about peace between the confessions, because most Germans feel that this confessional antagonism is disastrous to Germany; yet the situation is at present as far removed from peace as ever. It cannot be said that the Protestant religion in Germany is endangered by Rome, for in only two states are the Catholics in a majority, and in the whole empire only 35 per cent are Catholics, while the changes from Catholicism to Protestantism are more numerous than the losses of the Protestant established churches, and are constantly increasing. In the German-speaking part of Austria 65,000 people have left the Roman church within the last ten years.

But even if there is no danger from Rome to the Protestant religion, Rome yet does everything possible to disturb the peace in Germany. The "Centre," or Catholic party, which forms the largest part in the Reichstag, holds the balance of power, there, and its policy regards the wishes of Rome more than the welfare of the German nation. Through the confessional, the Catholics are hindered from joining any liberal party; art and science are branded and oppressed, the Syllabus of 1864 condemns the foundations of all modern culture as impious errors,

and rejects freedom of conscience and toleration; and these principles, more and more pervade the Catholic clergy. Luther, the greatest of heroes in the eyes of the majority of Germans, is insulted in the Catholic press and schools as the greatest of criminals. Mixed marriages, and all conditions in which Protestants and Catholics are living together, are continually disturbed by the fanatical interference of the Catholic priests, especially those of the younger generation. The intolerance of Rome is constantly increasing; since the new Encyclical of 1907 all reform in Catholicism is bound to fail; Rome knows no other alternative but recantation or excommunication. Among the German Catholics there is much genuine piety and sincere patriotism, but they are completely powerless so long as Rome's jesuitical spirit is dominant in their church; and therefore if Protestants should co-operate with pious and patriotic Catholics they would only strengthen the power of jesuitical Rome. How this increasing antagonism, which divides and hampers Germany in almost all questions of inner politics, science, art, and social work, is to develop and to be overcome, it is impossible to know. We can only say that the power of the Roman church in Germany has marvellously increased within the last hundred years, and that at the same time the Catholic church in Germany has increasingly retrograded in its inner life. Reason has been banished more and more, jesuitical formalism, casuistical morality, ultramontanistic striving for political power, superstitious cults, have more and more repressed the sound religious forces in German Catholicism. Without a radical revolution in the Roman church there can be no hope for a solution of the disastrous antagonism between the two confessions.

A few words must be added about the relation between state and church, and the future of the established church in Germany.

Since the time when Schleiermacher in his romantic enthusiasm declared the union of state and church to be intolerable, the question of separation has never ceased in Germany, and it is much discussed today. Separation of state and church was most in favor in 1848, when the reactionary ecclesiastical politics of the Prussian government estranged the liberales and the working-

men from the church, and the Frankfort Parliament announced separation of state and church as a fundamental principle. Today no parliament in any state would do that; universal separation is not to be expected in the near future. In some states, it is true, the church is almost completely independent, but nowhere is it really a free church. Freedom of conscience and the right to withdraw from the church and to establish a free church is everywhere granted, and so long as only one-half per cent of the whole population are outside of the established churches and most of these send their children to receive religious instruction in the public schools, one can scarcely say that the existence of a state-church creates an unjust discrimination in favor of one part of the population; any more than one could say that about the government support of theatres or art. The sects have distinctly failed to appeal to the people at large, and especially to the educated. The vast majority of the persons opposed to the state-church are much more opposed to the free churches.

The political reasons why no parliament today attacks the question of separation are various. The old liberal conception of the state as merely the protector of law and order, and of the free development of the individual, is completely gone in Germany; the German states, by their traditions and historical development, have taken into their hands all the tasks of culture, provision for education, health, science, art, industry, agriculture, the care of the sick, the poor, and the old, schools, post-offices, railroads, banks. But if the government so promotes all culture, shall it leave the most important part of it, religion, to individuals? Moreover, the matter is closely bound up with education. Shall the state, which selects with greatest care all other professors in the universities, leave the selection of the theological professors to the church, in spite of the fact that the education of the whole people depends so largely upon the quality of the pastors? Shall it tolerate the possibility that the most important part of education, the religious education of the children, may be given in a manner directly opposed to modern German culture and to the interests of the state itself? But this is what the Catholic church, even now, though itself

under state supervision, always tries to do. And a further political motive lies in the dread of an independent church. In France today there are many indications that the free Catholic church, although severely restricted by the Laws of Separation, will engender grave complications for the republic. So interest for German culture and for the education of the people, and fear of the power of an independent, unsupervised church, combine to make our governments and parliaments averse to the separation of state and church.

If we consider the question from the point of view of the church, we reach the same result. To be sure, much harm has come to the Protestant church through its connection with the state—from the ecclesiastical partisanship of autocratic sovereigns, from red tape and bureaucracy, from the necessary regard of the state for Rome; but on the other hand the German people by long tradition are so accustomed to have the state care for everything that a free church could be maintained only with serious difficulty. In the state of Oldenburg separation was once accomplished, but after four years there were so many financial difficulties, so many parties and quarrels arose, that the church asked the state to take it again under its care. The religious life of the people would suffer great harm, if religious instruction, which thus far has reached all children, should be banished from the public schools and from public institutions. Furthermore, a division between Conservatives and Liberals would be inevitable in the free church, and that would break up practical co-operation in the religious societies, and would give to the Roman church a very dangerous superiority. Liberal religion would have great disadvantages, because the majority of the religious laymen would go to the orthodox side, and would not tolerate liberal professors in their universities. The state is the best protector of freedom within the church; the synods as well as the free churches in Germany are mostly narrow and intolerant. The main objection raised against the state-church, that it necessarily contains good and bad, believers and unbelievers, cannot be considered valid, and contradicts the Lutheran idea of the church. Luther denied that a visible church could ever separate good from bad, believers from unbelievers,

converted from unconverted. If it does so, if the visible church undertakes to be a communion of saints, it must always apply a very external test of sainthood. Those who wish to see the church a separated body of the converted, such as our sects claim to be, follow in this respect what seems to us an unchristian individualistic principle. The task of the church is to be the salt of the earth, to educate all people for the Kingdom of God, not merely to uplift a few segregated converted Christians. The question of separation is one of practical advantage, not of principle, and, as we have seen, the state and the church alike have at present many good reasons for maintaining the union.

II

We have seen that the church in Germany has undoubtedly grown stronger during the last century, the Catholic church stronger chiefly in external power, the Protestant in respect to internal efficiency. One hundred years ago there did not exist in all Germany anything like a parish life, or vitally interested congregations, excepting in some pietistic circles; the Protestant church was almost exclusively an institution for preaching and teaching, and the preaching was mostly shallow rationalism. No important theologian was to be found in Germany during the eighteenth century.

Today we find a rich, well-organized, and busy life in many congregations; the work of home and foreign missions grows year by year, as does the willingness to give; sermons have become fresher and more appropriate to the modern world; the religious instruction of the young has made great progress, chiefly within the last ten years, and is undoubtedly better than that of any other country; in many great cities more churches have been built within the last thirty years than during the previous two centuries, and they are often splendid works of modern art. Theology, with men like Harnack, Herrmann, Seeberg, Troeltsch, Loofs, takes its fully acknowledged place in the universities; the results of modern research in theology are disseminated by the church more and more widely among the people; and evangelical work is carried on with greater

zeal than ever before among educated and uneducated. Certainly, we can say that the intensive power of the church is growing, that the church exerts a deeper influence upon the lives of its friends than was the case one hundred, or even twenty, years ago.

Much more difficult is it to decide whether the extensive influence of the church is growing or declining. We may distinguish in Germany four sections of the people, possessing about the same numerical strength, and representing four different philosophies, ideals, cultures: first, the conservatives; secondly, the liberals; thirdly, the ultramontanes (Romanists); fourthly, the socialists, or social-democrats. Three of these sections take a fairly distinct and uniform attitude towards the church. The conservatives are friends of the Protestant church, the ultramontanes are strict Catholics, the social-democrats reject all church and religion. Not quite so clear is the attitude of the liberal section; yet we may say that a majority of the liberals are either indifferent or hostile to the church, although perhaps not so to religion. Considering the statistics of these four groups, we find that of the whole German population about 35 per cent take a friendly attitude to the Protestant church, about 25 per cent to the Catholic church, and that about 40 per cent are completely indifferent or hostile to all churches. These proportions are reckoned by noting the number of votes cast in 1907 in the last election to the Reichstag; they show the political attitude of the men alone, and hence are not an adequate index of the attitude of the whole population. Yet we are probably not far from the truth, for in Germany the political parties do not merely represent different practical principles, but different philosophies, ideals, views of life; one might almost say that the political parties differ from one another as much in their views about religion and science and art as about politics. That is, indeed, a sign of the depth of German culture, which pervades the whole of a man's life; but it is a great calamity that the different groups of the German population have almost nothing in common. We have no Washington and Lincoln and Longfellow, whom the whole nation honors; those heroes who are worshipped with enthu-

siasm by one part of the people, like Luther or Goethe or Bismarck or Lassalle, are for another part objects of fanatical hatred or at least of great offence.

But we should have too favorable an impression of the conditions of the church in Germany if we regarded merely the fact that about sixty per cent of the population are friendly to the church. For although this sixty per cent may be willing to grant the means necessary for maintaining the churches and to send their children to religious instruction, yet only perhaps half of them attend church. The average attendance at the Lord's Supper is in Prussia thirty-seven per cent of the Protestant population, in one state ninety per cent, in Hamburg only eight per cent. Furthermore, we must consider that just among those who create public opinion, the authors and journalists, the majority are unfriendly to the church. If we look into German papers, magazines, or books, we find amazingly little real sympathy with the church, but much hatred and scorn. The situation in this respect is quite other than it is in America. In large circles it is a matter of good form to disparage the church. In many public questions of morality, or politics, or social reform, any interference by the church only does harm, because a great part of the men who influence public opinion oppose on principle policies which the church supports. It would be too much to say that ten per cent of the educated Protestant men are regular church-attendants. This is not surprising. The boy in school is first taught to love the Christian religion, the Bible, the church; later he becomes acquainted with the rich sources of modern German culture, he reads Lessing, Schiller, Goethe, Kant, and discovers that these and other men whom he is taught to revere as teachers of highest wisdom, were indifferent or opposed to the church. And so, although he may still believe, as did most of those heroes, that the Christian religion is the highest element in our civilization, yet he comes to think that the church is of no benefit to him. The sermon which must be adapted to uneducated listeners does not seem to offer anything to him, while the orthodoxy of many preachers repels him, and the caution of the liberals makes him distrust their sincerity. That the church has other purposes besides preach-

ing, that it should cultivate Christian fellowship, is an idea too new to attract him, and in any case the fellowship in one congregation of educated and uneducated, of the different classes, seems to him impossible. Hence many an educated person takes no part in the life of the church, although he may be willing to support it, and may let his children be baptized and taught the Christian religion. And all this is on the supposition that he does not become one of that great number of educated men, chiefly among the liberals, who consider not only the church, but also the Christian religion, to be old-fashioned and outgrown.

Is this unfriendliness to the church growing or declining? That is difficult to say. If we consider statistics, we might be forced to say that the estrangement from the church is growing, for the peasant and middle classes, whose members are the best church-attendants, do not grow in numbers, while the industrial class, and therefore the social-democrats, are increasing rapidly. The peasants move to the cities, and there become social-democrats and so hostile to the church. But over against this growing estrangement stands the certainty that the public influence of the church is actually increasing. Thirty years ago the conservative press took no notice of the church, and the liberal press attacked it bitterly. Today, through a change which has come about chiefly in the last decade, the conservative press openly defends and favors the Protestant church, and a large part of the liberal press has given up its blind hatred. Only the socialist press and some radical liberal papers maintain the old hostility. The old liberalism of the middle of the nineteenth century is everywhere dying out, and the new liberalism is very different, as in other matters so in its attitude to the church. Twenty years ago the church had not a single friend among the liberal members of the Reichstag, today two of the leaders of the liberal party in the Reichstag are former Protestant pastors. Since in Germany never numbers, but only quality, is decisive, it would not be just to say that the influence of the church is declining. Rather is it true that the position of the church is more satisfactory today than it has been at any time within the last sixty years. And, at any rate among church-

attendants, the number of persons to whom religion is an affair of personal moral decision is much greater than has been the case for a long time past. It is true, the number of persons abandoning the church-membership, although still very small (only one-sixth per cent), is increasing, and will probably continue to do so; but this cannot be regretted; on the contrary, it is the most hopeful sign of the present situation, for it shows that the old fatal indifference is disappearing, and that men are beginning to decide positively for or against the church.

What, now, is the present outlook for religion and Christianity in the four sections of the German population? Of the first two groups, the conservatives and the ultramontanes, I have already spoken. Conservative principles and philosophy are found in the nobility, in one part of the middle class, and above all among the peasants. All these classes are at the same time the best members of the Protestant church. Among the nobility and in some sections of the middle class the principle, "Throne and Altar together against Revolution," has still a strong hold. The peasants have come so little in touch with modern culture that they have no difficulties in believing the old orthodox formulas. We find among them much genuine piety and deep loyalty to the church, but since the majority of them are far behind the knowledge and ideals of the present age, their attitude can scarcely decide the future of religion in Germany. If the church remains as it has been up to the present, primarily a church of the conservatives, its influence on the life of the nation must decrease more and more.

The second group, the ultramontanes, is even more reactionary and backward in its philosophy than are the Protestant conservatives. Ultramontanism still follows the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and the superstition of the Middle Ages. One hundred years ago its death was prophesied, but history has shown that Rome's power is immeasurable and is able to force mediaeval culture upon the twentieth century. Ultramontanism presents the most hopeless problem in Germany, chiefly because Germans can contribute nothing towards it, but must wait as passive spectators to see how Rome itself shall develop.

Of the social-democrats more remains to be said. A fourth part of the German population are social-democrats. Their programme, laid down at Erfurt in 1891, is purely economic and political; religion is declared to be a private affair. But, in reality, among the German social-democrats only the so-called "scientific socialism," that is, the doctrine of Karl Marx, is considered to be socialism proper, and that doctrine is incompatible not only with the church and the Christian religion, but indeed with every religion. The Marxian system is based on economic materialism in its most pronounced form, and leaves no room for independent spiritual forces and values. Accordingly, we find throughout the books of the German socialist leaders many sentences which predict the certain destruction of all religion. "We do not seek new religious forms, we deny all religion," says the great leader Bebel. And the other socialist leader, Liebknecht, declares that "the Christian religion is the religion of private property and of the respectable classes."

Now to this position of the socialist programme and leaders corresponds the attitude of the millions of German social-democrats, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the German wage-earning class. Religion is a private affair,—that means for most of them: As socialists, we are indifferent to religion and church. Some of the leaders have tried again and again to bring about a secession from the church *en masse*, but they have had little success. The vast majority have their children baptized, and are married in church and buried with Christian rites, and part of them pay church-taxes; but that does not mean that they are friendly at heart. That they do not leave the church is because they are absolutely indifferent, and because it is customary to have religious ceremonies at wedding and funeral; from their inner life religion has disappeared.

But this attitude of indifference pertains only to the great unthinking mass. All socialists who think a little deeper, including the whole socialist literature and press, are not indifferent, but display unbounded hatred of the church. "The church is an institution to stultify the people, the ministers

are fools or hypocrites"; this dogma characterizes the attitude of socialist literature. Science and religion are considered as presenting an irreconcilable contradiction; religion is but the tool of the rich to keep the masses in darkness, the rich themselves do not believe in it. Accordingly, social-democracy has undertaken through a great popular literature and by constant public lectures to enlighten the people, to preach materialism as the result of science, and so to destroy religion and faith forever. Socialist evangelists go from place to place and preach in this sense about religion and church, in socialist meetings the subject is treated at length, and the children are influenced against their religious teachers. The outward result of this agitation can be seen in the withdrawals from the church, which are mostly on the part of social-democrats. The number of social-democrats who ever attend a service on Sunday is almost nil; upon every workingman who goes to church his fellow-workers pour out tremendous scorn. Inwardly, the effect is a horrible pessimism; faith in ideal values, trust in God's help, hope in an eternal life is gone. There remains only the endless hard struggle for existence and in the far background the expectation of a future socialist state, which the present generation will not see, and the benefits of which are purely material. But besides that,—and here we come to the most critical point,—with religious faith moral ideals also vanish. Especially the demoralization of the young has made amazing progress, chastity is considered a ridiculous prudery by girls as well as young men. Morality, like religion, is scoffed at as an illusion, the political struggle instigates the basest passions, the accepted doctrine of the party condemns the best virtues and undermines the most holy institutions—family and fatherland. If the strong power of conscience, which is native to the German people, had not counteracted the party doctrine, this demoralization would have gone much farther. Pastor Göhre, who knows social-democracy most intimately, who has himself been a workingman and now belongs to the social-democratic party, gives this judgment: "The effect of the social agitation has thus far been much less disastrous for the political and economic ideas of the workingmen than for their religious convictions and moral char-

acter. In the destruction of the Christian religion, social-democracy has had its greatest success."

What are the reasons for this sad state of things? The main reason is the materialism of the socialist doctrine. Marx and Engels founded socialism in the years 1840 to 1880, that is to say, in the period when materialism was the predominant philosophy in Germany. Consequently, today, when materialism and theological hypercriticism have lost their place among scholars and students, the lower classes accept as gospels Strauss's *Life of Jesus* and Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe*. As every spiritual movement comes down to the masses at about the time when it is outgrown among scholars, so it has been with materialism, and it would probably have been so, even if Marx had not made materialism the basis of his system. The attitude of the leaders can be further explained by the fact that by origin the majority of them were Jews who had lost their religion.

But all that can serve to explain only their indifference to the church, not their hatred of it. For this enmity the church itself must bear part of the guilt. During the last centuries the church has not been capable of educating the masses to real religion. It has retained old formulas, and renewed them in the time of reaction, and in so doing has brought it about that those for whom science and philosophy had destroyed the old formulas have lost all religion. In reading the criticisms of the socialists and in discussing religious problems with them, one finds that very few attack religion,—the life in and through God,—what they usually attack is certain dogmas, or alleged historical facts, or the attitude of some ministers. The real experience of faith they have apparently never known at all.

The second mistake of the church was political, and this was perhaps the greater mistake. At the time when Marx worked out his system, the dominant principle in Germany, and especially in Prussia, was "Throne and Altar together against Revolution," the church was used by the government for the support of its reactionary policies. And today the church is still in the main a conservative force; the newspapers friendly to the church are mostly conservative in politics. We have seen the reason for this in the materialistic principles adopted by both liberals

and socialists, and the consequent predominance in church affairs of the conservatives. But the accusation of the social-democrats that the ministers keep the masses down, is no longer justified, for today a very large part of the ministers are imbued with social ideas. As early as 1878 the court-preacher Stöcker founded the Christian Social party. Many ministers and friends of the church joined him; Christian workingmen's societies were started everywhere. But Stöcker was a very conservative man, he tried to solve the social question by paternal methods, and keeping to the orthodox formulas he was not able to bring religion nearer to the modern workingman. It remains, however, his great merit to have stirred the Protestant church and reminded it of its social responsibility. In the eighties Bismarck, and since the nineties Emperor William, both led by distinctly Christian motives, carried through the extensive German labor-legislation, and brought state socialism in Germany farther than it has gone in any other country. But through other governmental measures the socialists were driven further into opposition.

Since the beginning of the nineties, Pastor Friedrich Naumann has made a new attempt to solve the problem of social-democracy. He had formerly been an enthusiastic follower of Stöcker, and with marvellous eloquence had preached to the church and the pastors the duty of solving the social question through active participation in politics. He parted with Stöcker because he saw an obstacle in Stöcker's paternalism and orthodoxy; and he founded the National Social party, with the conviction that the social-democrats could be won for patriotism and the church, if liberalism would vigorously take up social problems and stand firm for labor-unionism. A deeply religious man and an enthusiastic orator, Naumann succeeded in winning many friends of the church, especially the younger pastors, to this new liberalism. In the years 1890 to 1894 there was a wave of social enthusiasm in the German Protestant church comparable with that in the United States at present. But the movement in Germany subsided, and for two reasons. First, Naumann did not succeed in winning over to his party a single socialist. The socialists scoffed at the

social pastor; they do not want to have their programme carried through little by little in a legal way, the theory of the inevitable increase of misery up to the final catastrophe has become with them an absolute dogma. So after four years the National Social party collapsed. Furthermore, Naumann himself has changed. He saw that, given the tremendous growth of our population, the first thing necessary for helping the social need in Germany is a great industrial development, and that this is possible only if Germany consciously adopts imperialistic policies, acquires colonies, and builds a navy. But that led to complications with Christian principles; indeed, Naumann came to the conclusion that politics, whether social or of any other sort, is primarily a struggle for power, and that it is impossible to derive the aims of politics from the Gospel. The Christian religion can put the struggle for power on a higher level, but it cannot solve the present problems.

This change in Naumann, and the failure to make converts from the social-democracy, have diminished the social enthusiasm of the friends of the church; more and more they have come to recognize that equally good Christians may hold very different opinions about the solution of the social question, and that therefore ministers who deal with political questions will necessarily be forced to enter into the struggle of parties. But the laymen justly ask that the ministers shall not be partisans, and so, especially because of the harmful political activity of the Catholic priests through the confessional, the demand has more and more prevailed that ministers shall not discuss politics. The "Christian social" enthusiasm has abated, but it has made the issue clearer, and has shown where the Gospel has its place and where not. The social spirit has at the same time extended itself in the church; in most cities the ministers have formed Christian workingmen's societies, which, with no party standpoint, take up political, social, religious, and educational questions, and in so doing infuse the Christian spirit into the discussion of social problems. The Protestant workingmen's societies have 140,000 members, the Catholic 400,000. Besides, there are two Protestant social congresses, one more conservative, the other more liberal, where ministers and economists

and manufacturers and Christian labor-leaders discuss and promote the solution of social problems. Not only within the church, however, but everywhere in Germany the social spirit, due in great measure to Naumann, is growing; the movement is no longer so enthusiastic as it was fifteen years ago, but it is more solid, sober, and thorough, an idealism which, we may hope, will at last win the victory over social democracy, and so open anew the way to religion for a great class of the people. But it must be confessed that thus far the growth of social-democracy has not been checked by all these movements; the social-democratic party is still increasing, though not in proportion to the increasing number of wage-earners, and more and more people are losing all religion.

The hope of victory must be based chiefly on theoretical considerations. First, materialism is definitely overcome in German philosophy and art, and this rejection of materialism must in time reach the masses. The overcoming of materialism in the laboring class will be a hard struggle, because the whole socialist system is based on materialism, but it will surely be accomplished at last. Germans are always primarily philosophers and thinkers, and in the social-democracy the philosophy of materialism has had a much greater influence than practical political and social doctrines. The German workingman is much more a philosopher than a politician, and in the end he will have to recognize the shallowness of materialism. For many of the best social-democrats even today their doctrine is something like a new religion, it is an ideal, a faith in the final victory of the good cause, and it leads them to the most unselfish devotion. They will learn how poor the world and mankind would be if its religion consisted only of material, economic, and political ideals. We may say already that Marxian socialism has reached its culmination. Although the numbers are growing, and the masses vote down all revision of the doctrine in the party congresses, yet the party will soon be almost like an army without officers, for the best and most intelligent members have revisionistic tendencies. And revisionism means not only the abrogation of the revolutionary principles, but also the abandonment of the materialistic foundation and of the

dogmatic attitude which scorns all idealism, all religion, and the church, as folly and hypocrisy.

III

If our confidence in a revival of religion among socialists is mainly theoretical, we can point out a more concrete basis for hope when we turn to the fourth or liberal group. And the attitude of liberalism is most important for our question, for it is decisive for the future of religion and the church in Germany. To be sure, liberalism comprises today very diverse elements. All those whom we call typically modern are here united,—a great part of the mob of the cities, the modern Jews, the classes who are moved by superficial sentiment, the apostles of immorality. These pseudo-liberals, who form a majority of their group, take much the same attitude to the church as do the socialists, an attitude of indifference or of blind hate. But to the class of modern men, to liberalism, belong as well the creators and representatives of real German culture, artists, professors, literary men, reformers, those whose attitude decides the future. For it is always true that what these men stand for today, will in the future become the common ideas of the people. Because one hundred years ago Goethe and Schiller turned from the church, and because fifty years ago science professed to have refuted religion, therefore today the masses leave the church and the workingmen scoff at religion. And if the men of art and scholarship turn to religion today, within one or two generations the masses will follow, even though no great reformer like Luther appears who can win the whole people by one stroke of genius.

So we come at last to the question which we asked at the beginning. Is the Christian religion possible for the modern man? Is the support of the church compatible with modern culture?

Since the latter part of the eighteenth century, when modern German culture began, the whole life of the educated German has been imbued with a rich culture completely independent of the church. In modern Germany, as nowhere else, all fields of culture have intimately co-operated; classicism, romanticism,

naturalism, impressionism, have put their impress not only on philosophy and literature, painting and music, but also on education, politics, and economics. At present no single new movement seems to be supplanting the old in all fields at once; the characteristic of today is rather that contradictory principles exist together, and often in the same persons. The older tendencies are not completely abolished by the more modern. One element alone seems to be common to all the tendencies of modern culture, the purely negative characteristic of Anti-supernaturalism. A supernaturalistic view of the world was self-evident for the church from its beginning and through the Middle Ages and at the time of the Reformation. By a positive revelation and an absolute miracle God has brought from the outside into the sinful natural world salvation for that part of mankind who with their hearts accept his revelation. After a short period of earthly life these persons will be led to their true home in heaven. This philosophy, which conceives all history as a drama played between heaven and earth, between the supernatural and the natural world, has completely disappeared from our modern thinking. Kant, the leader of modern German philosophy, and Goethe, the hero of modern German art, have destroyed it for the educated part of the German people. The classical German idealists—Kant, Schiller, Goethe, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling—were not atheistic,—on the contrary, most of them were pantheistic, and accepted all reality as a revelation of the divine; yet this idealism was in fundamental ways, above all in its anti-supernaturalism, opposed to what had up to that time passed for Christian religion, and the idealists were very far from the church. Since, according to them, all life and all human relations share in the eternal, they had no need for specific religion. The highest thing in life for Kant was morality; for the others it was rather philosophy, art, or science.

But in the middle of the nineteenth century, after a splendid period of predominance, this classical German idealism collapsed. The idealization and deification of reality appeared unjustifiable—a subjective transgression of the limits of experience, and a stronger feeling for the dark and gloomy aspects of life and the world caused the idea of the whole world as a

realm of reason and a revelation of God to seem a vast illusion. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, natural sciences, positivism, naturalism, have taken the place of idealistic art and philosophy; science no longer tries to understand things from their inner reasons, but only to investigate and order phenomena; art no longer aims to create a new world, but to copy as closely as possible the immediate impression of things; political and private life no longer strive for ideals and for universal harmony, but are a struggle for the physical, economical, and political fundamentals of existence. A new realistic type of culture has arisen, such as was never known in Germany before. The truest representatives of German idealism, Schiller, Fichte, Hegel, are neglected and derided; only Goethe, that universal genius, who in all his idealism had always a marvellously keen sense for real life, has maintained his place as hero, and of Kant only the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the philosophy of the caused phenomenal world, has maintained its acceptance. This realistic culture of the second half of the nineteenth century has made life immensely rich and refined, has not only created a politically united, strong empire, and produced enormous progress in industry and the arts, and in the standard of living, but has also sharpened our eyes for the realities of life, and taught us that to get truth is more important than to idealize things, that life and art are not a play or a toy, but serious hard work. The naturalistic art of poets like Ibsen and Hauptmann and of painters like Liebermann has revealed with inexorable sharpness the intricate complexity of the soul and the cruel mechanism of society, so that today no optimistic phrases or idealistic abstractions can make us overlook the realities of life.

But from the church and religion this realistic culture has departed still more widely than did the pantheistic idealism of the first half of the century. Religion, like metaphysics, can appear to such naturalistic thinking only as a beautiful dream or a foolish illusion. In philosophy agnostic positivism does not allow reflection on God and eternal things; materialism, or, as it calls itself today, monism, treats all psychic life, and so religion, as an accidental product of the causal physical mechanism, and rejects the idea of a personal God as unscientific. The few

thinkers who use the name of God venerate him as mere natural power pervading the world, to which any personal relation is impossible. Concepts like love and grace, faith and trust, are called anthropomorphic. Not a certain form of religion, but religion as such, seems outgrown. The somewhat vague conceptions of a transcendental world and spiritual values are contrary to the whole temper of a realistic age, which through the predominance of natural sciences and technique has come to unbounded admiration for exact empirical facts. Furthermore, the results of modern historical criticism, and the work of Strauss and Baur, have become known to the educated laymen, and have taken away their belief in the trustworthiness of the fundamentals of Christianity. So religion has vanished from the minds of the representatives of the highest modern culture; for many of them art has taken the place of religion, a realistic art which is supposed to be able to satisfy the longings of the soul.

The sad results of naturalism are seen not only in the attitude of the age towards religion, but also in its morality. It is true that a great part of the naturalistic philosophers and artists acknowledge the ideals of truth and goodness and beauty, but only as natural and necessary products of the social evolution of mankind, and therefore as possessing merely relative value. The complete determinism of the age allows no faith in free moral personalities. Moral weakness and cynicism pervade large numbers of the educated; and when in the later eighties and the nineties of the nineteenth century the old optimism in regard to technical and political success gave way to the painful discovery of the inner demoralization and shallowness of life, German culture of the so-called *fin de siècle* really became in many respects a decadent civilization.

All this still exists in German liberalism today. The zealous League of Monists under the leadership of Haeckel still preaches materialism to the people, realistic interests still control many of the educated, the spirit of decadence still produces in arts and literature abundant, and sometimes horrible, fruits, and the Christian religion and Christian morality still find their most dangerous enemies among the men and women of culture.

And yet we are justified in saying that the profoundest men of our time are no longer on the side of the enemies of religion, and that since the end of the nineteenth century naturalism has been continuously declining until it has nearly disappeared among the men of highest education. And what has taken its place? The new spirit is called neo-romanticism, or mysticism, or symbolism; in reality, we must confess that it is not a definite new type of culture, but only a great striving,—but this striving we may fairly call religious. The one great problem of the salvation of the soul, the question: How can the soul find the eternal? has driven all others into the background. The old broad faith in the sufficiency of secular culture is deeply shaken. Men had believed that this faith would make life rich and man great, and it turns out that on the contrary it has made our life small and poor.

As leaders of this modern movement, with its deep striving, may be named three great men, of whom only one is a German, but who have all found their greatest body of disciples in Germany: Ibsen, Tolstoi, Nietzsche. Ibsen was a naturalist in fundamental philosophy, but the problem of the soul in danger of perishing under the standardizing and mechanizing power of culture had laid hold on him, and he tried to solve it, although by purely naturalistic means which led to failure—a complete bankruptcy, of which his last book is the frank confession. Tolstoi has preached with the tremendous force of genius that our realistic culture is absurd and will ruin mankind. He has thereby expressed the dim feeling of thousands, and has attained to enormous influence. But the majority follow him only on his negative side, in his criticism of the present civilization; the way to salvation which he has shown, a radical anarchism of Christian brotherhood, has found few in Germany to accept it. Tolstoi is a John the Baptist, the forerunner, preaching the law and calling the men of his time to repentance.

A far greater influence than that of Ibsen or Tolstoi has been exercised by Nietzsche. He has aroused an interest and enthusiasm, chiefly among the young, which America can scarcely imagine. Although during the last twenty years an immense literature has been written about him, he is still the unsolved

riddle for Germany. In a language whose music enchants every artistic sense, he has preached, as a new Messiah, the great gospel of the superman. He has attacked the Christian religion and Christian morality as the one great fundamental lie which has made our culture sick and decadent; God is dead, sin never existed, truth we do not want, the will of the few to be mighty is alone God and truth and righteousness. This doctrine has caused a widespread agitation and confusion of mind. The decadents, especially the aesthetic and literary youth, have accepted it with enthusiasm, and preached brutal immorality with provoking frankness. Aristocratic tendencies have again come forward, and in many circles have driven out the newer democratic ideas; unbounded individualism, which since the days of romanticism has had a great hold on our people, claims the right to live its own life without restrictions. The "Congregation of Nietzsche," as they call themselves, have undertaken a campaign to overthrow the Christian religion.

So Nietzsche seems to have been a destroyer of Christianity. Yet this is surely not the place which he will take in the history of German thought. Quite the contrary. Nietzsche's philosophical ideas may temporarily confuse the minds of a great part of the educated, but they will soon be outgrown by reason of their own irrationality. Nietzsche was not a philosopher, he was a poet and a prophet, and he has made an end of naturalism in Germany. He saw that there is only one problem in life, the problem of the soul; and his whole life was one great longing after true idealism in contrast to realism and naturalism, his whole thinking was a seeking after God, after holiness, after eternal life. His solutions are, at least theoretically, wrong and confused, and through them he ultimately lost his mind; but his point of view, his attitude towards life, is the great and striking thing in him.

And that question which is the content of Nietzsche's life has deeply penetrated German thought in the years since he first won recognition. Our best books are no longer merely naturalistic, but deal with the fundamental and eternal questions of life. It is an unparalleled thing that a purely theological book like Harnack's *What is Christianity?* should have

five editions in one year. And it is almost unknown in the history of German literature that within a few months a book should find sale to the extent of 150,000 copies, and produce such an immense agitation as did Frenssen's *Hilligenlei*, a book whose only subject is the longing for truth and holiness, and which explicitly contains a life of Christ. Doubtless other causes helped to the great success of that book, and it may be admitted that the treatment of the subject was not at all satisfactory, but the hundreds of criticisms of the book clearly proved how deeply its subject, and in particular the religious aspect of that subject, had stirred German hearts. So it is with other popular modern writers and poets, Björnson, Tolstoi, Maeterlinck, Rosegger, Chamberlain, Lilienkron, Dehmel, who all treat religious questions. Schiller has come more into favor, and of Goethe it is no longer only his middle, and purely humanistic, period that is admired, in which he called himself a decided heathen, but also his later work, which tends much more towards religion and Christianity.

On the other hand, we must say that thus far this seeking is seldom friendly to the church, and that it has not yet reached any positive results which can be called distinctively Christian. Its character is more aesthetic than ethical; satisfaction is sought more from the great artists than from Jesus. The worship of Goethe has truly become religious, but as there are Goethe-congregations, so we find congregations of the followers of Tolstoi, of Nietzsche, of Ibsen, of Klinger, besides "Teutonic" and many other "religions." In one year thirteen such new so-called religions were propounded, all among the educated,—partly pagan, partly mystical, partly theosophical, partly merely aesthetic. Yet some of these new movements, none of which, of course, led to new religious institutions, are decidedly imbued with a deep Christian spirit,—as, for example, the great number of educated persons gathered under the influence of Johannes Muller.

On the whole, we may say that naturalism is outgrown in the best circles of German thinking, but that no distinct new ideal has taken its place. The age is disgusted with mere realistic culture, and is characterized by religious longing, but this long-

ing has not yet found a definite satisfaction. Will it find it in the Christian religion, will the church be able to satisfy it? Two things seem to me to be certain. First, the old orthodox form of Christianity cannot satisfy this longing of the age, for the older supernaturalism is gone forever; all philosophy since Spinoza would have to be annulled, all modern culture would stultify itself, if thought should return to the old supernaturalism. Secondly, the Christian religion stands and falls with the ethical concepts of sin and salvation, that is to say, with at least a relative dualism. Neither immanent idealism, which sees divine revelation in all things, nor naturalism, which knows no other reality than the phenomenal world, is compatible with the Christian religion. Here indeed lies the fundamental antagonism between the Christian religion and modern thought. If the two are to come together, if the religious longing of the present is to find its answer in the Christian religion, modern thought will have to abandon its purely immanent view of the world, that view which either takes God and world as the same thing, or else knows only the world and no God. Modern thinking has brought about its own destruction. The idea of a transcendental world was abandoned, and only then did this present world of immediate reality come into view as a realm of reason and ideals. But that mode of thought could only continue so long as the departed idea of a transcendental world was still casting its brightness upon this mundane scene. When the illusion disappeared, our world displayed its irrationality and meanness. In that aspect naturalism has viewed it. But naturalism has become disgusted with itself. Today men are again longing for eternal values, for a deeper reality and a higher aim of life than this mere immediate world and its happiness can offer. This longing, this incipient faith in an unseen depth of reality, changes the attitude towards religion. Men had before struggled against it as against an outside authority, now they are becoming aware that in the struggle against religion their own souls are at stake. Today, therefore, culture with its immanence and religion with its transcendence must try to come to an understanding. If they do not succeed, modern culture and the Christian church will separate for all time; if they do

succeed, there is a possibility of union. Only a possibility, to be sure; much depends upon whether the church of the future will be broad enough to accept the understanding. For there can be no doubt that it will be something new; a simple resumption of the old supernaturalism would be no solution of the problem. Only a new conception of transcendence, of God, of salvation, can settle it. The future we cannot foresee; if we look at the rigid conservatism of the friends of the church and at the fanatical anti-supernaturalism of the men of culture, we must be very doubtful whether without the appearance of some great creative genius such a change is possible. In Germany today such a man is awaited by many, who find intolerable the present hopeless confusion of ideas and dissolution of the very fundamentals of life.

Meanwhile, many are working steadfastly for a solution,—chiefly students of philosophy and theology,—and of these a word must be said. After the complete breakdown of the Hegelian philosophy in the middle of the nineteenth century theology was in trouble. Philosophy was either materialistic or agnostic or pessimistic or, since the seventies, neo-kantian in a purely critical form; and there seemed to be no room for religion in any of these systems. In this distress Ritschl appeared like a saviour. Taking up Schleiermacher's ideas, he defended the truth of the Christian religion by completely separating religion from culture, and theology from metaphysics, and by basing religion and theology exclusively on practical religious experience and on "value-judgments." He practically swept the whole field of liberal theology in Germany; his ideas were greeted with great enthusiasm by theologians; and today his disciples are still among the foremost of German theological scholars. In the last ten years, however, Ritschlianism has passed more and more into the background. Many have seen that the old problem of the antagonism of religion and modern thought cannot be solved by merely treating them as two independent things, and dividing man into two parts, but that an understanding and reconciliation between the two is absolutely necessary, and in the last fifteen years a new interest has sprung up in the philosophy of religion. This has proceeded

first from the side of the philosophers. The modern movement called "critical idealism," or "the idealism of freedom," cannot be described without a more detailed discussion than can here be given of the difficult epistemological investigations on which it builds. It is based on Kant, yet no longer chiefly on the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but on Kant as a teacher of the realm of freedom which is above the realm of nature. The world of ideals and values, in distinction from the world of causal mechanism, is presented as an independent, personal reality, indeed as the only certain reality. It is far less obscure to us in its existence than is the phenomenal world of nature, and the latter world only becomes definite reality to the degree that it is taken up into the world of ideals. In man both realms meet, the natural, including physical and psychic life, and the ideal; and so in man a struggle arises between freedom and necessity, that struggle which makes human life at once tragic and sublime.

The philosopher Rudolf Eucken has treated this idealism of freedom especially from the religious point of view, and in so doing has called forth a strong movement in theology. In the practical affirmation of the higher spiritual life which enters into our natural world of experience Eucken has seen the essence of religious faith. Religion is possible without faith in a God, as is shown by Buddhism, but religion without the dualism of life is an empty word. The religious problem for Eucken is nothing else than the problem of the transcendental life in us men, the problem of sin and of regeneration by the saving grace of God, who is himself the personal embodiment of the transcendental world. This philosophy seems to give a solution of the antagonism between supernatural religion and the immanent philosophy of modern thought. The old supernaturalism is given up, for the divine is not considered to be outside of the world but to have its reality in the ideals which pervade our world. And yet the dualism so necessary for religion is recognized; the eternal world, which we experience as Personal Spirit, lays hold on man as he is, in the chains of natural necessity, and lifts him up into the realm of freedom.

Whether this new movement in philosophy and theology will

be able to reconcile religion and culture remains to be seen. The main thing is that the problem is clearly recognized, and that the best men are trying to solve it. We are still far removed in Germany from a harmonious religious or Christian culture, and much farther from a culture united with the church. But we have no right to be discouraged. Where truth is sought with unwavering sincerity, where the best men of the church and of all departments of secular thought are working for the solution of one definite task, where so large a part of the people sincerely desire a revival of religion, there we are justified in hoping that the period upon which we are entering will bring nearer the final solution of the antagonism between religion and culture, and so will make a contribution of inestimable value to the religious thought and life of mankind.

*CAN PRAGMATISM FURNISH A PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR THEOLOGY?*¹

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In order to establish a negative answer to this question, one would simply have to show either that pragmatism itself is not tenable, or else that it can afford theology no adequate support. To establish the affirmative, however, it would be necessary to show in the first place that pragmatism is in itself tenable, and in the second place that it is compatible with and gives some real support to theology. But for the would-be theological pragmatist himself neither of these positions can be readily accepted as established without the other. On the one hand he cannot say that pragmatism supports theology unless it is itself tenable, for, if untenable, so far from being the philosophical basis of theology, it cannot be a real basis for anything. On the other hand the person who finds religion essential cannot, on pragmatic principles, accept pragmatism, if it is not at least compatible with the fundamentals of religion and theology—unless, indeed, he needs pragmatism more than he needs religion. While beginning, then, by inquiring whether pragmatism is tenable or not, it must be recognized that a final affirmative answer cannot be given until we have considered the question of the bearing of pragmatism upon the essential affirmations of religious faith.

The investigation of the question, Is pragmatism tenable? involves, of course, the preliminary inquiry, What is pragmatism? To answer this question fairly is no small task in itself.

A common attitude toward the whole pragmatist movement is expressed in the criticism, "If it is new, it is nonsense; if it is old, it is obvious."² When it is affirmed that true judgments

¹ A paper read before the Baptist Congress, at New York, Nov. 9, 1909.

² E. E. Slosson, *The Independent*, Feb. 21, 1907.

must be ultimately satisfactory, and that none but true judgments can be really satisfactory as working principles in the service of legitimate human interests; that indeed all true judgments about reality are actually or potentially useful, so that the experienced usefulness of a belief indicates with more or less probability its truth,—most thinkers agree that this is obviously true. There is an intimate relation between the truth and the practical utility of judgments, but the truth, they say, is something to be established independently of the usefulness; we test the truth first and find it useful afterwards. Such a position may be called semi-pragmatism, but it is not pragmatism proper.

Many of those who criticise pragmatism seem to regard it as the doctrine that all satisfactory judgments are true, simply by virtue of their giving satisfaction to some particular desire; that all judgments found useful in the realization of purposes are, to the extent of their usefulness, true. Now it is undoubtedly true that much of the popular so-called pragmatism is of this sort. And Professor James himself often uses such unguarded expressions that he has to complain, in spite of his popular style, that he is very generally misunderstood as teaching some such doctrine. For example, in his book entitled *Pragmatism* he says, "Truth is only the expedient in the way of our thinking" (p. 222), and again, "On pragmatic principles we cannot reject any hypothesis if consequences useful to life flow from it" (p. 273). And yet in his latest work, *The Meaning of Truth*, he characterizes as "silly" and "an obvious absurdity" the view attributed to him "that anyone who believes a proposition to be true must first have made out clearly that its consequences *are* good, and that his belief must primarily be in that fact" (pp. 272f.), or "that whatever proves subjectively expedient in the way of our thinking is 'true' in the absolute and unrestricted sense of the word" (p. 231). Now this doctrine which Professor James seems at times to teach, but which he strenuously repudiates, is very evidently, as it has been characterized, nonsense. It is what the newspaper wit had in mind when he wrote, "The Eskimos would seem to have a strong natural leaning toward pragmatism." This may fairly be called

pseudo-pragmatism, for it would be a very superficial judgment which would identify the essence of the whole pragmatic movement with this absurd doctrine.

But if the essential nature of pragmatism consists neither in the doctrine that all true judgments are useful, nor in the doctrine that all useful judgments are true; if it must be differentiated from semi-pragmatism, which is obvious, and from pseudo-pragmatism, which is nonsense, just what, then, is it? What escape is there from the horns of this dilemma? Now it is the fault of the typical absolutist critic of pragmatism that he has a passion for expressing every movement and tendency in the form of a universal principle, and it is his mistake to suppose that when he has refuted the principle he has virtually annihilated the movement. And it may very well be that the proper pragmatist easily avoids both horns of the intellectualist's dilemma.

The fairest way to answer the question, What is Pragmatism? is to settle it pragmatically. In pragmatism, then, what is the practical attitude? What does it really propose to do? To this the answer is that it proposes, in any crisis in which a judgment is demanded, to take the most promising suggestion as a working hypothesis and test its truth by the way it *works*. If the hypothesis has been thoroughly tested and has worked satisfactorily, it is properly called not only useful but true. Thus usefulness is taken as a mark of truth, although it is not claimed universally that all judgments that are subjectively useful or temporarily satisfactory are objectively true. But further, pragmatism takes as its working hypothesis that every test there is for truth can be stated as a test of working, and that the results of speculation are problematic until verified in the experiences of life.

It will be seen, then, that pragmatism proper does not make for a greater laxity of thought, but rather for a more rigorous and extensive application of the principles of scientific method. Now in all scientific judgment the predicate is regarded as a mere trial-predicate and the judgment is made purely hypothetically at first, in order that by acting as if it were true it may be shown by the manner of its working whether the best hypothesis was

used, that is, whether the best trial-predicate was employed. And pragmatism, as we have intimated, does not propose to find a substitute for science in the study of nature or history, nor to change scientific procedure, nor to discredit in any way the results of scientific investigation. On the contrary it establishes scientific procedure as its model, and undertakes to make philosophy, with which it is chiefly concerned, more scientific. If there is to be thinking about any reality beyond the reach of the phenomenal sciences, that thinking must imitate those sciences as far as possible; it must refer to experience wherever it is able to do so and find truth only through some kind of verification of working hypotheses. This surely is a tenable position.

But pragmatism is young and vigorous, and it has exhibited a good many overgrowths and excrescences that will doubtless be pruned away in time. To some extent this is already taking place. Early pragmatism tended to discredit system, consistency, and the so-called theoretical interest. Schiller of Oxford was especially pronounced in this respect. But now it is more usual to find the practical set forth, not as opposed altogether to the theoretical, but as including it as a special type of the practical. Science was described by Professor Dewey six years ago as "just the forging and arranging of instrumentalities for dealing with individual cases of experience."³ But what shall we say about the pursuit of science as something interesting apart from its further application; what about the interest in truth for its own sake? This is now interpreted as an instance of the shift of interest whereby the process of securing means to possible practical ends becomes interesting and an end in itself, the original practical purpose being lost sight of, and this new purpose being now itself an active principle, organizing other activities into its service as means.

It is to be expected also that pragmatists will give up the somewhat dogmatic assertion that any particular truth has only temporary value. There is a manifest contradiction, as has been repeatedly pointed out, in stating universally that there is no universal truth, assuming that it will be permanently satisfac-

³ The Logical Conditions of Scientific Treatment of Morality, p. 8.

tory to hold that no truth will permanently satisfy, that all things else are in a flux and only pragmatism has come to stay. To guard his position the pragmatist must say that it is simply his working hypothesis that all truths will prove ephemeral; but as a matter of fact he tacitly assumes that some truth at least will be permanently valid, and he might more consistently adopt as his working hypothesis that some human judgments will be abidingly true.

Again, there is a decided tendency among pragmatists to go beyond the hypothesis that the only way to test truth is by an experience of its working, and to assert that truth is a species of utility. Of course this does not necessarily involve the crass utilitarianism that has been charged against pragmatism, but which really belongs to what we have styled pseudo-pragmatism. And yet, for the following reasons, it is questionable whether pragmatists may not prematurely identify their position with this doctrine. In the first place the doctrine that truth can be accurately and adequately defined in terms of utility can be established, if at all, only after a thorough analysis of the psychology of meaning and of the judging process, and after an adequate examination of the representational theory of truth. Again, the statement lends itself very readily to misinterpretation on the part of critics, thus hindering the acceptance of what truth there is in pragmatism. In addition to this, when taken as a principle it tends to lead one into making statements which come dangerously near to pseudo-pragmatism. And, lastly, since one can set forth, as above, the essence of pragmatism without making use of this disputed principle, on the pragmatic ground that no difference should be recognized unless it *makes* a difference, the pragmatist should perhaps content himself with the irreducible minimum definition of pragmatism as the hypothesis that there is no test of truth which is not essentially a test of usefulness in some concrete situation. The necessary—that is, what man really needs to believe in order to live as he ought—is true. And this fundamental hypothesis of pragmatism is still a working one; it has not been shown to be scientifically untenable.

But even if one should accept the essential postulate of prag-

matism, it does not follow that he must accept all that can truly call itself pragmatism. For even in essential pragmatism wide is the gate and broad is the way that leads to theological destruction, and many are they that enter in thereby.

At the very gateway of pragmatism there is an obvious downward path whose finger-post points in the direction of animalism. It is undoubtedly true that originally consciousness and in man the judging process were valuable chiefly as means of better adjusting the animal organism to its environment, so that the physical life might be preserved and propagated. In that primitive situation the biological function of judgments, that is, the way in which they functioned in the service of the physical life of the individual and of the race, was, roughly speaking, an index to their truth. But when it is assumed that not only then but now and always the only test of truth is its function in man's struggle for physical existence, we have an animalistic pragmatism which cannot be adequate to the demands of man unless he is satisfied to live simply as an animal. In criticism of this type of pragmatism attention may be called to the notorious fact that in conscious life new interests are constantly developing, many of which are not centred in the fate of the physical organism at all. Moreover, these new interests peculiar to man as a spiritual personality may lead to a transvaluation of all former values, so that instead of life's being interpreted in its lowest terms, as the physical existence of the individual and of the race, it is interpreted in its highest terms, as the spiritual development and efficiency of the individual and society. Then, instead of consciousness and judgments being regarded as mere means for the promotion of the physical life, the physical life is regarded as simply or chiefly instrumental in the promotion of the conscious life in its spiritual aspects. The ideal interests no longer exist for the sake of the physical, but the physical life for the sake of the ideal. Or, as Professor Montague puts it, "Man began to think in order that he might eat: he has evolved to the point where he eats in order that he may think."⁴ Instead of the animalistic type, then, we are led to a humanistic pragmatism, in which the truth of judgments is

⁴ *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. vi, p. 489.

tested by their utility in the service of that life of the individual and of society in which all the peculiarly and legitimately human interests are recognized as being of primary importance. Once the ends in view are thoroughly accredited, it may be assumed that those judgments that are ultimately necessary for the achievement of these ends are valid. Thus, in the sense of what is humanly necessary, necessity remains the test of the truth of judgments.

But sometimes humanistic pragmatism presents itself in an extremely individualistic form. That Dr. Schiller does not entirely escape this is shown by his assertion that two men "with different fortunes, histories, and temperaments, ought not to arrive at the same metaphysic, nor can they do so honestly."⁵ But over against individualistic pragmatism which would make usefulness or necessity for the individual the sole criterion of truth, pragmatism is coming to state more clearly that it is the function of ideas in the social situation that is the test of their truth. For example, Professor A. W. Moore says, "When the pragmatist talks of attention and thought as arising at the point of a need for readjustment, this need must not be taken to mean the need of some one lone, marooned organism or mind only. The readjustment is always in and of a 'social situation.'"⁶ The humanistic pragmatism, then, to be defensible, must be of the social rather than of the individualistic type. It is not in merely individual but in social utility and necessity that truth is assuredly to be found.

But, once more, even this type of humanistic pragmatism may vary according to the interests which are recognized as genuinely and legitimately human. For example, there may develop on the one hand a positivistic pragmatism in which the distinctly religious interest is repudiated, and on the other hand a religious pragmatism in which, along with the social, scientific, aesthetic, and moral interests, the distinctly religious interest is recognized as essentially human and valid, so that judgments which are really indispensable to the promotion of the highest

⁵ *Studies in Humanism*, p. 18.

⁶ *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. vi, pp. 332-3.

type of religious life are regarded as validly claiming our acceptance as true.

Just here is the crux of the question as to the relation of pragmatism to theology. There are some with whom pragmatism is a methodological principle for accrediting the postulates of religious faith with regard to realities that transcend phenomenal experience. There are others who employ their pragmatism to discredit speculation and assertions about transcendent reality generally; they do not recognize as legitimate and significant for philosophy the religious interest which requires to express itself theologically. But theistic religion must accept, and, I take it, is ready to accept, the challenge of pragmatism. Any pragmatic philosophy which is to satisfy the whole man at his highest and best, and the race at its highest and best, cannot afford to ignore a religion which meets fundamental spiritual need with abiding satisfaction, and which necessarily expresses itself in a theology for which it just as necessarily claims objective validity.

Now pragmatism in alliance with religion is not a new thing under the sun. Exactly that which gave to the Ritschlian theology its vitality and appeal was its religious pragmatism. But the Ritschlian pragmatism was partial; it was applied to religious judgments only, leaving scientific and philosophical judgments apparently on an entirely different footing. In keeping with this absolute distinction between theoretical and value-judgments, it refused to mediate philosophically between its dogmatics on the one hand and the sciences and philosophy of nature on the other. Its pragmatism was thus dualistic in its tendency. It encouraged the impression that certain judgments were valuable and valid in theology, but not in philosophy. The outcome in many cases was that instead of being a thoroughgoing religious pragmatism to the exclusion of positivism, Ritschlianism became a partial and dualistic pragmatism, religious in theology and positivistic in philosophy. This ignoring of the logical principle of contradiction is a characteristic of pseudo-pragmatism. Ritschlianism began well in its pragmatic doctrine of religious value-judgments; it should have gone further and recognized the pragmatic character of all real

live judgments as opposed to fossilized propositions, and then, instead of keeping the religious value-judgments in unhealthy solitary confinement, it should have brought them out into the philosophical arena to try conclusions with other judgments about reality. In other words, Ritschlianism made its chief mistake in not seeking to mediate between the scientific and religious views of the world, taking the essential ideas of religion as working hypotheses in philosophy.

But it is not to philosophy alone, but to life generally, that we must look for the solution of our ultimate problems. The lack of finality in speculation is due to the limitations of philosophy when abstracted from life. With regard to the most fundamental convictions, what is lacking in philosophical demonstration is to be made up by the demonstration of life. Reflection can never furnish a philosophy of reality which can afford to dispense with its bearing upon the moral well-being of society as a test. And, indeed, a philosophy that settled all problems apart from life would be no servant of life, but a substitute therefor, such as mediaeval scholasticism often tended to be.

Still it must be equally emphasized that it is not to life without systematic reflection, such as philosophy is, that we must look. That would not be fulness of life which ruled out philosophy. Life is to be guided by reflectively developed hypotheses which subsequent life-experience either confirms or rejects. Or, to state it differently, the verification of consistency is to be regarded as an essential part of the verification of life, for, after all, the interest in consistency or rationality is the interest in harmonizing the various practical interests recognized as valid.⁷

Thus it will be seen that the kind of use one makes of pragmatism in philosophy depends upon the kind of interests and purposes one has, and so, ultimately, upon the kind of man one is. He who uses pragmatism—or pseudo-pragmatism, to speak accurately—in order to justify the rejection of scientifically obtained results in any department of human investigation, is dishonest at heart. And on the other hand, as Dr. Schiller

⁷ Cf. A. K. Rogers, *The Religious Conception of the World*, p. 71, a suggestive book in connection with our present topic.

significantly says, "A perfect and complete metaphysics is an ideal defined only by approximation, and attainable only by the perfecting of life. For it would be the theory of such a perfect life."⁸ And, we may add, philosophy must make room for a saving gospel for the individual and society, if it is to be pragmatically verified.

So much, then, may be expected to result from pragmatism in epistemology; religious knowledge must be integrated with other knowledge in the final philosophy. If we turn now to a very brief consideration of the bearing of pragmatism upon ontology, we find that the standing of ontology is in dispute among pragmatists; there are some who profess to dispense with it altogether as either unimportant or impossible or fictitious. Nevertheless it must be evident that wherever there is room for epistemology there is room for ontology; if there is knowledge, there must be reality known.

Professor Dewey has indicated what he conceives to be the pragmatist theory of reality in two articles entitled respectively "The Postulates of Immediate Empiricism"⁹ and "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?"¹⁰ In the former he says that if we want to know what anything is we must go to immediate experience and ask what the thing in question is experienced as. In the latter essay he says that pragmatism means the doctrine that reality possesses practical character; that knowing reality changes it; that, in fact, knowledge *is* reality changing itself in a definite way. Now it would be very easy to interpret this in terms of a solipsistic pragmatism, according to which reality would be just what the individual takes it to be, and individual psychology would be the only possible ontology.

But the charge of solipsism pragmatists meet with a vigorous disclaimer,¹¹ and we are given to understand that it is to social psychology that we are to make our ultimate appeal in order

⁸ *Studies in Humanism*, p. 21.

⁹ *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. ii, no. 19.

¹⁰ *Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James*, pp. 53-80.

¹¹ See, for example, the article by A. W. Moore in *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. vi, no. 14.

to know what reality is. The ideas we use are social products; the realities we recognize are social achievements, and they are what they are to the social consciousness.

But are we to understand, then, that this exhausts their whole reality? What about realities which we know to exist, but of which humanity has never had immediate experience? What about the centre of the earth, the other side of the moon, and the south pole, for instance? Is their whole reality their existence in human minds as mathematically deduced hypotheses? It is evident that the postulate of immediate empiricism, while valuable as far as it goes, is not a sufficient criterion for the definition of reality so long as it does not recognize an experience which transcends not only the individual man, but all humanity. Common sense and pragmatism are both right in affirming that we know reality, and that we know it as it is, in immediate experience. But it is equally compatible with common sense and pragmatism to say that we do not and cannot know reality completely, because we do not experience it fully. But we have to think about this reality which transcends immediate human experience, and as a matter of fact we do think of it and have to think of it as it would be to some one to whose experience it was immediately present. Why not assume, then, according to pragmatic principles, that this necessary way of thinking of it indicates the true way, and that in reality although not present to immediate human experience it is immediately present to some experiencing subject?

To sum up, then: we have criticised pragmatism as it is, and attempted to depict it as it might be and ought to be. Our main results are two. Pragmatic epistemology, to be consistent, must make room in its philosophy for the essential postulates of the religious consciousness. Pragmatic ontology, with its postulate of immediate empiricism, to be consistent, must make room for an experiential (spiritualistic) philosophy of reality including but transcending all human experience. These are two points. Taking the shortest distance between these two points we get a straight line indicating that pragmatism can furnish a philosophical basis for theology.

THE HARVARD EXPEDITION TO SAMARIA

In the *Review* for January, 1909, an account was given of the excavations carried on by Harvard University at Samaria in the summer of 1908. The work of that year extended, with serious interruptions, from April 24 to August 21, and was confined mainly to the summit of the hill and to a building beside the threshing-floor near the village of Sebastiyeh. At the summit, and only a few inches below the surface, a paved platform, or floor, was uncovered, with a broad stairway of seventeen steps leading up to it from the north. On the stairway was found an inscribed stele, and a few feet in front of the foot of the stairway a large altar with another inscribed stele standing beside it. Near this altar lay a fine statue of heroic size, carved in white marble, representing a Roman emperor. Massive foundation-walls resting on the rock were uncovered on the south of the platform. Several periods of construction were recognized in these buildings, and one of these periods was believed to be that of Herod the Great.

For 1909 it was planned to begin work in April and continue until rainfall in the autumn. Digging did not, however, begin till May 31, although the explorers reached the place on May 7. The delay was due to the disturbed state of affairs in Turkey, and particularly to the late arrival of the imperial commissioner at Samaria. Once begun, the work was pushed with great vigor until rain came about the middle of October, and was not finally closed until November 14.

This campaign has been in charge of Professor George A. Reisner, assisted by Mr. Clarence S. Fisher, architect. The problems at Samaria are very complicated, owing to the disturbance of the site in successive periods of construction, to robbery of the older structures for building material, and to the terracing of the hill for agricultural purposes. For the solution of these problems Dr. Reisner's long experience in Egypt has given him an admirable training. Dr. Reisner took with him about thirty-

five of his experienced Egyptian workmen, and by their aid he has trained the local helpers to a degree of efficiency hitherto unknown in Palestinian exploration. The total working force has averaged about 285 persons.

As in the previous year, the chief interest has centred about the summit. On the southeast, south, and southwest of the platform a considerable tract has been cleared down to the rock. The plan of a temple, ascribed to Herod the Great, has been laid bare, and also the plan of a reconstruction of this temple, ascribed to Alexander Severus. Beneath the floor-level of these temples are remains of Greek buildings. Of particular interest are the massive outlines and a portion of the wall of a still older structure, which Dr. Reisner thinks is the palace of Omri and Ahab. The identification of these ruins as a Hebrew palace is accepted by Professor Hugues Vincent of Jerusalem, a leading authority on Palestinian archaeology, who has declared this to be the most instructive discovery yet made for the correct understanding of Israelite architecture. In a subterranean chamber beneath the palace, were found several fragments of pottery with Hebrew inscriptions, but, unfortunately, no royal name has been recognized on them.

Extensive digging has also been carried on to the south of the palace, partly on a lower terrace. A fragment of a cuneiform inscription with a Hebrew seal-stamp was found near the foot of a wall which seems to be in the Babylonian style. A massive Roman wall has been found which probably enclosed the temple-precincts, while a fragment of a fine Hebrew wall more than sixteen feet in thickness probably formed part of the palace enclosure. On the lower level was a vast complex of structures, Hebrew, Greek, and Roman.

At the gateway on the west side of the hill one of the two towers flanking the gate was dug out. It is a round tower of Roman masonry, resting on a larger square foundation of Greek origin, beneath which is a still larger cleared space of rock which gives the outline of the ancient Hebrew tower. The Roman city-wall running north from this tower was laid bare, also remnants of other walls recognized as Babylonian and Hebrew. Between the two towers Herod's gateway was identified, and the paved

Roman road leading up to it from the outside. It is hoped that next season the Hebrew road leading to the gate may be found below the Roman.

The building near the village has been further cleared, down to the level of its floor. It seems to be of Herodian origin, and to have been connected with the forum, which Dr. Reisner supposes to lie beneath the threshing-floor on the east, where many large fragments of masonry lie scattered about. In places the excavations have gone below the floor-level, revealing massive foundations belonging to earlier buildings believed to be Hebrew.

The small objects usually found in such excavations came to light in all of these diggings, such as coins, fragments of pottery, metal, bone, seals, lamps, and fragmentary inscriptions.

It is expected that a fuller report by Dr. Reisner will be published in the April number of the *Review*.

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